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Abstract
NEW PERSPECTIVES ABOUT FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: DISRUPTION BY
SENIOR MANAGERS AND FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
by
YU SHAN
Advisor: Professor Linda Allen
This dissertation consists of three chapters that span managerial styles, financial technolo-
gies, and social interactions.
Chapter 1 Banks increase credit risk-taking in syndicated bank loans when their systemic
risk increases; however, the interrelationship across risks depends on bank managerial styles.
Using a connectedness sampling method to differentiate patterns of business policy styles and
systemic risk-taking among managers, I find that credit risk-taking is more sensitive to the
bank’s systemic risk if the manager exhibits a preference for systemic risk. Asset-innovating
managers (exhibiting a preference for non-traditional forms of income and assets) take higher
credit risk in their loan portfolios, but marginally reduce their credit risk during systemic
crises. In contrast, liability-innovating managers (relying on non-traditional funding sources)
generally take less credit risk, but increase their credit risk during systemic crises. Bank-level
differences cannot explain the observed heterogeneity across banks.
Chapter 2 This chapter studies whether FinTech mortgage lenders fill the credit gap
left by non-FinTech lenders (i.e., traditional banks and non-FinTech shadow banks). Using
natural disasters as shocks to local mortgage demand, I find different reactions between
FinTech and non-FinTech lenders. First, FinTech lenders and traditional banks expand
lending after demand shocks, while non-FinTech shadow banks do not. Second, non-FinTech
lenders tighten lending standards after demand shocks, whereas no evidence shows that
iv
FinTech lenders change lending standards or risk-taking. Third, non-FinTech lenders tend
to “cherry pick” good borrowers after demand shocks, and no similar behavior is observed on
FinTech lenders. However, there is little support that FinTech loans originated after demand
shocks perform worse. These results suggest that the adoption of financial technologies allows
FinTech lenders to meet local credit demand more efficiently.
Chapter 3 I examine the effects of social connectivity on the demand for and supply of
consumer and small business loans on peer-to-peer (P2P) FinTech sites such as LendingClub.
P2P loan demand increases when geographically distant, but socially connected areas have
large amounts of past P2P borrowing activity. Both approval rates and quality (as measured
by loan grade and interest rates) are higher the greater an area’s aggregate online social
connections. Performance (i.e., reductions in defaults or delayed payments) is enhanced
by social connectivity indicating that information diffusion through online social networks
improves lending outcomes for both high and low risk borrowers.
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Chapter 1
How Do Managerial Styles Differentiate Banks’ Reac-
tion to Systemic Crises?
1.1. Introduction
Bank regulators and the general public have a love and hate relationship with bankers.
Despite widespread resentment and accusations of greed and insensitivity, top bank execu-
tives are entrusted with risks that may either build up or bring down the entire financial
system. Bank managers have a great deal of discretion in managing the specifics of their
bank’s portfolio of risks, and literature has been attempting to explain the effects of managers
on bank risk-taking with reference to incentive pay (Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011), DeYoung,
Peng & Yan (2013), Cheng, Hong & Scheinkman (2015)), socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics (Berger, Kick & Schaeck (2014), Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi (2017)), risk
management functions (Ellul & Yerramilli (2013)), board compositions (Beltratti & Stulz
(2012), Berger et al. (2014), Minton, Taillard & Williamson (2014)), and ownership structure
(Erkens, Hung & Matos (2012)). However, relatively little is known about how idiosyncratic
manager preferences (or styles) impact banks’ risk-taking. In particular, how do bank man-
agers respond to systemic crises? How do they adjust the bank’s idiosyncratic risk? Do
managerial styles matter? I address these questions by investigating how banks adjust their
credit risk-taking in the syndicated bank loan portfolios in reaction to systemic crises, and
how managerial styles matter in this process.
Although extant research focuses on establishing a connection between implicit govern-
ment guarantees and banks’ risk-taking behavior, these studies do not explore the direct as-
sociation between risks taken by individual financial institutions and their systemic risk con-
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tribution. Current systemic bank regulations, which include countercyclical capital buffers
and total loss-absorbing capacity requirements, are considered to be add-ons and do not
fully integrate established individual bank risk-taking measure (such as risk-based capital
regulations) into newer systemic risk regulations. Bank regulations would lead to suboptimal
outcomes if an existing association between systemic risk and disaggregated risk exposure on
an individual bank basis is ignored. For example, if banks consistently reduce their individ-
ual risk exposure during a rise of systemic risk, then systemic bank regulations can be milder
due to this automatic stabilizer. Alternatively, if banks regularly aggravate their own credit
risk exposure by exploiting potential moral hazard advantages, then systemic risk regulation
would not be enough to address system-wide crises.
In this study, I first examine a direct interrelationship between credit risk and systemic
risk-taking, then investigate how bank manager-specific styles affect this interrelationship.
To this end, I develop and test an empirical measure of each bank’s credit risk sensitivity
to systemic risk that measures the relationship between the bank’s idiosyncratic risk and its
contribution to global systemic risk. Idiosyncratic risk is measured using bank credit risk
exposure on newly originated syndicated bank loans. I utilize a global measure of bank-
specific systemic risk ∆CoV aR (Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)), which encompasses all
sources of systemic risk and channels of transmission1. ∆CoV aR is constructed based on the
belief that the market is efficient and reflects public information about a financial institution
and its correlation with the entire financial system. Thus, an institution’s contribution to
systemic risk (∆CoV aR) is measured as the change in the tail risk of the entire financial
system when that institution changes from a normal to a stressed state.
Theory suggests two possible directions for the credit risk-taking reactions to systemic
1 In the context of this study, using this global systemic risk measure provides several advantages beyond
analyzing each source of systemic risk individually. First, the measure provides an estimate of an overall
Pigovian “regulatory systemic risk tax” that engenders moral hazard if it is not precisely priced or charged
by regulators, therefore inducing higher risk-taking at the cost of social welfare. Second, the measure
captures the most important features of systemic risk - spillover and tail co-movement, which are common
consequences of all causes of systemic risk. Third, the measure is based on market data and can be freely
calculated in real time.
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risk. First, an inverse relationship between systemic and credit risk would occur if, in fear
of counterparty risk, high ∆CoV aR financial institutions are wary of lending to credit-
risky borrowers. Avoiding risky loans may both mitigate systemic risk and also reduce the
likelihood of bank delinquency and contagion. Further, concerns about systemic liquidity
crises may induce high ∆CoV aR banks to hoard liquidity and build up cash positions,
thereby reducing their credit risk exposures. Finally, bank charter value arising from the
government safety net may incentivize banks to reduce credit risk as systemic risk increases
in order to prevent bank delinquency, thereby preserving franchise value in the event of a
systemic crisis.
Alternatively, a direct relationship between systemic and credit risk would occur if moral
hazard incentivizes banks to increase the perceived likelihood of a government guarantee for
systemically important (high ∆CoV aR) banks ((Diamond & Rajan 2009), (Farhi & Tirole
2012)). As high ∆CoV aR banks are likely to be the ones that are more important to the
system and, thus, more likely to be bailed out, they have the greatest incentive to increase
their idiosyncratic credit-risk exposure in a “heads I win, tails you lose” rationale. Market
and regulatory risk mispricing further intensify the incentive for high ∆CoV aR banks to
take on higher idiosyncratic credit risk if systemic risk is underpriced.
I find that banks with high systemic risk tend to increase their credit risk-taking in their
loan portfolios (i.e., positive credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk) consistent with imper-
fect market discipline and regulatory risk mispricing that allows banks to exploit abnormal
returns from syndicated bank lending. I also find that the extent of this positive credit risk
sensitivity is related to the bank’s idiosyncratic managerial styles. That is, some bank man-
agers respond to increases in their systemic risk with a ramping up of credit risk, whereas
other bank managers respond by marginally mitigating their credit risk exposure.
Following Hagendorff, Saunders, Steffen & Vallascas (2017), I identify manager-specific
asset innovation, liability innovation, and systemic risk styles from a series of bank business
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and risk models, and extract the main dimensions of variation in managerial styles using
factor analyses. Asset-innovating managers show a preference for non-traditional forms of
income and assets, such as non-interest income and mortgage-backed securities, whereas
liability-innovating managers exhibit a preference for non-traditional funding sources, such
as non-deposit liabilities. Systemic risk-seeking managers exhibit a higher preference for
systemic risk-taking.
I find that banks with asset-innovating managers take higher credit risk. This is consis-
tent with the argument that non-traditional assets and income are associated with higher
bank risk (Brunnermeier, Dong & Palia (2012), Nguyen (2012), Williams (2016)). Managers
pursuing asset-innovating strategies can tolerate higher idiosyncratic risk levels because they
are better able to hedge and source risk using non-traditional bank assets; e.g., by selling off
the credit risk of syndicated loans through securitizations and loan sales on the secondary
market. Further, I find that banks with asset-innovating managers increase their idiosyn-
cratic credit risk less than other banks when their systemic risks are high. That is because
during volatile periods (high ∆CoV aR), market prices of non-traditional assets experience
higher volatility than traditional assets, thereby forcing asset-innovating managers to limit
increases in their idiosyncratic risk-taking so as to avoid bank insolvency and illiquidity.
They may choose to limit lending to riskier borrowers in fear of counterparty credit risk or
for the concern of liquidity spiral. Thus, my findings suggest a procyclical, volatile pattern
of lending by asset-innovating managers similar to the findings of DeYoung & Rice (2004),
Stiroh (2006), and Stiroh & Rumble (2006) who show a relationship between non-interest
income and increased volatility.
Moreover, I find that banks with liability-innovating managers take on lower levels of
idiosyncratic credit risk compared with others for a given level of systemic risk. Liability-
innovating managers rely on market-priced non-deposit funds, such as interbank deposits,
Fed funds, and large denomination CDs. During normal periods, non-deposit funds are more
flexible and readily available compared with retail deposits, allowing banks to fully exploit
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investment opportunities and reduce liquidity risks (Goodfriend & King (1997)). Because
the incentives of the bank to invest in risky projects increase with the costs of their funding
(Allen & Gale (2000), Allen & Gale (2004), Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz (2000)), liability-
innovating managers, who are better able to access the debt market and get cheaper funds
during normal periods, tend to take lower credit risk. However, when systemic risk is high,
the supply of uninsured non-deposit funding to liability innovators becomes more volatile and
prices of non-deposit funding rise, which sharply increases a bank’s funding costs, inducing
them to undertake more credit risk in their portfolio.
My focus on credit risk-taking in the commercial lending market is motivated by several
reasons. First, the U.S. commercial loan market is extremely sizable and fast-growing, with
an annual issuance of $2.41 trillion as of December 19, 2017, jumping 24% above $1.94
trillion during the same period in 20162. Second, although commercial loans only account
for a relatively small fraction of bank balance sheets, its size is comparable with bank equity
capital and, thus, its risk is still large enough to impact banks’ capital adequacy, illiquidity,
and insolvency3. Third, banks adjust their commercial lending behavior as a response to
severe market conditions and systemic events. With the fear of counterparty risks and
liquidity dry-ups, banks sharply cut back their lending during financial crises (Ivashina &
Scharfstein (2010)) and hoard liquidity as a precaution for future liquidity spirals. Fourth,
commercial lending is closely related to managers’ risk appetite and preferences. Despite
the development of financial technology, most commercial lending decisions remain highly
subjective and can be heavily influenced by credit officers’ discretion and the risk culture of
the banks, both of which are affected by the styles or preferences of the top managers. Thus,
the commercial lending market is a useful laboratory to examine how managerial styles affect
banks’ risk-taking practices. Fifth, the focus on micro, loan-level decisions in this chapter
complements other literature that focuses on managers’ influence on bank risk-taking at the
2 “U.S. syndicated lending topples records in 2017,” Reuters, December 19, 2017.
3 For U.S. bank holding companies, during the periods between 1992Q1 and 2017Q4, the average ratio
of commercial and industrial loans to U.S. and non-U.S. addresses (bhck1763+bhck1764) as a percentage of
total assets (bhck2170) was 10.63% while the average capital ratio (bhck3210/bhck2170) was 9.25%.
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balance sheet level.
I estimate regression models that relate banks’ credit risk-taking on newly originated syn-
dicated loans to banks’ systemic risk contribution and a range of loan, bank, borrower, and
macroeconomic controls. I measure the credit risk using borrower distance-to-default during
loan origination while controlling for a range of loan characteristics, borrower industry, bank,
and time effects. The results are robust to several endogeneity corrections. In particular, I
employ a range of within-loan analyses to control for the demand effects of the lending pro-
cess (Chu, Zhang & Zhao (2017)). I find that systemically risky banks contribute a larger
(smaller) portion to risky (safe) loans, consistent with positive credit risk sensitivity to sys-
temic risk. Further, I conduct a two-stage least-square analysis and employ the geographic
distance between the borrower and the lender and the number of banks in the state of the
borrower as instruments for observed lending relationships. I also test for reverse causality
using both lead-lag regressions and a dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM)
method (Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012)), which allows current explanatory variables to be
influenced by previous realizations of the dependent variable.
In this chapter, I follow Hagendorff et al. (2017) and define managerial styles as man-
agers’ preferences on balance sheet (asset and liability) innovations. Specifically, I identify
managerial fixed effects using three-way fixed effects (time, bank, and manager) regressions
that relate eight bank business policy variables to a range of bank, manager, and economic
controls. To separately estimate manager and firm fixed effects, I use the connectedness
sample method of Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999) (The AKM Method). Based on the
approach of Bertrand & Schoar (2003) who utilize a set of managers who switch across
firms, the AKM method uses a small number of affiliation movers to deduce information
about non-movers who work in firms that employed at least one mover, thereby allowing me
to estimate manager fixed effects for both movers and non-movers. In this way, firms and
their non-moving executives are connected by the movers. Thus, the AKM method enables
me to estimate a substantial number of manager fixed effects from a small sample of moving
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managers.
The eight policy variables I use in the three-way fixed effects models reflect a bank’s
engagement in traditional and non-traditional (innovative) businesses on both sides of its
balance sheets. Because each manager exhibits styles in each of the policy variables, I use
a factor analysis to identify the main dimensions of variations in styles. Consistent with
Hagendorff et al. (2017), two factors are dominant in explaining the patterns of managerial
styles. These factors capture managerial preferences for policies that deviate from traditional
deposit-taking and loan-granting businesses. The first factor captures a preference for non-
traditional assets and income, such as non-interest income, MBS, and derivatives. The second
factor exhibits a preference for non-traditional liabilities, such as non-deposit funding.
Banks may react to systemic risks very differently, depending on their business policies.
To detect this heterogeneity, I run the baseline regressions for each individual bank and
find there is much heterogeneity across different banks in their adjustment of credit risk in
response to systemic risk, implying that there is a bank-specific idiosyncratic component. I
then analyze if managerial styles can help explain banks’ credit risk-taking and heterogeneous
responses to systemic risk. Because compensation incentives affect managers’ risk-taking
attitudes, I control for observable compensation variables (e.g., Delta, Vega, and Bonus) and
interact systemic risk with the manager’s asset (or liability) innovation index. In additional
tests, I also add interactions of systemic risk and the bank asset (liability) innovation index.
Although identifying managerial style diversity within banks makes it less likely that
managerial styles simply capture some heterogeneity in bank style (e.g., bank business cul-
ture) rather than manager-specific latent characteristics, I still test if the results above are
driven by bank styles instead of managerial styles. I include both bank and manager inno-
vation styles and interact each of them with systemic risk. I find that bank styles do not
significantly correlate with credit risk-taking or sensitivity to systemic risk.
Because each manager exhibits a pattern in both asset and liability innovations simulta-
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neously, I examine the correlation across the two dimensions of innovation to obtain the net
effect for each manager. Specifically, I assign each executive into one of four profiles based
on whether their innovation indexes are above or below the median level of the sample: (1)
asset innovator (Innovating in assets but traditional on liability); (2) dual innovator; (3)
traditionalist (traditional on both asset and liability); and (4) liability innovator (innovating
in liability but traditional on assets). I find that asset innovators restrain and reduce the
bank’s credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk when systemic risk is high, whereas liability
innovators increase the bank’s credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk when systemic risk is
high. Moreover, traditionalists behave more like liability innovators while Dual innovators
do not exhibit any similar specific pattern with asset or liability innovators.
Collectively, I find that differences among different managerial styles, not bank styles,
explain banks’ credit risk-taking and the heterogeneous response of credit risk to systemic
risk exposure. These findings are consistent with Hagendorff et al. (2017), who argue that
extreme risk-taking and other unsustainable business models in banking could ultimately be
a “people problem” rooted in the idiosyncratic preferences of individuals and, therefore, are
not easily restrained by regulators and investors.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Subsection 1.2 introduces the literature
and hypothesis development. Subsection 1.3 discusses the data and variables. Subsection
1.4 reports the identification of managerial styles. Subsection 1.5 presents empirical results
on bank credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk. Subsection 1.6 focuses on how idiosyncratic
manager-specific styles explain the variation in credit risk sensitivity across bank systemic
risk exposures. Subsection 1.7 presents the conclusion.
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1.2. Literature, Contribution, and Hypothesis Devel-
opment
This chapter is most closely related to three strands of literature. The first is the be-
havior of banking institutions during systemic crises, the second is bank lending on the
syndicated loan market, and the third is the effects of managers on shaping a bank’s risk-
taking strategies. I first develop my empirical credit risk sensitivity measure based on a
large body of literature on banks’ responses to systemic crises. In particular, there are two
alternative viewpoints in the literature regarding bank responses to systemic crises. First,
the moral hazard incentive induces banks to increase their idiosyncratic risk taking in or-
der to maximize the value of government safety nets for systemically important banking
institutions. Perceived implicit public guarantees and market and regulatory risk mispricing
reduce market discipline (Acharya, Anginer & Warburton (2016), Flannery (1998), Sironi
(2003), Gropp, Vesala & Vulpes (2006), Hett & Schmidt (2017)), enhance the private ben-
efit of higher risk-taking, and amplify the risk-taking incentive of systemically risky banks
(Kane (1989), Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002), Diamond & Rajan (2009), Farhi &
Tirole (2012), Dam & Koetter (2012), Gropp, Hakenes & Schnabel (2010), Demirgüç-Kunt
& Detragiache (2002)). In contrast, however, a competing literature argues that the gov-
ernment safety net for systemically important banks increases their probability of survival,
thereby raising their charter values. Thus, systemically important banks have a countervail-
ing incentive to reduce idiosyncratic risk-taking so as to preserve franchise value by avoiding
insolvency (Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Demsetz & Strahan (1997), Cordella & Yeyati
(2003)). In this chapter, I test these alternative hypotheses by examining the relationship
between systemic risk and a specific source of idiosyncratic risk: credit risk on the bank’s
syndicated loan portfolio. Thus, based on the two sets of arguments above, I posit the
following two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.A. Ceteris paribus, a bank’s idiosyncratic credit risk-taking on syndicated
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bank loans increases with its systemic risk contribution.
Hypothesis 1.B. Ceteris paribus, a bank’s idiosyncratic credit risk-taking on syndicated
bank loans decreases with its systemic risk contribution.
I denote the relationship between systemic risk and idiosyncratic credit risk as the bank’s
credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk. However, this relationship may discretely change
during macroeconomic upheavals such as recessions and systemic crises. In particular, the
literature suggests that the financial system’s risk-taking capacity may be very different
during non-stress and stress periods. That is, during periods of abundant liquidity, a flexible
credit environment, and ample capital positions, banks may have the capacity to engage in
risky investments (Behn, Haselmann & Wachtel (2016)). However, during systemic crises,
when asset prices decline and liquidity dries up (Diamond & Rajan (2005)), banks tend
to cut back on their investments, including lending to customers (Ivashina & Scharfstein
(2010)), and are forced to sell assets at deep-discount fire sales (Kashyap, Berner & Goodhart
(2011), Korinek (2011)). Concerns about a systemic liquidity crisis causes healthy banks to
hoard liquidity and build up cash positions (Diamond & Rajan (2011), Heider, Hoerova &
Holthausen (2015)). Meanwhile, in fear of counterparty risk, banks become wary of lending
to risky borrowers (Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999)), which induces a flight to quality
and an overall credit crunch (Radde (2015), Gertler & Karadi (2011), Meh & Moran (2010)).
This creates a cycle of contagion that impairs the entire financial system. Due to their size,
interconnectedness, and complexity, systemically risky banks are even more vulnerable than
other banks and non-banking firms to the negative effects of financial contagion. Systemically
risky banks inherently hold correlated assets, thereby amplifying and reinforcing macro-level
systemic risk during disruptive periods. Thus, systemic crises can be transmitted to them
not only through their wide direct contractual connections with other banks and customers,
but also through the price and liquidity impact of fire sales of the correlated assets. Thus,
systemically risky banks have incentives to pull back from the brink of insolvency and reduce
risk-taking, such as credit risk, on their newly issued syndicated bank loans. Thus, whatever
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the sign of the bank’s credit risk-taking response to systemic risk (i.e., positive for Hypothesis
1.A and negative for Hypothesis 1.B), the literature suggests a less positive (or more negative)
relationship during recessions and systemic crisis periods.
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the direct relationship between credit risk and systemic risk
decreases during stress periods (recession or systemic crises).
Traditional economic theory suggests that firms should simply pursue positive net present
value projects to maximize shareholder value, which does not explain why different firms be-
have differently when facing the same investment opportunities. However, there is a literature
that documents heterogeneous behaviors across banks, which implies some bank-specific id-
iosyncratic component that may be driven by a bank-specific risk culture (Dudley (2014),
Board (2014), of Thirty (2015)) or managerial risk preferences (Graham, Harvey & Puri
(2013)). Bertrand & Schoar (2003) find that a significant portion of the heterogeneity in in-
vestment, financial, and organizational practices of firms can be explained by manager fixed
effects, spawning a burgeoning literature on managers’ impacts on firm decisions and per-
formance (see Graham, Harvey & Puri (2015) for delegation of decision-making, Mullins &
Schoar (2016) for management styles and philosophies, Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González
& Wolfenzon (2007) for family firms, Faccio, Marchica & Mura (2016) for manager demo-
graphic characteristics, Kaplan, Klebanov & Sorensen (2012) for manager and private equity
success, and Malmendier & Tate (2005), Malmendier & Tate (2008), Galasso & Simcoe (2011)
for CEO overconfidence). A large body of banking literature also tries to link managers to
bank risk-taking and performance through channels such as compensation (Fahlenbrach &
Stulz (2011), DeYoung et al. (2013), Cheng et al. (2015)), risk management (Ellul & Yer-
ramilli (2013)), and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Berger et al. (2014),
Nguyen et al. (2017)).
Market power in the syndicated bank loan market affords bank managers the oppor-
tunity to indulge their personal preferences. Studies have found evidence of heterogeneous
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risk-taking behavior in the syndicated loan market (see Giannetti & Yafeh (2012) for cultural
differences Esty & Megginson (2003), Qian & Strahan (2007), Bae & Goyal (2009) for law
and regulations, Lin, Ma, Malatesta & Xuan (2012) for characteristics of borrowing firms;
Boot (2000) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders & Srinivasan (2009) for lending relationships;
Albring, Khurana, Nejadmalayeri & Pereira (2011) for executive compensations; Holmstrom
& Tirole (1997), Sufi (2007), and Ivashina (2009) for syndication structure). However, the na-
ture of banks’ heterogeneous behavior in the loan market is the source of some disagreement
in the literature. For example, some studies argue that the prevalence of option-based com-
pensation induces bank managers to choose non-traditional banking businesses and higher
risk (DeYoung et al. (2013)), whereas others suggest that riskier banking firms compensate
managers for higher wealth uncertainty (Cheng et al. (2015)); therefore, higher risk-taking
does not come at the expense of shareholder wealth (Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011)). More
importantly, Ellul & Yerramilli (2013) suggest that it is weak risk management instead of
risk-taking incentives that leads to higher risk-taking of banks.
In this chapter, I address this controversy by examining the impact of specific managerial
styles on banks’ credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk. Theory suggests that managerial risk
aversion drives specific behaviors (Smith & Stulz (1985) and Ross (2004)). In particular, the
manager can adjust risk-taking in the bank’s portfolio to indulge personal risk preferences.
Given the opacity at the individual risk level of large, complex banking institutions, man-
agerial style may explain the heretofore unexplained heterogeneity across bank risk-taking.
To address this in the context of the relationship between idiosyncratic and systemic risk, I
utilize the empirical formulation of Hagendorff et al. (2017), which shows that compensation
and other manager characteristics only account for a small portion of the heterogeneity in
bank business models. Indeed, Graham et al. (2013) show that managerial behavioral traits
(i.e., optimism, time preference, and risk-aversion) are related to corporate financial policies.
I therefore focus on latent managerial preferences or attitudes rather than observable factors
to formulate my third hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. Idiosyncratic managerial styles can explain the heterogeneous differences
across banks’ credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk.
I extend the work of Hagendorff et al. (2017) in order to examine how managerial styles
correlate with heterogeneity in banks’ credit risk sensitivities to systemic risk. Extending the
three-way fixed effects models of Hagendorff et al. (2017), I identify each manager’s asset-
innovating preferences, liability-innovating preferences, and systemic risk-taking preferences
based on estimated manager fixed effects on a range of bank business policy and risk-taking
variables. For example, managers with a preference for asset innovation (i.e., mortgage-
backed securities or derivatives) may be better able to utilize non-traditional bank assets (i.e.,
credit derivatives) or activities (i.e., loan sale or securitization) to hedge credit risk, reduce
economic or regulatory capital, and actively manage the credit risk of their loan portfolio
(see Norden, Buston & Wagner (2014) for a discussion of these channels). These financial
innovations facilitate the extension of credit and allow banks to increase their risk exposure
(see Güner (2006) and Cebenoyan & Strahan (2004) for loan sales, Franke & Krahnen (2007)
for CDS and risk sharing, Nadauld & Weisbach (2012) for loan securitization, Hirtle (2009)
for the effects of credit derivatives on credit supply, and Ashcraft & Santos (2009) for CDS
and cost of corporate debts). In contrast, managers with a preference for liability innovation
exhibit a preference for non-deposit funding sources (e.g., Fed funds, public funds, and
brokered deposits) to supplement retail deposits and finance their investment. During non-
stress periods, the use of non-traditional, wholesale sources lowers the cost of bank liabilities.
Allen & Gale (2000) and Hellmann et al. (2000) show that the incentives for banks to invest
in risky projects increase with the cost of its funding and, conversely, banks with low cost
liabilities pursue more conservative risk strategies. However, when systemic risk increases,
reduced liquidity increases the cost of wholesale funding and leads to potential “hot money”
flows that do not impact traditional insured deposits. Thus, uninsured non-deposit funding
is highly sensitive to systemic shocks. These debt holders can exit and withdraw their funds
faster than retail depositors. Thus, higher funding costs may induce liability-innovating
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managers to undertake more credit risk in their portfolio when the bank’s systemic risk
rises. Combining the two managerial styles above, I raise my fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, asset-innovating managers take higher credit risk on syn-
dicated bank loans while liability-innovating managers take lower credit risk.
The chapter then relates managerial styles to banks’ credit risk sensitivity to systemic
risk. As a bank’s systemic risk rises, the prices of its assets are more vulnerable to exter-
nal shocks and the market prices of non-traditional assets experience higher volatility than
traditional assets, thereby forcing asset-innovating managers to limit the increase in their
idiosyncratic risk-taking so as to avoid bank insolvency and illiquidity. This suggest a pro-
cyclical, volatile pattern of lending by asset-innovating managers, similar to the findings of
DeYoung & Rice (2004), Stiroh (2006), and Stiroh & Rumble (2006) that show a relationship
between non-interest income and increased volatility. This leads to my next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. As a bank’s systemic risk increases, asset-innovating managers take lower
credit risk than other managers, thereby reducing the bank’s credit risk sensitivity to systemic
risk.
On the contrary, the prices of uninsured non-deposit funding are highly sensitive to
systemic shocks. These debt holders can exit and withdraw their funds faster than retail
depositors. Thus, when a bank’s systemic risk increases, the supply of uninsured non-deposit
funding to liability innovators becomes more volatile and expensive. The higher funding cost
may force liability-innovating managers to undertake more credit risk in their portfolio, which
introduces my next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. As a bank’s systemic risk increases, liability-innovating managers take higher
credit risk than other managers, thereby increasing the bank’s credit risk sensitivity to sys-
temic risk.
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Alternatively, I test the impact of bank-level business or risk culture rather than man-
agerial style. The bank’s business or risk culture may reflect the prevailing attitudes and
behaviors toward risk within a bank and may dominate the impact of particular managers
(see Dudley (2014), Board (2014), and of Thirty (2015)). I therefore test whether bank
heterogeneity is driven by bank, not manager style by comparing the explanatory power of
managerial style to bank-specific styles.
Hypothesis 7. The explanatory power of managerial styles on the bank’s credit risk sensi-
tivity to systemic risk is independent of and more significant than bank-level heterogeneity.
Note that my hypotheses do not deny the possibility that managers also affect banks’
credit risk-taking through observable bank variables and also do not reject the possibility
that bank-level styles can be correlated with managerial styles. The generated styles mainly
capture some latent and stable bank and managerial preferences that are time-invariant,
which is consistent with what I observe on many banks and managers.
1.3. Data and Variables
1.3.1. Sample Construction
The sample spans the period between January 1995 and December 2016. Because the
systemic risk measure uses bank market data and most banks are publicly traded at the bank
holding company level, I focus on bank holding companies (”bank”). Bank quarterly financial
data are collected using WRDS data collected from the Consolidated Financial Statements
for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C). Bank market data are obtained from CRSP and merged
with bank financial data using the PERMCO-RSSD links provided by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
Bank manager data are obtained from Execucomp, which provides manager employment
and compensation data for companies in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap
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600. Because I want to focus on managers who have the power to affect a bank’s risk-taking,
I only focus on CEOs, CFOs, and COOs. Execucomp data are linked with PERMCO using
the GVKEY-PERMCO links provided by CRSP and are further linked with bank financial
data.
Borrowing firms’ financial data are collected from Compustat. Due to differences in
capital structures and financing strategies between financial and non-financial firms, loans
to financial companies (SIC between 6000 and 6999) are excluded from the sample. The
utility firms (SIC code falls between 4900 and 4999) are also excluded because they may
have different operating and reporting environments. Borrower financial data are linked to
Dealscan using the Dealscan-Compustat linking data provided by Chava and Roberts (2008,
updated in August 2012) and Schwert (2018).
Syndicated loan data are obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan
loan database. The Dealscan database contains historical information on the terms and
conditions of deals in the global syndicated bank loan market. I manually match Dealscan
lenders with their top bank holding companies. Because this analysis focuses on lenders at
the bank holding company level, I identify the ultimate parent company of each bank lender.
However, the data in this field in Dealscan suffers from time inconsistency problems as the
ultimate parent company is updated and backfilled into the database.
Thus, I utilize the information provided by the Federal Reserve System via its National
Information Center (NIC) database to identify financial institutions in my sample. The
NIC database provides detailed information about financial institutions, including types of
institutions, establishment time, ownership information, address changes, name changes, and
merger and acquisition history. The NIC database also provides each financial institution’s
RSSD ID, a unique identifier assigned to each financial institution by the Federal Reserve
System. Based on the lender information in Dealscan, I manually search each lender’s RSSD
ID in the NIC database. Using their RSSD ID (Item RSSD9001 in Call Report and Y-
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9C), the lender’s top holder at the time of loan origination is determined by cross-checking
the information contained in Call Report items RSSD ID of Regulatory High Holder 1
(RSSD9348), Financial Higher Holder ID (RSSD9364), and Financial High Holder Percent
of Equity (RSSD9365). The three items provide the RSSD ID of a lender’s top holder when
a lender has an RSSD ID. In the case of bank acquisitions, the syndicated bank loans in
the acquired bank are assigned to the acquirer’s RSSD ID as of the acquisition date. The
full bank and bank holding company’s merger and acquisition history is obtained from the
Federal Bank of Chicago. Using the RSSD ID, Dealscan lenders are linked to the Y-9C to
obtain bank financial data.
1.3.2. The Connectedness Sampling Method
Separating manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects requires managerial turnover
during the sample period. Otherwise, the two effects will be perfectly collinear. Thus, the
separation is possible only for firms that employed at least one mover (i.e., a manager who
switches firms). Bertrand & Schoar (2003) proposed the mover dummy variable (MDV)
method, which restricts the sample to movers and the firms that hired moving executives.
There are a few disadvantages of applying the MDV method to the banking industry.
First, the size of the mover sample is too small to draw any statistical inferences. Fewer
than 70 moving managers (CEOs, CFOs, COOs) are identified during the sample period.
Further, moving managers may be different than non-moving managers, thereby creating
sample selection bias.
An alternative method that overcomes these disadvantages is the connectedness sampling
method of Abowd et al. (1999) (The AKM Method). Focusing on a sample of connected
banks, the AKM method separates manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects not only for
movers but also for non-movers who work in firms that employed at least one mover during
the sample period. Note that both the MDV and AKM methods focus on the same group of
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banks; however, the MDV method only looks at movers, whereas the AKM method includes
all managers who work for banks, with at least one mover during the sample period. Thus,
the AKM method allows me to extract a large sample of managers from a modest group
of movers. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion on how the AKM method separately
identifies manager and firm fixed effects in the connectedness sample.
I use graph theory to construct the connectedness sample. Starting with an arbitrary
mover, I find all banks that employed them during the sample period and include all managers
(movers and non-movers) who worked for these banks. Then, I further track all banks
those managers ever worked for. This procedure is continued until all data are exhausted
and the “connected” managers and banks are assembled into a single “connected” group.
Then, another arbitrary mover manager that is not assigned a group is selected and the
above procedure is repeated. This procedure is followed until all mover managers have been
assembled into groups. As suggested by Abowd et al. (1999), the AKM method makes it
computationally feasible to estimate manager and bank fixed effects for each group relative
to a within-in group benchmark. Because I want to compare manager and bank fixed effects
across groups, I employ the normalization procedure by Cornelissen et al. (2008). I first
normalize the mean bank fixed effects to zero for each group and the group mean bank fixed
effects is added to manager fixed effects. Next, I subtract the grand mean of manager fixed
effects from each manager fixed effect and add this grand mean manager fixed effect to the
intercept.
1.3.3. Systemic Risk and Credit Risk Variables
I measure bank systemic risk using the widely used systemic risk measure ∆CoV aR as
proposed by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)4. ∆CoV aR is constructed based on the belief
that the market is efficient and reflects much information about a financial institution and the
4 I thank Tobias Adrian and Markus Brunnermeier for sharing their code for computing CoVaR.
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system. The idea behind ∆CoV aR is simple: the distribution of asset values of the financial
system are collectively determined by the financial health of individual institutions and their
correlations; once a financial institution undergoes financial distress, it will affect the asset
values of the system. Thus, an institution’s contribution to systemic risk (∆CoV aR) is just
the changes in the tail risk of the system when an institution changes from a normal to a
stressed state, which can be observed through market data. I introduce the derivation of
∆CoV aR measure in Appendix B.
To measure credit risk-taking on syndicated bank loans, I use the borrower’s Merton
distance-to-default (Bharath & Shumway (2008)) at the time of loan origination. The Merton
distance-to-default model applies the framework of Merton (1974), in which the equity of
the firm is a call option on the underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to
the face value of the firm’s debt. This options-theoretic default risk model recognizes that
although the market value of the firm is not observable, it can be inferred from the value of
equity, the volatility of equity, and other observable variables through an iterative procedure
to solve a system of nonlinear equations. The model relies on some strict assumptions.
First, the model specifies that the probability of default is the normal cumulative density
function of a z-score depending on the firm’s underlying value, the firm’s volatility, and the
face value of the debt. Second, the model assumes that the underlying market value of the
firm follows geometric Brownian motion and that each firm has issued just one zero-coupon
bond. Despite the simplifying assumptions that underlie its derivation, distance-to-default
has proven empirically to be a strong predictor of default (Jessen & Lando (2015)) and is
successful in ranking firms’ default probabilities.
1.3.4. Bank Business Policy Variables
In this chapter, I measure managerial business styles by looking at their preferences
regarding bank business policies. Banks follow different business policies characterized by
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the choices of different types of assets and liability. Following Hagendorff et al. (2017), I
utilize the data from FR Y-9C reports and choose eight bank policy variables that reflect
bank management’s major strategic choices. First, I include non-interest income over the
sum of interest and non-interest income (Non-interest Income) to reflect a bank’s choice
between lending-based and fee-based activities. I use this variable to reflect the fact that in
recent years, banking companies have taken advantage of deregulation to generate substan-
tial amounts of non-interest income from non-traditional activities like investment banking,
securities brokerage, insurance agency and underwriting, and mutual fund sales. Similarly,
I use the ratio of loans over total assets (Loans) to measure a bank’s focus on traditional
interest-generating assets. To identify banks with more focus on the trading book and on
the banking book, two variables are employed: the ratio of mortgage-backed securities to
total assets (MBS) and the natural logarithm of the ratio of the notional amount of deriva-
tive contracts held for trading to total assets (Derivatives). To describe banks’ efforts to
reduce diversifiable risk, I use the term Lending Diversification, which is defined as 1 minus
the Herfindahl Index of the shares of real estate, commercial and industrial, consumer, and
other loans over total assets as broken out in the form FR Y-9C. On the liability side, I
measure banks’ funding structures using loans over total deposits (Loans/Deposits) and the
proportion of liabilities that are not financed via deposits (Non-deposit Funding) to whole-
sale sources of bank funds, in contrast to traditional core deposit funding. Finally, a bank’s
funding of liquidity risk-taking is measured using the difference between liabilities repricing
or maturing within 12 months and assets repricing or maturing with 12 months, scaled by
total assets (Liquidity Gap). Detailed definitions for the bank business policy variables are
defined in Appendix A.
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1.3.5. Control Variables
Throughout the analysis, I also use a range of loan, borrower, bank, manager, and macroe-
conomic characteristics as control variables. To ensure that outliers do not strongly influence
the statistical results, I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Because credit risk can also be affected by loan characteristics, such as amount, maturity,
and being secured or not, I control for a range of loan characteristics in my analysis. I use
both package- and facility-level data in the within-loan analysis and package-level data in
all other analyses. ln(Amount) is the natural logarithm of the package size (in millions).
ln(Maturity) is the natural log of the maturity of the package (in months) where deal ma-
turity is the weighted average maturity of all facilities in the package. As I include both
lead lenders and participants in all the regressions, I create a Lead Lender dummy in the
within-loan regressions to account for possible unobservable differences between lead lenders
and participants. A bank is defined as a lead lender if its lend arranger credit variable is
“Yes” in Dealscan. The variable ln(Number of Leads) is the natural logarithm of the number
of lead lenders in the deal syndicate. Secured is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
at least one facility in the package is secured and 0 otherwise.
Next, I control for bank characteristics based on the fact that bank characteristics can
affect a bank’s risk-taking behavior. Because ∆CoV aR is constructed using market data
and nearly all banks are publicly traded at the bank holding company level, bank financial
variables are measured at the bank holding company level: ln(Total Assets) is the natural
logarithm of bank total assets; Capital Ratio is total equity over total assets; Core Deposit
is the portion of total deposits (sum of interest-bearing deposits and non-interest-bearing
deposits) that excludes deposits of $100,000 or more divided by total deposits; Productivity is
total assets over the number of full-time employees; Market to Book is the natural logarithm
of the ratio of market-to-book value of equity; and Return on Equity is the bank’s net
income over book equity. Liquidity is the sum of cash and available-for-sale securities over
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total assets; Loan Charge offs is the total charge-offs on loans and leases over total assets;
Loan Loss Allowance is the total allowance for loan and lease losses over total assets; Risk
Weighted Assets is total risk weighted assets divided over total assets. Trading Assets is total
trading assets over total assets. Intangible assets is the sum of goodwill and other intangible
assets over total assets. I also control for borrower characteristics. ln(Borrower Size) is the
natural logarithm of total assets (in billions); Borrower Tangibility is the total property,
plant, and equipment divided by total assets; Borrower Leverage is the total debt divided
by total assets. I also use a lending relationship measure of Bharath et al. (2007) because
the intensity of past lending relationships can influence the matching between borrowers and
lenders. The lending relationship between borrower i and bank j is defined as the dollar
amount of loans to borrower i by bank j in the past five years over the total dollar amount
of loans by borrower i in the past five years.
Manager compensation can also affect banks’ risk-taking behavior (Fahlenbrach & Stulz
(2011), DeYoung et al. (2013), Berger et al. (2014), Nguyen et al. (2017)). Therefore, I
also control for pay incentive variables including pay sensitivity to changes in stock prices
(Delta) and stock return volatility (Vega). Delta, the sensitivity of manager pay to bank
performance, is calculated as the dollar change in manager wealth to stock price performance.
Vega measures the sensitivity of manager pay to bank risk and is calculated as the dollar
change in compensation associated with a 1% increase in stock return volatility. If a riskier
bank policy increases stock price and volatility, then managers with high Delta or Vega
have more incentives to engage in riskier bank policies. Both Delta and Vega are scaled
by cash compensation and transformed to the natural logarithm. I also control for the log
of cash bonus (Bonus) because it is distinct from equity-based compensation and might
impact on a manager’s risk preferences. Finally, I control for macroeconomic conditions.
Quarterly GDP per capita growth rate is used to measure the macroeconomic performance.
In addition, a recession dummy (Recession) is generated to test the differential effect of
bank systemic risk on credit risk-taking in expansion and recession periods. The recession
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dummy equals 1 if the month of loan origination is designated to be a contraction month by
NBER and 0 if it is designated to be an expansion month. To control for the macro-level
aggregate systemic risk, I use CATFIN by Allen, Bali & Tang (2012). To calculate CATFIN,
I first estimate the 99% VaR of the financial system using three different methodologies: the
generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED),
and the nonparametric estimation method. CATFIN is then the arithmetic average of the
GPD, SGED, and nonparametric VaR measures.
1.3.6. Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the two samples I use in this chapter. Panel
A presents the summary statistics for the Dealscan-Compustat-Y-9C merged sample, which
includes 36,526 lender-package observations that contain 9,419 unique loans borrowed by
2,861 unique borrowers and 276 unique banks that are owned by 110 unique bank hold-
ing companies. To analyze the role of bank mergers, I merge the database with Execu-
comp data. Panel B presents the summary statistics for this Dealscan-Compustat-Y-9C-
Execucomp merged sample, which includes 33,016 lender-package observations that contain
8,976 unique loans borrowed by 2,529 unique borrowers and 236 unique banks that are owned
by 78 unique bank holding companies.
The key dependent variable is the borrower’s quarterly distance-to-default, which has a
mean of 6.772, a median of 6.002, and a standard deviation of 4.903. The key independent
variable is ∆CoV aR, which has a mean of 5.216, a median of 4.351, and a standard deviation
of 2.550. The average deal amount is US$878 million, with an average maturity of 49 months.
On average, there are 4.141 lead lenders in each package. The lending relationship measure
has a mean of 0.47. This indicates that on average, each bank engaged in 47% of the total
amount a typical firm borrowed in the five years preceding the loan origination. Borrowers
have an average size of $6.752 billion, with a mean tangibility of 0.310 and leverage of 0.322.
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Banks have a mean size of $779 billion, with mean capital ratio of 8.5% and return on equity
of 8.3%. Table 1.2 presents the Spearman correlation matrix for selected variables included
in the baseline regressions. As shown in the correlation matrix, borrower distance-to-default
is negatively correlated with both ∆CoV aR (the bank-specific measure of systemic risk)
and CATFIN (the aggregate measure of systemic risk), with correlation coefficients of -0.220
and -0.289, respectively. This provides preliminary evidence that banks with higher levels
of systemic risk lend to borrowers with higher credit risk during periods of high aggregate
systemic risk.
1.4. Identifying Managerial and Bank Styles
Since the last financial crisis, many practitioners and regulators have expressed their
concerns about the “culture” at financial institutions that may have led to excess risk-taking.
Culture may reside either in top management or may be endemic to the institution itself.
In this section, I utilize empirical measures of both managerial and bank styles to determine
whether risk preferences are related to managerial or bank culture. “Managerial style” refers
to the ways managers accomplish the business objectives of a company. It reflects some
latent managerial skills, attitudes, or preferences that are unobservable to econometricians5.
As documented by Bertrand & Schoar (2003), managers have their personal styles when
making investments, financing, and taking other important corporate decisions. Compared
with those in other industries, managers have more discretion to indulge their personal
preferences as a result of the opaque nature of banking firms. For example, regulators,
shareholders, and the Board of Directors may monitor the bank’s overall risk exposure,
but may have limited knowledge of the distribution of individual risks across the bank’s
many lines of business. In particular, they may be unable to monitor the trade-offs between
systemic risk and credit risk in the bank’s syndicated loan portfolio. Thus, the manager may
5 As Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) argue, the word “unobservable” indicates information that is difficult
to quantify or unavailable to econometricians. It may not necessarily be unobservable to employers.
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indulge a personal preference for underpriced systemic risk in lieu of idiosyncratic credit risk.
I show that bank managers’ asset and liability innovation preferences are of great relevance
to the distribution of risks within the bank’s entire risk portfolio.
Managerial styles stem from some time-invariant manager-specific attributes with ex-
planatory power beyond what pay incentives or biographical characteristics can explain.
Despite the large literature discussing how performance-based compensation packages create
incentives for managers to engage in risk-taking, some studies find that executive incentive
schedules and biographical information (such as gender, education, and professional expe-
rience) are inadequate to explain manager risk-taking behaviors and bank business policies
(Ross (2004), Hagendorff et al. (2017)). Instead, Hagendorff et al. (2017) find that idiosyn-
cratic manager-specific attributes, or managerial styles, can explain a much higher variation
in bank business models. Time-invariant manager fixed effects have also been shown to have
large power in explaining variations in executive pay (Graham, Li & Qiu (2012)).
1.4.1. Identifying Managerial and Bank Innovation Styles
A focus on managerial style is only meaningful if it is important in explaining corporate
outcomes. To quantify the statistical and economic importance of managerial styles, I follow
Graham et al. (2012) and Hagendorff et al. (2017) and run a range of three-way fixed effects
regressions using the connectedness sample:
Pm(j,t) = Mm(j,t−1)δ + B j,t−1γ + E t−1β + Σ
J
j=1Dm(j,t−1)θm + φj + µt + εm,t, (1)
where Pm(j,t) is one of the business policy variables (as defined in Section 1.3) observed
for manager m in bank j at time t, and is explained by manager characteristics Mm(j,t−1),
bank characteristics B j,t−1, macroeconomic conditions E t−1, bank fixed effects φj, time fixed
effects µt, and manager fixed effects θm. Dm(j,t−1) maps managers to banks and is equal to
1 if manager m works for bank j at time t − 1. The residual εm,t captures the variation in
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dependent variables that cannot be explained by the regressors.
Business policy variables in Pm(j,t) capture a bank’s preferences for traditional or non-
traditional forms of banking assets, income, and liabilities. On the asset and income side, I
include the ratio of loans over total assets (Loans) to measure a bank’s focus on traditional
interest-generating assets and use the ratio of mortgage-backed securities to total assets
(MBS) and the natural logarithm of the ratio of the notional amount of derivative contracts
held for trading to total assets (Derivatives) to identify banks with more focus on the trading
book than on the banking book. To describe banks’ efforts to reduce diversifiable risk, I use
the term Lending Diversification, which is defined as 1 minus the Herfindahl Index of the
shares of real estate, commercial and industrial, consumer, and other loans over total assets.
On the liability side, I measure banks’ funding structures using loans over total deposits
(Loans/Deposits) and the proportion of liabilities that are not financed via deposits (Non-
deposit Funding) to wholesale sources of bank funds in contrast to traditional core deposit
funding. Finally, I use the difference between liabilities repricing or maturing within 12
months and assets repricing or maturing with 12 months, scaled by total assets (Liquidity
Gap), to measure a bank’s funding liquidity risk-taking.
Table 1.3 reports the results from Equation (1). Panel A reports the results for bank
business policy variables and Panel B shows the results for the systemic risk regression.
Table 1.3 shows that three-way fixed effects models are able to explain a large proportion
of variation in bank business policies and systemic risk. In the systemic risk regression and
most of the business policy regressions, the explanatory variables are able to explain over
70% of the variation in the dependent variable. Compared with the two-way fixed effects
models (time and bank fixed effects only, results unreported), the adjusted R2 increases from
3% to 16% in three-way fixed effects regressions.
Table 1.4 reports the contribution of each explanatory variable in explaining the depen-
dent variables in Equation (1). Panel A shows that both manager and bank fixed effects are
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jointly and statistically significantly different than zero for each business policy variable and
systemic risk contribution. In Panel B, I use the coefficient estimates from Table 1.3 to sepa-
rate out the following components: observable time-variant variables, manager fixed effects,
bank fixed effects, and residuals. I examine how much each component contributes to the
variation in each business policy variable and systemic risk by using the covariance between
the dependent variable and each component, normalized by the variance of the dependent
variable. This normalized covariance is just the percentage of total variation in the depen-
dent variable that can be explained by each component. The normalized covariance divided
by model R2 is just the fraction of R2 that is explained by each component. Consistent
with Graham et al. (2012) and Hagendorff et al. (2017), Panel B shows that manager fixed
effects contribute the most to the total variation in dependent variables as well as to R2.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that manager-specific heterogeneity has significant
incremental explanatory power beyond what can be explained by observable variables.
Because managers exhibit distinct styles in each of the business policies, it is difficult
to identify an overall business style for each manager and compare them with one another.
However, there may be some inherent correlations among some business policy variables as
shown in Panel A of Table 1.5. Indeed, non-interest income is positively correlated with hold-
ings of MBS and derivatives, and negatively correlated with holdings of traditional loans.
Thus, I find that managers with a preference for non-interest income also demonstrate a
preference for MBS and derivatives, whereas a preference for traditional loans is negatively
correlated with a preference for non-interest income. Because there are some commonalities
among managers’ preferences on business policies, it may be possible to describe the vari-
ability among manager fixed effects in terms of a lower number of common factors that can
closely reflect managers’ preferences for specific business models. Following Hagendorff et
al. (2017), I perform a factor analysis to remove redundancies from the correlated variables
so as to identify the dominant factors that describe manager preferences.
Panel B of Table 1.5 shows the results of factor analysis for manager fixed effects. The
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Kaiser rule suggests dropping all factors with eigenvalues under 1 (being the eigenvalue equal
to the information accounted for by an average single term). The first two dominant factors
satisfy this requirement and together they explain more than 90% of the total variance.
Thus, I retain the first two factors. Panel C of Table 1.5 shows the factor loadings on each
policy style for the first two retained factors. Generally, the two factors exhibit managerial
preferences that deviate from the traditional deposit and loan business model. Factor 1 has
a high loading on preferences for non-traditional forms of assets and income. It positively
loads on non-interest income, indicating a preference for innovation on profit generation. It
also positively loads on MBS and derivatives and negatively loads on loan-to-assets ratio
and loan-to-deposit ratio. This implies a preference for asset allocation innovation and a
lower reliance on traditional loan-making. In sum, managers with higher loadings on Factor
1 exhibit stronger preferences for asset innovation. Factor 2 positively loads on non-deposit
funding, capturing a preference for non-traditional liabilities; thus, managers with higher
loadings on Factor 2 exhibit stronger preferences for liability innovation. The loadings of
each manager on the two factors can then be used to describe managerial style on both sides
of the balance sheet.
I refer to a manager’s loading on Factor 1 as her asset innovation index, and a manager’s
loading on Factor 2 as her liability innovation index. In the remaining parts of this chapter,
I investigate the risk-taking behavior of managers with these two dimensions of innovation
indexes6. Considering that the two dimensions of innovation may jointly affect a manager’s
behavior, so I also cluster managers into groups that differ in terms of their general prefer-
ences on innovation. Managers are clustered into four groups based on whether their asset
(liability) innovation index is higher (lower) than the median level: asset innovators (inno-
6 The word “innovation” refers to non-traditional banking products that deviate from traditional products
like deposits or loans. There are three categories of financial innovation-institutional, product, and process.
Institutional innovations relate to the creation of new types of financial firms such as specialist credit card
firms, discount broking firms, and branchless banks. Product innovation relates to new products such as
derivatives, securitized assets, and foreign currency mortgages. Process innovations relate to new ways of
doing financial business, including online banking and telephone banking. In this chapter, I mainly focus on
financial product innovation.
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vating in assets but not on liability), dual innovators (innovating on both), traditionalists
(traditional on both), and liability innovators (innovating in liability but not on assets).
Panel D of Table 1.5 shows the average values for the two indexes for each group. Figure
1.1 represents the graphical clustering of managerial patterns in styles and their profiles.
Further, I test the hypothesis that business policy choices are related to bank business
styles rather than managerial preferences. Thus, I conduct a similar factor analysis for bank
fixed effects to determine innovation styles for banks as corporate entities. Panel E presents
the results. Similar to manager factor analysis, I find that the first two factors summarize a
large portion of the variance of the correlation matrix of bank styles. Panel F shows a similar
pattern of loadings for Factors 1 and 2. Factor 1 positively loads on innovative business
models of income generation and asset allocation, such as non-interest income, MBS, and
derivatives, and negatively loads on loan-to-assets ratio and loan-to-deposit ratio. Factor
2 positively loads on non-deposit funding, which indicates innovation on liability structure.
Thus, I refer to a bank’s loading on Factor 1 as its asset innovation index and a bank’s
loading on Factor 2 as its liability innovation index.
1.4.2. Identifying Managerial Systemic Risk-taking Styles
Previous literature has documented that non-core banking businesses, such as non-
interest income, have a higher contribution to systemic risk than traditional banking (Brun-
nermeier et al. (2012)). Thus, if manager-specific heterogeneity can explain a large variation
in bank business policies, then it may also have large explanatory power on banks’ systemic
risk-taking. Thus, in this section, I investigate how manager-specific heterogeneity explains
a bank’s systemic risk-taking. Specifically, I estimate the following three-way fixed effects
regressions using the connectedness sample:
∆CoV aRm(j,t) = Mm(j,t−1)θ + B j,t−1γ + E t−1β + Σ
J
j=1Dm(j,t−1)θm + φj + µt + εm,t, (2)
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where ∆CoV aRm(j,t) is bank systemic risk contributions observed for manager m in bank j
at time t and is explained by manager characteristics Mm(j,t−1), bank characteristics B j,t−1,
macroeconomic conditions E t−1, bank fixed effects φj, time fixed effects µt, and manager
fixed effects θm.Dm(j,t−1) maps managers to banks and is equal to 1 if manager m works for
bank j at time t − 1. The residual εm,t captures the variation in dependent variables that
cannot be explained by the regressors. As a global measure of systemic risk that encompasses
all sources of systemic risk, ∆CoV aRm(j,t) can be determined by a much wider array of bank
variables (Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)). Thus, I include a broader set of bank control
variables that can explain cross-sectional differences in systemic risk.
The results of this three-way fixed effects model are shown in Panel B of Table 1.3. The
explanatory variables are able to explain over 64% of the variation in systemic risk compared
with 58% in the two-way fixed effects (time and bank fixed effects) model. Table 1.4 shows
that both manager and bank fixed effects in the systemic risk model are jointly statistically
significantly different from zero and that manager fixed effects can explain more than 23%
of the variation in bank systemic risk. While this is lower than the economic importance
of manager fixed effects in business policy variables shown in Panel B of Table 1.4, it still
indicates that manager-specific heterogeneity is important in explaining a bank’s systemic
risk-taking. I therefore refer to a manager’s estimated fixed effect on systemic risk as her
“systemic risk style”.
Table 1.6 shows the correlation matrix for systemic risk, managerial asset and liability
innovations, managerial systemic risk style, and bank asset/liability innovations. There are
several interesting results. First, both managerial asset and liability innovation indexes are
positively correlated with systemic risk, with a higher correlation for asset innovation than
for liability innovation. This confirms that managerial innovation styles are of systemic rel-
evance and echoes the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2012). Second, managerial systemic
risk style is positively correlated with both managerial asset and liability innovation indexes,
and consistent with the impact of managerial preferences on systemic risk exposure. Table
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1.6 further shows that correlations between systemic risk and the bank innovation indexes
are much lower compared with those between systemic risk and the managerial innovation in-
dexes. This provides preliminary evidence showing that bank risk-taking is mainly driven by
managerial preferences rather than bank-specific styles, which is consistent with Hypothesis
7.
Managerial style impacts the bank’s most fundamental decisions. In particular, the
manager can adjust the portfolio of bank risk-taking to indulge personal preferences. Given
opacity at the individual risk level of large, complex banking institutions, managerial style
may explain the heretofore unexplained heterogeneity across bank risk-taking. What is
referred to as “bank culture” may be driven by divergence in risk trade-offs across managerial
styles. As an example of risk trade-offs, I specifically consider the relationship between
systemic risk-taking and the idiosyncratic credit risk in the bank’s syndicated bank loan
portfolio. Thus, I examine the relationship between managerial style and the bank’s credit
risk sensitivity to systemic risk. In Section 5, I develop my empirical credit risk sensitivity
measure and in Section 6, I examine whether managerial or bank style can explain this
measure.
1.5. Measuring the Bank’s Credit Risk Sensitivity to
Systemic Risk
1.5.1. Baseline Results
I utilize the option-theoretic distance-to-default to examine the credit risk exposure of the
bank’s syndicated loan portfolio. To measure the relationship between distance-to-default
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and systemic risk, I posit the following regression:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×Recessiont−1 + β3Recessiont−1
+ Lk,tγ + B j,t−1θ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,t,k,t,
(3)
where subscripts i, j, k, and t indicate borrowing firm, bank, loan, and time, respectively.
The observations are by loan package-bank. DDi,j,k,t is the borrower’s distance-to-default at
the time of loan origination and is explained by the bank’s one-period lagged systemic risk
∆CoV aRj,t−1, loan characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics B j,t−1, borrower characteristics
F i,t−1, and macroeconomic controls E t−1. I use time fixed effects µt based on the year of loan
origination to take into account the credit cycle in the economy in general. I use borrower
industry fixed effects φi and bank fixed effects θj to absorb any time-invariant unobservable
borrower or lender heterogeneity.
B j,t−1 includes bank size, capital ratio, return on equity, and lending relationship. Con-
trolling for bank size is to distinguish the effects of size and systemic risk on lending choice.
Because undercapitalized or less profitable banks may refrain from lending to risky borrow-
ers, I control for bank capital ratio and return on equity. Controlling for lending relationship
is to control for lender’s choice, which is based on previous lending experience with the
borrower. F i,t−1 includes borrower size, leverage, and tangibility. Controlling for borrower
characteristics is to mitigate the impact of demand-side factors that correlate with both
default risk and the firm’s choice of bank. Lk,t includes deal amount, maturity, number of
lead lenders, and secure dummy.
How banks adjust their credit risk-taking in response to systemic risk may also depend
on the stability of the financial system. During normal periods, when the system is stable,
banks may increase their credit risk-taking with systemic risk to exploit abnormal returns
from weak market discipline and regulatory risk mispricing, whereas during volatile periods,
when asset prices are depressed and liquidity is drying-up, banks may tend to reduce credit
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risk-taking with systemic risk to alleviate counterparty risk and avoid liquidity spirals. To
account for this dynamic relationship, I add the dummy variable Recessiont−1, which is equal
to 1 if the loan was originated in a month designated as a contraction month by NBER and 0
otherwise, and I interact it with ∆CoV aRj,t−1. In an additional specification, I also replace
Recessiont−1 with macro-level systemic risk CATFINt−1.
Table 1.7 reports the results for Equation (3). The results in Columns (1)-(6) show
a significant inverse relation between borrower distance-to-default and bank systemic risk.
The coefficients of ∆CoV aR in all columns are negative and significant at the 1% level. The
results reveal that higher bank systemic risk exposure is associated with higher borrower
credit risk. In other words, systemically important banks are matched with borrowers with
high default risk, which is consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1.A and inconsistent
with the predictions of Hypothesis 1.B. The coefficients of CATFIN are also negative and
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that credit risk in bank loan portfolios is high
during periods of high aggregate systemic risk. From an economics perspective, taking the
coefficients of -0.201 and -0.452 in Column (4), starting from mean value, a one standard
deviation increase (2.550) in ∆CoV aR is associated with a decrease in distance-to-default
by 0.513. This indicates a 0.104 standard deviation (4.903) decrease in borrower’s distance-
to-default and a 7.568% decrease from the mean value (6.772) of distance-to-default. A one
standard deviation increase (0.926) inCATFIN is associated with a decrease in distance-to-
default by 0.419. This indicates a 0.085 standard deviation (4.903) decrease in borrower’s
distance-to-default and 6.190% decrease from the mean value (6.772) of distance-to-default.
To perform a quasi-diff-in-diff analysis, ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1 interact in Col-
umn (5) to investigate how aggregate systemic risk affects the relation between ∆CoV aRj,t−1
and borrower distance-to-default. The signs, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients
of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1 remain. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive
and significant at the 1% level although its magnitude is much smaller than the coefficients
of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1. In fact, although the sign of the interaction term is
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positive, unless CATFINt−1 is extremely high, the net effect of changes in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 on
borrower distance-to-default is still significantly negative with a large economic magnitude.
For example, when CATFINt−1 is at its median level (2.286), a one standard deviation
increase in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 is associated with 0.073 standard deviation decrease in borrower’s
distance-to-default, which is an even larger effect than that shown in Column (4). Only
when CATFINt−1 is much higher than median values will banks with high individual levels
of systemic risk reduce the credit risk in their loan portfolios. The aggregate effect of an
increase in both ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1 is also strong. For example, a simultaneous
one standard deviation increase in both ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1 is associated with
a 0.135 standard deviation decrease in borrower’s distance-to-default. These results suggest
that banks reduce their individual credit risk exposure when aggregate systemic risk is high,
thereby lending to safe borrowers when the risk of recession increases. In other words, the
negative relation between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and borrower distance-to-default is weakened during
periods of high CATFINt−1. Two other tests are performed as robustness checks. First,
in Column (6), CATFINt−1 is replaced by a Recession dummy, which is equal to 1 if the
quarter of loan origination is an economic recession quarter and 0 otherwise. The result is
similar to Column (6). The relation between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and borrower distance-to-default
is weakened, but still remains.
The results in Columns (5) and (6) indicate that during volatile periods of high levels
of aggregate systemic risk or recession, banks with high individual levels of systemic risk do
not increase credit risk as much as they did during normal periods, which is in line with
some mitigation of moral hazard by systemically important banks during crisis (or imminent
crisis) periods, as these banks attempt to pull back from the brink by reducing the credit risk




In the previous sub-section, I show that banks’ credit risk-taking increases with their
systemic risk. To argue that banks actively increase their credit risk-taking when their sys-
temic risk increases, I have to rule out two alternative explanations with regard to borrower
self-selection. First, some types of borrowers may choose to apply for loans at systemically
risky banks. For example, risky borrowers may rely more heavily on stable funding sources,
especially during volatile periods, so they may choose to apply for loans from banks that are
better protected by implicit public guarantees, e.g., systemically important banks. Second,
borrowers are more likely to request loans when their financial conditions deteriorate and
those periods may coincide with the periods when bank systemic risk is high. For instance,
a large increase in credit line drawdowns occurred during the financial crisis when banks’
systemic risk also increased. Both explanations imply self-selection bias. I adopt two ap-
proaches to resolve this concern: within-loan analysis and two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regressions.
1.5.2.1 Within-loan Analysis
Exploiting a unique feature of syndicated bank loans that a group of lenders, referred to
as a “syndicate,” work together to provide funds for a single borrower, within-loan regres-
sions eliminate the impact of demand-side of loans and only focus on the supply-side. The
methodology benefits from the underwriting process of a syndicated loan. Conditional on a
loan request, the lead lender(s) originates the loan, negotiates spreads and terms with the
borrower, and coordinates with other syndicate participants who then determine their contri-
bution to funding the total loan amount. Because leaders choose their allocation share after
a loan has been originated, any borrower self-selection on lenders is eliminated. The analysis
also rules out borrower self-selection on when to borrow because it compares banks’ lending
cross-sectionally. If systemically risky banks actively increase their credit risk-taking, then
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within-loan regressions should show that banks with higher systemic risk contribute a larger
allocation share to risky borrowers and (or) a smaller allocation share to safe borrowers.
Because the within-loan analysis measures a bank’s willingness to take risk by looking
at their allocation shares in a loan, the analysis requires additional restrictions on the data.
First, I only keep loan facilities that have at least two lenders because otherwise the allocation
share would always be 100%. Second, I only keep facilities whose allocation shares are non-
missing for all of their lenders. Allocation shares are non-missing for about 31% of lender-
facility pairs in Dealscan. Third, I drop facilities whose total allocation share by all lender is
greater than 100% (apparently erroneous). Fourth, I calculate bank allocation share at the
bank holding company level and define it as the total allocation shares of all its subsidiaries
that participate in the facility. A bank’s allocation shares in each facility are then aggregate
to the package level for package-level regressions. The summary statistics for within-loan
regressions are presented in Table 1.8.
I start the test by first differentiating risky from safe borrowers. In each year, borrowers
of newly originated loans are sorted into ten quantiles based on their distance-to-default
at the time of loan origination, with the 1st (10th) quantile including the riskiest (safest)
borrowers. Then I construct a risk dummy RD1, which equals 1 for borrowers whose distance-
to-default falls into the 1st to the 5th quantiles (risky) and 0 otherwise. Because I expect the
relationship between systemic risk and allocation share to differ the most between riskiest
and safest borrowers, I construct another two risk dummies, RD2 and RD3, which focus on
more extreme borrowers. RD2 equals 1 for borrowers whose distance-to-default falls into
the 1st to the 4th quantiles and 0 if it falls into the 7th to 10th quantiles. RD3 equals 1
for borrowers whose distance-to-default falls into the 1st to the 3rd quantiles and 0 if it falls
into the 8th to 10th quantiles. I then run the following within-loan regression:
Sharei,j,k,t = β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×RDi,t−1 + B j,t−1δ + φj + λk + εi,j,k,t (4)
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where subscripts i, j, k, and t indicate the borrowing firm, the bank, the package/facility,
and time, respectively. The dependent variable, Sharei,j,k,t, is bank j’s allocation share in
percentages in package/facility k borrowed by firm i at time t and is explained by bank
systemic risk ∆CoV aRj,t−1 (∆CoV aRj,t in additional specifications), the interaction of sys-
temic risk with RDi,t−1 (RDi,t in additional specifications), which is one of the three risk
dummies, bank characteristics Bj,t−1, bank fixed effects φj, and package/facility fixed effects
λk. Note that RDi,t−1 is included in this regression only through the interaction term and
does not arise independently because it is absorbed by loan fixed effects. All loan, borrower,
and macroeconomic controls drop out for the same reason. Because lead lenders are more
likely to take a higher allocation share in a loan, I add a lead lender dummy, which equals 1
for lead lenders and 0 otherwise. I also keep the lending relationship variable to account for
the fact that relationship lenders are more likely to take a higher allocation share. To ensure
variation within banks, I only keep banks with at least five loan observations throughout the
sample period.
B j,t−1 includes a range of bank control variables, including the natural logarithm of
total assets (in millions), capital ratio, return on equity, liquidity, loan charge-offs, loan loss
allowance, and risk-weighted assets. Because lead lenders are more likely to take a higher
allocation share in a loan, I add a lead lender dummy, which equals 1 for lead lenders and 0
otherwise. I also add the lending relationship variable to account for the fact that relationship
lenders are more likely to take a higher allocation share. To ensure variation within banks,
I only keep banks with at least five loan observations throughout the sample period. To
account for the possibility that there might be some funding persistence among frequent
bank players and such funding persistence causes regression error terms to be correlated
within banks, the study clusters the standard errors at the bank level. All regressors are
lagged by one quarter and I also use contemporaneous regressors in additional specifications.
The aggregate effect of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 on Sharei,j,k,t is β1 + β2RDi,t−1. Therefore, β1
measures the relation between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and bank allocation share for safe borrowers
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(RDi,t−1=0). I hypothesize that β1 is negative and (β1 + β2) is positive, which means that
for loans lent to safe (risky) borrowers, Share decreases (increases) with ∆CoV aRj,t−1.
Table 1.9 presents the results from the within-loan regressions estimated at both package
and facility level. I try both contemporaneous and one-period lagged systemic risk in differ-
ent specifications and interact them with risk dummies. There are several findings. First,
all specifications show a negative β1, which is statistically significant at 1% or 5% levels in
most specifications. The negative β1 indicates that systemically risky banks decrease their
allocation share for loans to less risky borrowers. The coefficient of the interaction term β2
is significantly positive at the 1% level in all specifications. This implies that the relation
between systemic risk and bank allocation share is significantly different between the risky
group and the safe group. α1 + α2 represents the relation between systemic risk and bank
allocation share in the risky group. Note that α1 + α2 is always positive in all specifica-
tions, which indicates that systemically risky banks increase their allocation share to risky
borrowers.
Economically, considering the coefficients of -0.096 of ∆CoV aRj,t and 0.204 of the in-
teraction term in Column (1) as an example, a bank with a one standard deviation in-
crease in systemic risk would decrease its contribution to a borrower in the safe group by
0.096 × 2.684 = 0.258% from its mean. In contrast, for the risky group, a bank with one
standard deviation increase in systemic risk would increase its contribution to a borrower in
the risky group by (−0.096 + 0.204)× 2.684 = 0.290% from its mean.
Note that the negative/positive relation between bank allocation share and systemic
risk is even stronger in the borrower groups with even more extreme default risk levels.
α1 decreases from -0.096 in Column (1) to -0.189 in Column (3), with significance levels
increasing from 10% to 1%. This indicates that on average, systemically risky banks heavily
pull back their lending to the most creditworthy borrowers, which strongly proves that
systemically risky banks are less willing to lend to creditworthy borrowers. Meanwhile, β2
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increases from 0.204 in Column (1) to 0.387 in Column (3), with 1% significance level in all
specifications. This indicates that the effects of systemic risk on bank allocation share vary
significantly between very risky borrowers and very safe borrowers. The net effect β1 + β2
increases from −0.096 + 0.204 = 0.108 in Column (1) to −0.189 + 0.387 = 0.198 in Column
(3). This means that systemically risky banks increase their lending to risky borrowers.
Similar results are found in Columns (4) to (6), where one-period lagged systemic risk is
used to reduce simultaneity. The coefficient of ∆CoV aRj,t stays negative and is significant
at the 1% significance level in all three columns. The coefficient of the interaction term is
positive and significant at the 1% significance level. This implies that the relation between
bank allocation share and systemic risk varies significantly between the safe group and the
risky group. Economically, taking -0.180 and 0.348 in Column (6) as an example, on average,
a bank with a one standard deviation increase in systemic risk would decrease its contribution
to a borrower in the safe group by 0.1802.684 = 0.483% from its mean and would increase its
contribution to a borrower in the risky group by (−0.180 + 0.348)2.684 = 0.451%. Columns
(7) to (12) report the within-loan estimation at the facility level and the results are similar
to those in the package-level regressions.
Equation (4) assumes that banks select borrowers based on their relative credit risk
compared with other borrowers in the same year. However, the overall borrower default risk
may differ significantly across periods. For instance, during recession periods, some firms are
not creditworthy in absolute terms but may be categorized into the safe group just because
they are safer than others at that point of time. If banks select borrowers simply based
on their absolute level of credit risk, then the statistical inference drawn from Equation (4)
would be misleading. Thus, I replace the RDi,t−1 in Equation (4) with borrower actual
distance-to-default DDi,t−1:
Sharei,j,k,t = β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×DDi,t−1 + B j,t−1δ + φj + λk + εi,j,k,t (5)
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where the aggregate effect of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 on Sharei,j,k,t is β1 +β2×DDi,t−1. Thus, β1 mea-
sures the relationship between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and Sharei,j,k,t for the riskiest borrowers whose
DDi,t−1 = 0 (or close to 0). I hypothesize that β1 is positive and β2 is negative, meaning
that for loans lent to risky (safe) borrowers, Share increases (decreases) with ∆CoV aRj,t−1.
Table 1.10 presents the coefficient estimates for Equation (5) at both package and facility
level. To avoid potential simultaneity, both the contemporaneous and one-period lagged
values for the two variables of interest, systemic risk and borrower distance-to-default, are
attempted in different specifications. β1 is positive and significant at 5% or 1% significance
levels in most specifications, implying that for very risky borrowers, bank allocation share
increases with bank systemic risk. β2 is negative and significant at the 1% significance level
in all four columns. This implies that the positive relation between bank systemic risk and
bank allocation share is weaker as borrower distance-to-default increases, that is, as the
borrower becomes more creditworthy.
Economically, taking 0.171 and -0.024 in Column (2) as an example, for a borrower
whose distance-to-default is 0 (or close to 0), a bank with a one standard deviation increase
in ∆CoV aRj,t would increase its contribution by 0.1712.684 = 0.459%, implying a higher
contribution to risky borrowers. As borrower distance-to-default increases, that is, as the
borrower becomes more creditworthy, the positive relation between systemic risk and bank
allocation share is weaker. When borrower distance-to-default reaches 5.952, α1+α2×DDi,t−1
is equal to 0 (0.171 − 0.0245.952 = 0); therefore, bank allocation is unrelated to systemic
risk on these loans. Here, the relation between systemic and bank allocation is reverted to a
negative relation. Note that 5.952 is lower than but not far from the sample mean (8.181) or
median (7.564) value of borrower distance-to-default. As borrower distance-to-default further
increases to the 75th percentile, which is about 10.872, a bank with a one standard deviation
increase in ∆CoV aRj,t would decrease its contribution by (0.171−0.024×10.872)×2.684 =
0.241%. Columns (5) to (8) report the facility-level results, which are similar with those at
the package level.
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Overall, the results in Table 1.10 are consistent with my previous findings and imply
that the positive (negative) relation between bank systemic risk and allocation share for
risky (safe) borrowers is robust with both relative and absolute credit risk levels and with
treatment of discrete credit risk quantiles and continuous borrower distance-to-default levels.
1.5.2.2 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regressions
Endogeneity can also arise if bank systemic risk affects not only the bank’s credit risk-
taking, but also affects whether or not they lend. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find
that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis.
Because the observed credit risk-taking is based on observations of originated loans, omitting
the probability of lending by bank may lead to biased results.
I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to control for the probability of originat-
ing a loan between firm i and bank j. Specifically, I employ the geographic distance between
borrower and lender and the number of banks in the state of the borrower as instruments
for observed lending relationships between a bank and a borrower. Geographic distance is
measured as the distance in thousands of kilometers between the location of the firm and
the location of the parent company of the lending bank in the quarter of loan origination.
Longer geographic distance proxies for higher information asymmetries and transportation
costs (Degryse & Ongena (2005)), which may reduce the likelihood of lending. The number
of banks in the borrowing firm’s state of incorporation is counted as the number of financial
institutions that filed a Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) in the
quarter of loan origination. Both instruments should affect the probability of originating
loans between a certain borrower/lender pair, but it is unlikely to affect how systemically
risky banks are matched with borrowers with differing default probabilities.
I apply 2SLS for all specifications that are in Table 1.7. Panel A of Table 1.11 reports
the regression diagnostics for all specifications. The underidentification test is an LM test of
whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are “relevant,” meaning
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correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis is that the instruments and
endogenous variable are not correlated. The p-values are close to 0, which strongly rejects the
null hypothesis. A Sargan-Hansen test examines the joint null hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and correctly excluded from the
estimated equation. Sargan’s chi-square test statistics are insignificant in all specifications.
This implies that the excluded instruments are valid instruments and correctly excluded
from the estimated equation.
Panel B of Table 1.11 presents the results of the first-stage regression. I find that longer
geographic distance is associated with lower extent of lending relationship, which indicates
banks’ “localness” feature. I also find that the extent of lending relationship is negatively
associated with the number of banks in the state, indicating a stronger competition effect
from other competing banks in states with more banks. Panel C of Table 1.11 reports the
results for the second-stage regression using borrower distance-to-default as the dependent
variable. I use the fitted value of lending relationship in all specifications and use the same
set of regressors as in Table 1.7. The coefficient estimates of key variables are consistent with
those in the baseline regressions. Both ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and CATFINt−1 remain statistically
significant with similar economic magnitude as found in the baseline regressions. Thus, the
results indicate that the findings in the baseline regressions are robust to controlling for the
likelihood of a lending relationship.
1.5.3. Reverse Causality
Endogeneity can also arise from reverse causality. For instance, current values of systemic
risk could also be a result of previous credit risk-taking although this is less likely considering
that commercial and industrial loans only account for about 10% of the balance sheet size.
If this is the case, then an empirical estimation of the effect of systemic risk on credit risk-
taking that ignores the dynamic relation between the two will yield biased and inconsistent
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estimates. I employ two methods to resolve the reverse causality concern. First, I use a set
of lead-lag analyses to show that current values of systemic risk are less likely to be the result
of previous credit risk-taking. Then, I use a dynamic panel GMM estimation to remove the
effects of previous credit risk-taking.
1.5.3.1 Lead-lag Analysis
I first use a set of lead-lag analyses to detect any cross-correlation between systemic risk
and credit risk-taking. If systemic risk leads credit risk, then banks are likely to make endoge-
nous decisions on their loan portfolio credit risk-taking conditioned on systemic risk. If credit
risk leads systemic risk, then raising concern about reverse causality becomes necessary.
In a range of specifications, I first use systemic risk in quarter t− 1, together with other
controls, to predict credit risk-taking in quarter t and use credit risk-taking in quarter t− 1
and other controls to predict systemic risk in quarter t. Table 1.12 presents the results.
The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (4) is borrower distance-to-default DDi,t and
the dependent variable in Columns (5) to (8) is bank systemic risk ∆CoV aRj,t−1. The key
variables of interest are ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and DDi,t−1. In Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6), I
only include main regressors of interest, whereas in Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) I include
all control variables. In Columns (1) to (4), the coefficients of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 are significant
at the 1% level, indicating that lagged systemic risk affects the next period’s credit risk-
taking. Economically, taking the coefficient of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 in Column (3), a one standard
deviation increase in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 is associated with a 0.063 standard deviation decrease in
distance-to-default. However, in Columns (5) to (8), I find that the coefficients of DDi,t−1
are insignificant in all four specifications. In sum, I find lagged systemic risk can predict
credit risk-taking and lagged credit risk-taking cannot predict systemic risk.
1.5.3.2 Dynamic Panel GMM Models
Although the lead-lag analysis shows that one-period lagged credit risk-taking does not
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predict contemporaneous systemic risk, it is still possible that past credit risk-taking affects
future systemic risk through multiple loans across multiple periods. Following Wintoki et al.
(2012), I use a dynamic panel GMM analysis to further alleviate this concern. The dy-
namic panel GMM method allows current explanatory variables to be influenced by previous
realizations of the dependent variable. This eliminates unobservable heterogeneity by first-
differencing all dependent and independent variables and using a combination of historical
variables as valid instruments to account for simultaneity.
The GMM estimation consists of four steps: First, I convert the regression equation to
a bank-quarter panel regression. For all loans originated by bank j in quarter t, I calcu-
late their weighted average (based on total loan amount) borrower distance-to-default and
refer to it as PortfolioDD. I follow the same method to generate the average borrower
and loan characteristics. Then, the regression is converted to a panel regression using quar-
terly PortfolioDD as the dependent variable, quarterly systemic risks as main independent
variables, and quarterly bank, average borrower, and average loan characteristics as control
variables. Second, the regression equation is rewritten as a dynamic model, adding three




p=1PortfolioDDj,t−p + β2∆CoV aRj,t + Lk,tγ +Bj,tδ
+ Fi,tζ + Etη + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,t
(6)
Third, I first-difference all variables in Equation (6) to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity
and omitted variable bias. Fourth, I estimate the model using the dynamic panel GMM
method and use lagged regressors as instruments for the present values of regressors, which
controls for potential simultaneity and reverse causality (Saunders, Schmid, and Walter,
2016). This estimation procedure allows all the explanatory variables to be treated as en-
dogenous7. Table 1.13 reports the results of the GMM estimation. The results across all six
7 The dynamic GMM test is not without its flaws. All loans used to compute lagged PortfolioDD are
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columns confirm a negative contribution of systemic risks to borrower distance-to-default.
1.6. How Does Managerial Style Affect Bank Credit
Risk-taking and Sensitivity to Systemic Risk?
In the previous section, I document that banks endogenously increase their credit risk-
taking on syndicated bank loans as their systemic risk increases. I assumed banks homo-
geneously respond to systemic risk. In fact, when I separately estimate β1 in Equation (3)
for individual banks, I find there is much heterogeneity across banks. Table 1.14 shows the
estimated β1 for selected largest U.S. bank holding companies. Note that β1 presents for a
bank’s credit risk-taking sensitivity to systemic risk during non-recession periods. Table 1.14
shows a wide variation in credit risk-taking sensitivity across different me banks to systemic
risk, which questions the factors driving this heterogeneity. This section provides evidence
that some bank executive-specific effects, termed as managerial styles, play an important
role in explaining banks credit risk-taking and the credit-risk sensitivity to systemic risk.
First, I apply the estimated manager innovation styles into the baseline regression of
Equation (1.7), and interact them with the systemic risk measure:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 × AIj,t−1 + β3∆CoV aRj,t−1 × LIj,t−1
+ β4AIj,t−1 + β5LIj,t−1 + Lk,tγ + B j,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
(7)
where subscripts i, j, k, m, and t indicate the borrowing firm, the bank, the package, the
manager, and time, respectively. The observations are by package-manager pairs. AIj,t−1
and LIj,t−1 are the average manager asset and liability innovation indexes for all managers
working for bank j in quarter t−1. The dependent variable DDi,j,k,t is borrower distance-to-
newly originated loans in respective quarters as it is hard to control for the effect of all existing loans due to
data limitations.
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default at the time of loan origination and is explained by bank systemic risk ∆CoV aRj,t−1,
average innovation indexes AIj,t−1 and LIj,t−1, the interaction of systemic risk with innova-
tion indexes, loan characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t−1, borrower characteristics
Fi,t−1, and macroeconomic controls E t−1. I use time fixed effects µt based on the year of loan
origination to take into account the credit cycle in the economy in general. I use borrower
industry fixed effects φi and bank fixed effects θj to absorb any time-invariant unobservable
borrower and lender heterogeneity.
Table 1.15 presents the results. In Column (1), I repeat the baseline regression of Equa-
tion (3) using the Execucomp-merged dataset. The results for the main variables in Column
(1) do not qualitatively differ from those in Table 1.7, indicating that the Execucomp-merged
sample is comparable with the one in baseline regressions. In Columns (2) and (3), I in-
teract ∆CoV aRj,t−1 with AIj,t−1 and LIj,t−1, respectively, and in Column (4) I add both
interaction terms into the specification. The results in the first row of all columns of Table
1.15 are consistent with the direct relationship between credit risk and systemic risk pre-
sented in Table 1.7. Banks’ credit risk-taking increases with their systemic risk contribution.
The coefficients on AIj,t−1 are negative and significant at 5% or 1% level, indicating that
asset-innovating managers take higher credit risk than other managers. Economically, taking
0.200 in Column (2) as an example, starting from the average level, for each one standard
deviation (0.588) increase in AIj,t−1, DDi,j,k,t decreases by -0.1176 (−0.200×0.588), which is
about 2.4% of its standard deviation. On the contrary, the coefficients on LIj,t−1 are positive
and significant at 5% or 1% level, indicating that liability-innovating managers take lower
credit risk than others. Economically, taking 0.224 in Column (3) as an example, for each
one standard deviation (0.627) increase in LIj,t−1, DDi,j,k,t increases by 0.132 (0.224×0.588),
which is about 2.6% of its standard deviation. Although the economic significance of the
two variables is relatively low, and considering that credit risk-taking is jointly determined
by borrowers, lenders, and macroeconomic conditions while senior managers do not directly
engage in the origination of loan contracts, the economic significance of manager innovation
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style is still sizable enough to draw attention.
The two results above jointly support the predictions of Hypothesis 4. Asset-innovating
managers are more likely to increase credit risk-taking given their ability to utilize non-
traditional bank assets (i.e., credit derivatives or structured instruments) or activities (i.e.,
loan sales or securitizations) to hedge credit risk (as discussed by: Güner (2006) and Cebenoyan
& Strahan (2004) for loan sales; Franke & Krahnen (2007) for CDS and risk sharing; and
Nadauld & Weisbach (2012) for loan securitization), reduce economic or regulatory capital,
and actively manage the credit risk of their loan portfolio (see Norden et al. (2014) for a
discussion of these channels). These financial innovations facilitate the extension of credit
and allow banks to increase risk appetite (Hirtle (2009)). The “originate to distribute” prod-
ucts may also increase credit risk-taking of the transfer of risk leads to incentive problems
at banks. My results suggest that asset-innovating managers do take higher credit risk on
the syndicated loan market, which is consistent with this strand of literature. Liability-
innovating managers, with a preference for non-deposit funding, are better able to avoid
intense competition on traditional retail deposits and lower the cost of bank funding by
using wholesale funding (only when its prices are less volatile and the bank’s systemic risk
is low). As the incentives of banks to invest in risky projects increase with the cost of its
funding, banks with cheap sources of funding pursue more conservative risk strategies (Allen
& Gale (2000), Hellmann et al. (2000)). My results show that liability-innovating managers
take lower credit risk on loans and, therefore, are consistent with this argument. In sum,
the results for individual terms of AIj,t−1 and LIj,t−1 are consistent with the predictions of
Hypothesis 4.
The coefficients on the interaction of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and AIj,t−1 show how the relation-
ship between credit risk and systemic risk changes when the asset-innovating preference of
managers changes. The interaction is positive and significant at 1% level, indicating that
asset-innovating managers marginally reduce credit risk-taking when systemic risk goes up.
In terms of economic significance, taking 0.031 in Column (2) as an example, for a manager
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whose asset innovation is at the 25th percentile (lower than 75% of other managers) in the
sample, which is -0.566 (as shown in Panel H of Table 1.5), a one standard deviation increase
(1.755) in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 is associated with a decrease in DDi,j,k,t by 0.471 (-0.251 1.755 +
0.031 (-0.566) 1.755), which is about 9.146% of its standard deviation (0.471/5.153) and is
relatively sizable. In contrast, for a manager whose asset innovation is at the 75th percentile
(lower than 25% of other managers) in the sample, which is 0.057 (as shown in Panel H of
Table 1.5), a one standard deviation increase (1.755) in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 is associated with a
decrease in DDi,j,k,t by 0.437 (−0.251×1.755+0.031×0.057×1.755), which is about 8.488%
of its standard deviation (0.437/5.153).
The results for the interaction between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and AIj,t−1 indicate that credit
risk still increases with systemic risk but increases less if the manager is an asset innovator.
In other words, the bank’s credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk is lower (less positive) for
asset-innovating managers. As a bank’s systemic risk rises, the prices of its assets (partic-
ularly non-traditional assets) are more vulnerable to external shocks, thereby forcing asset-
innovating managers to limit their idiosyncratic risk-taking so as to avoid bank insolvency
and illiquidity. This suggests a procyclical pattern of lending by asset-innovating managers,
similar to the findings of DeYoung & Rice (2004), Stiroh (2006), and Stiroh & Rumble
(2006) that show a relationship between non-interest income and increased volatility. Thus,
the positive coefficients on interaction between ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and AIj,t−1 are consistent with
Hypothesis 5.
With regard to liability innovation, the coefficients on the interaction of ∆CoV aRj,t−1
and LIj,t−1 show how the relationship between credit risk and systemic risk differs across
managers with different liability-innovating preferences. The interaction is negative and
significant at 1% level, indicating that liability-innovating managers marginally increase
credit risk-taking when systemic risk goes up. Economically, taking 0.041 in Column (3) as
an example, for a manager whose liability innovation is at the 25th percentile (lower than
75% of other managers) in the sample, which is -0.478 (as shown in Panel H of Table 1.5),
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a one standard deviation increase (1.755) in ∆CoV aRj,t−1 is associated with a decrease in
DDi,j,k,t by 0.415 (-0.217 1.755 + 0.041 (-0.478) 1.755), which is about 8.058% of its
standard deviation (0.415/5.153). In contrast, for a manager whose liability innovation is
at the 75th percentile (lower than 25% of other managers) in the sample, which is 0.322 (as
shown in Panel H of Table 1.5), a one standard deviation increase (1.755) in ∆CoV aRj,t−1
is associated with a decrease in DDi,j,k,t by 0.358 (−0.217× 1.755 + 0.041× 0.322× 1.755),
which is about 6.941% of it standard deviation (0.358/5.153).
The results on the interaction of ∆CoV aRj,t−1 and LIj,t−1 suggest that loan credit risk-
taking is more sensitive to the bank’s systemic risk. Compared with traditional retail depos-
itors, innovative fund providers, such as wholesale financiers, are not insured, are relatively
more sophisticated, and are more sensitive to systemic shocks. Therefore, providers of non-
deposit funds can exit or withdraw their liquidity faster than retail depositors in cases when
a bank’s systemic risk increases, which may sharply increase a bank’s funding costs in the
short term and force them to undertake risky projects on the syndicated loan market. This
problem would be severer for banks managed by managers who deviate from the traditional
deposit-taking model and are more innovative in their liability structure. My finding here,
therefore, is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 6.
Collectively, the results displayed in Table 1.15 suggest that idiosyncratic managerial
styles, which cannot be captured by compensation incentives or other observable bank vari-
ables, are highly correlated with banks’ actual credit risk-taking and help explain the het-
erogeneous differences across banks’ credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk. These results are
consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3. To some extent, this finding helps explain
the existence of some persistent heterogeneous risk-taking across banks.
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1.6.1. Alternative Explanation: The Effect of Bank Innovation
Styles
An alternative explanation for the above results could be that managerial asset and
liability innovation preferences capture not only the managerial styles but also the bank-
level innovation preferences. To address this hypothesis, I use both bank and manager
innovation styles to explain credit risk-taking:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankAIj,t−1 + β3∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankLIj,t−1
+ β4∆CoV aRj,t−1 × AIj,t−1 + β5∆CoV aRj,t−1 × LIj,t−1 + β6AIj,t−1 + β7LIj,t−1
+ Lk,tγ + B j,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
(8)
where subscripts i, j, and k denote the borrowing firm, the bank, and the loan, respectively.
t is the quarter when loan k was originated. BankAIj is bank j’s time-invariant asset inno-
vation index (loading on Factor 1). BankLIj is bank j’s time-invariant liability innovation
index (loading on Factor 2). AIj,t−1 is the simple average manager asset innovation index
(loadings on Factor 1) for all managers working for bank j at time t−1. LIj,t−1 is the simple
average manager liability innovation dimension index (loading on Factor 2) for all managers
working for bank j at time t.
Table 1.16 presents the results. The same set of control variables in Table 1.15 are used
here and their results are omitted. In addition, the terms for individual bank-level style are
absorbed by bank fixed effects, thus, only their interactions with systemic risk are estimated.
The first row of Table 1.16 further confirms the direct relationship between idiosyncratic
credit risk and systemic risk. Further, the results on managerial style are consistent with
those presented in Table 1.15, which is in support of Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. However, none
of the results on bank style (AI or LI) are statistically significant at the 5% level. This is
also consistent with Hypothesis 7 in that it is managerial style, not bank style that drive
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bank risk-taking.
The results in Table 1.16 suggest that managerial style is more important than bank
style in explaining bank risk-taking. This either implies that bank culture is a term that is
very hard to capture or quantify, or highlights the importance of top managers in shaping a
bank’s behavior. Admittedly, a bank-wide style in a large bank can be hard to observe, but
the “tone at the top” may be more crucial and easily observable. This finding is, therefore,
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 7.
1.6.2. Effect of Managerial Profiles
In this section, I further investigate managerial styles by identifying an overall managerial
profile based on the net effect of innovation preferences for each manager. As in Panel D of
Table 1.5, I assign each manager into one of four profiles based on whether their innovation
index is above or below the median level of the sample: (1) Asset Innovator (innovating
on assets but traditional on liability); (2) Dual Innovator; (3) Traditionalist (traditional on
both asset and liability); and (4) Liability Innovator (innovating in liability but traditional
on assets). I then estimate the following fixed effects regression:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 × Profilej,t−1 + β3Profilej,t−1
+ Lk,tγ + B j,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
(9)
where subscripts i, j, and k denote the borrowing firm, the bank, and the loan, respectively.
t is the quarter when loan k was originated. The dependent variable DDi,j,k,t is borrower
distance-to-default at the time of loan origination and is explained by bank systemic risk
∆CoV aRj,t−1, a set of dummy variables representing each manager profile Profilej,t−1, loan
characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t−1, borrower characteristics Fi,t−1, and macroe-
conomic controls Et−1. I use time fixed effects µt based on the year of loan origination to take
into account the credit cycle in the economy in general. I use borrower industry fixed effects
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φi and bank fixed effects θj to absorb any time-invariant unobservable borrower or lender
heterogeneity. To prevent different managerial profiles with the top management team from
contaminating the results, I only include banks that have only one type of manager.
Table 1.17 presents the results. The results in Columns (2)-(5) of Table 1.17 show that
credit risk-taking sensitivity to systemic risk is significantly weaker for banks managed by
Asset Innovators and significantly stronger for asset Traditionalists regardless of their liability
innovation types. Specifically, the credit risk sensitivity to systemic risk is stronger for
Liability Innovators and Traditionalists, weaker for pure innovators, and weakest for Asset
Innovators. This pattern implies that Liability Innovators behave more like traditionalists
while Dual Innovators do not exhibit any similar specific pattern with Asset Innovators or
Liability Innovators.
To validate that these managerial profiles are a relevant depiction of the impact of man-
agerial preferences on risk-taking, a placebo test is used for the executives in the sample of
Table 1.17. In particular, managers are randomly assigned into one of the four profile groups
and their effects on the credit risk-taking sensitivity to systemic risk are investigated. Table
1.18 shows that the randomly assigned styles do not influence banks’ reactions to systemic
risks, thereby confirming my managerial profile measure.
1.6.3. Managerial Systemic Risk Styles
To this point, I have identified managerial style by observing balance sheet positions at
the bank level. However, managerial style may relate specifically to systemic risk itself. For
example, a manager’s attitude toward the government safety net may dictate the manager’s
preference for systemic risk. That is, the manager’s willingness to exploit the government
safety net may impact the choice of underpriced systemic risk. In this section, I examine
the manager’s systemic risk style. As shown in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, manager fixed effects
can explain much of the variation in the bank’s actual systemic risk-taking. Table 1.6
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further shows that the asset and liability innovation styles of managers are of great systemic
relevance. I utilize these results to identify the manager’s persistent systemic risk style.
Examining the relationship between managerial systemic risk style and idiosyncratic credit
risk emphasizes the relationship between credit risk and systemic risk. I first decompose
bank systemic risk in each period into two components. The first component is the manager
fixed effects estimated from Panel B of Table 1.3 and the second is the actual systemic
risk exposure excluding the manager fixed effects. The second component thus includes the
predicted value of systemic risk from all other regressors plus the residual value and presents
the bank’s systemic risk-taking that is free from the impact of managerial style. Thus, the
bank’s actual systemic risk ∆CoV aRj,t is equal to the sum of the two components:
∆CoV aRj,t = θ̂m + ∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,t), (10)
where θ̂m is manager m’s systemic risk-taking style and ∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,t) is the bank’s systemic
risk-taking excluding the effect of manager impact8. I examine the joint effects of the two
components on bank credit risk-taking in the following regression:
DDi,j,k,m,t =β1∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,m) + β2∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,m) × θ̂m + β3θ̂m
+ Lk,tγ +Bj,tδ + Fi,tζ + Etη + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,m,t
(11)
where the dependent variable DDi,j,k,m,t is explained by the two components of systemic risk
and their interaction, loan characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t, borrower character-
istics Fi,t, macroeconomic controls Et, time effects µt, borrower industry fixed effects φi, and
bank fixed effects θj. The observations are by loan-manager pairs.
Table 1.19 presents the results. I find that both higher θ̂m and ∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,t) are sig-
nificantly associated with high credit risk-taking. This indicates that both components are
relevant in determining the bank’s higher credit risk-taking. Further, the interaction term
8 This component cannot rule out the impact of managers through observable bank financial variables or
other time-variant unobservable variables.
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of the two components is also significantly associated with credit risk-taking, which implies
a credit risk amplification process such that when systemic risk preferences increase, the
bank’s idiosyncratic credit risk exposure also increases. In Columns (2) and (3), I restrict
the sample to only CEOs or CFOs to examine who is driving this effect. I find the amplifi-
cation effects only exist on CEOs, which highlights the importance of CEOs in determining
a bank’s risk-taking. Overall, the results in Table 1.19 suggest that manager systemic risk
style, especially the CEO’s managerial style, is as important as their innovation style in
explaining banks’ credit risk-taking.
1.7. Conclusion
This chapter investigates whether and how financial institutions adjust their credit risk
exposure in their syndicated bank loan portfolios in response to systemic risks. I find a
direct relationship between the two risks such that credit risk increases as systemic risk in-
creases, and results are robustness to borrower self-selections and reverse causality concerns.
However, different banks react differently during systemic crises. I identify managerial pref-
erences (or styles) for asset innovation, liability innovation, and systemic risk using a series
of three-way fixed effects regressions and find that managerial styles delineate the bank’s
risk-taking decisions so that unobservable executive personal traits play an important role
in affecting the bank’s reaction to a potential systemic risk crisis. Specifically, I find that
credit risk-taking is more sensitive to the bank’s systemic risk if the bank’s manager exhibits
a preference for higher systemic risk, suggesting an amplifying effect of managerial styles. I
also find that when a bank’s systemic risk is low, asset-innovating managers generally take
higher credit risk on syndicated bank loans, which can be attributed to their higher capa-
bility of hedging and selling off credit risk through non-traditional assets and activities such
as securitizations, while liability-innovating managers generally take lower credit risk, which
could be due to the low cost but short-term non-traditional funding sources such as whole-
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sale funding. When a bank’s systemic risk rises, compared with others, asset-innovating
managers marginally decrease credit risk-taking as their asset portfolios are more vulnerable
to external shocks, while liability-innovating managers increase credit risk to compensate
for the increased funding costs from non-deposit funding market. Managerial style is more
important than bank style in explaining banks’ credit risk-taking sensitivity to systemic
risk, indicating that possible moral hazard risk taking concerns emanate from human, not
institutional factors.
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Figure 1.1. Graphical Clustering of Managerial Styles
This figure presents the graphical clustering of managerial styles. Using factor analysis, I
extract two factors (Factor1 and Factor2) that summarize a large portion of the correlation
matrix of managerial styles and categorize managers into four profiles based on their loadings
on the two factors. Asset Innovators are managers with loading on Factor1 higher than
the median level and loading on Factor 2 lower than the median level, Dual Innovators
are managers with loadings on Factor 1 and Factor2 both higher than the median levels,
Traditionalists are managers with loadings on Factor 1 and Factor 2 lower than the median
levels, Liability Innovators are those managers with loading on Factor 1 lower than the mean
level and loading on Factor 2 higher than the median level.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the Dealscan-Compustat-Y-9C merged sample (Panel A) and Dealscan-Compustat-Y-
9C-Execucomp merged sample (Panel B). All loans are originated between January 1992 and December 2016. Syndicated loan
data are obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan loan database. Bank characteristics data are collected from
the Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (”FR Y-9C”) available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
website. Borrower balance sheet data are obtained from Compustat. The number of observations (N) indicates the sample on
which the summary statistics are based. N is by package-lender, where lender is identified at the bank holding company level.
ln(Deal Amount) is the natural logarithm of the package size (in millions). ln(Maturity) is the natural log of the maturity of the
package (in months), where deal maturity is the weighted average maturity of all facilities in the package. ln(Number of Leads)
is the natural logarithm of the number of lead lenders in the deal syndicate. Secured is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if at least one facility in the package is secured, and 0 otherwise. Distance-to-default is the expected distance-to-default
calculated using method from Bharath & Shumway (2008). ln(Borrower Size)is the natural logarithm of borrower’s total assets
(in billions); Borrower Tangibility is borrower total property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; Borrower Leverage is
borrower’s total debt divided by total assets. Lending Relationship is the dollar amount of loans to borrower i by bank j in last
5 years over the total dollar amount of loans borrowed by borrower i in last 5 years. ∆CoV aR is the time-varying microlevel
systemic risk calculated following in Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016). Non-interest income is bank non-interest income over the
sum of interest income and non-interest income, Loans are total loans over total assets, MBS are mortgage backed securities over
total assets, Derivatives are trading contracts over total assets, Lending diversification is 1 minus Herfindahl index of the shares
of real estate, C&I, consumer, and other loans out of total loans, Liquidity Gap is the 12-month liquidity gap over total assets,
LoansDeposits is the ratio between total loans and total deposits, and Non-deposit funding is the ratio between non-deposit
funding over total liabilities. ln(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets, Capital Ratio is total equity over
total assets, Core Deposit is the portion of total deposits (sum of interest-bearing deposits and non-interest-bearing deposits)
that excludes deposits of $100,000 or more divided by total deposits, Productivity is total assets over the number of full-time
employees, Market to Book is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market to book value of equity, and Return on Equity is the
bank’s net income over book equity. Liquidity is the sum of cash and available-for-sale securities over total assets; Loan Charge
offs is the total charge-offs on loans and leases over total assets; Loan Loss Allowance is the total allowance for loan and lease
losses over total assets; Risk Weighted Assets is total risk weighted assets divided over total assets. Trading Assets is total
trading assets over total assets. Intangible assets is the sum of goodwill and other intangible assets over total assets. Delta is
the natural logarithm of the dollar changes in manager pay to stock price performance divided by cash compensation. Vega
is the natural logarithm of the dollar changes in manager pay associated with a 1% increase in stock return volatility divided
by cash compensation. Bonus is the natural logarithm of cash bonus. Coincident is the 12-month average of the monthly
coincident index in the state of the bank. CATFIN is the macro-level systemic risk borrowed from Allen et al. (2012). GDP is
quarterly growth rate of U.S. quarterly GDP per capita. Coincident is the 12-month average of the monthly coincident index
in the state of the bank.
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Panel A. Dealscan-Compustat-Y-9C Merged Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std. P25 P75
Loan Characteristics
Deal Amount ($million) 36,526 878.017 400.000 1,555.896 150.000 1,000.000
ln(Deal Amount) 36,526 19.677 19.807 1.504 18.826 20.723
Maturity (in months) 36,526 49.480 59.891 20.530 36.000 60.000
ln(Deal Maturity) 36,526 3.775 4.093 0.566 3.584 4.094
Number of Lead Banks 36,526 4.141 4.000 2.716 2.000 5.000
Number of Participants 36,526 14.724 12.000 12.145 7.000 19.000
Secured 36,526 0.576 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000
Allocation Share (Deal, in %) 17,909 10.638 7.750 10.551 4.230 13.330
Allocation Share (Facility, in %) 14,322 11.170 8.330 10.650 4.923 13.637
Borrower Characteristics
Distance-to-default 36,526 6.772 6.002 4.903 3.433 9.184
Borrower Tangibility 36,526 0.310 0.243 0.233 0.126 0.446
Borrower Total Assets ($billion) 36,526 6.752 1.828 14.621 0.610 5.777
Borrower Leverage 36,526 0.322 0.298 0.194 0.188 0.426
Lending Relationship 36,526 0.471 0.482 0.435 0.000 1.000
Bank Characteristics
∆CoV aR 36,526 5.216 4.351 2.550 3.432 6.302
Total Assets ($billion) 36,526 778.874 427.849 748.184 167.830 1317.591
Capital Ratio 36,526 0.085 0.083 0.016 0.074 0.094
ln(Market to book) 36,526 0.450 0.516 0.533 0.109 0.796
Core deposits 36,526 91.707 92.508 5.195 89.571 95.481
Productivity 36,526 5.130 4.725 2.333 3.287 6.605
Return on Equity 36,526 0.083 0.078 0.052 0.041 0.115
Liquidity 36,523 0.115 0.090 0.084 0.047 0.164
Loan Charge-offs 36,526 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.006
Loan Loss Allowance 36,526 0.020 0.018 0.009 0.014 0.023
Risk-Weighted Assets 32,781 0.790 0.797 0.144 0.701 0.874
Trading Assets 35,214 0.069 0.030 0.086 0.007 0.113
Intangible Assets 36,511 0.028 0.026 0.018 0.012 0.041
Non-interest income 36,526 34.613 33.726 11.878 26.463 41.711
Loans 36,526 56.666 61.059 15.296 45.493 68.106
MBS 36,526 1.437 0.741 2.660 0.071 1.656
Derivatives 34,082 138.686 100.909 125.301 24.510 265.243
Lending diversification 36,526 0.596 0.609 0.078 0.554 0.648
Liquidity Gap 36,526 -27.624 -28.081 11.116 -35.485 -20.691
Loans/Deposits 36,526 91.976 93.017 20.532 81.963 104.640
Non-deposit funding 36,526 31.814 30.390 13.374 22.212 39.840
Macroeconomic Conditions
CATFIN 36,526 2.393 2.286 0.926 1.644 2.968
GDP Growth 36,526 2.662 2.730 1.565 1.650 4.080
Coincident 36,526 138.613 139.662 20.746 124.327 151.827
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Panel B. Dealscan-Compustat-Y-9C-Execucomp Merged Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std. P25 P75
Loan Characteristics
Deal Amount ($million) 33,016 1051.334 500.000 1874.995 210.000 1150.000
ln(Deal Amount) 33,016 19.981 20.030 1.301 19.163 20.863
Maturity (in months) 33,016 46.949 60.000 21.050 36.000 60.000
ln(Deal Maturity) 33,016 3.742 4.094 0.585 3.584 4.094
Number of Lead Banks 33,016 5.533 5.000 4.808 2.000 7.000
Number of Participants 33,016 13.560 11.000 10.872 6.000 18.000
Secured 33,016 0.512 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Borrower Characteristics
Distance-to-default 33,016 7.881 7.107 5.153 4.318 10.467
Borrower Tangibility 33,016 0.316 0.245 0.239 0.129 0.451
Borrower Total Assets ($billion) 33,016 9.878 2.640 21.290 0.892 8.599
Borrower Leverage 33,016 0.307 0.290 0.172 0.187 0.403
Lending Relationship 33,016 0.531 0.583 0.449 0.000 1.000
Bank Characteristics
∆CoV aR 33,016 4.025 3.517 1.755 2.870 4.660
Total Assets ($billion) 33,016 694.193 269.311 777.923 86.064 1328.001
Capital Ratio 33,016 0.094 0.088 0.025 0.076 0.107
ln(Market to book) 33,016 0.437 0.470 0.569 0.098 0.799
Core deposits 33,016 88.387 90.942 9.187 85.842 93.902
Productivity 33,016 4.519 3.924 2.465 2.805 5.518
Return on Equity 33,016 0.081 0.076 0.050 0.041 0.112
Liquidity 33,016 0.119 0.097 0.082 0.048 0.178
Loan Charge-offs 33,016 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.007
Loan Loss Allowance 33,016 0.020 0.017 0.008 0.014 0.023
Risk-Weighted Assets 30,683 0.778 0.785 0.142 0.682 0.863
Trading Assets 32,423 0.080 0.038 0.087 0.009 0.143
Intangible Assets 33,016 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.016 0.042
Non-interest income 33,016 25.436 22.477 14.199 16.160 31.685
Loans 33,016 62.167 66.032 14.234 57.767 71.450
MBS 33,016 1.346 0.174 2.842 0.000 1.419
Derivatives 31,625 42.613 1.136 88.502 0.000 26.708
Lending diversification 33,016 0.513 0.524 0.130 0.416 0.621
Liquidity Gap 33,016 21.132 22.679 16.424 10.958 32.765
Loans/Deposits 33,016 93.553 93.046 43.975 82.549 101.992
Non-deposit funding 33,016 23.938 21.116 14.941 14.055 29.684
Manager Characteristics
Delta 33,016 0.226 0.114 0.444 0.056 0.235
Vega 33,016 0.076 0.030 0.266 0.012 0.073
Bonus 33,016 3.991 5.239 3.166 0.000 6.399
Male 33,016 0.978 1.000 0.145 1.000 1.000
Age 33,016 68.364 69.000 9.174 61.000 75.000
Macroeconomic Conditions
CATFIN 33,016 7.701 7.756 2.810 5.284 9.676
GDP Growth 33,016 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.007

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B. Three-way fixed effects regressions on bank systemic risk






















































Fixed effects Time, Bank, Manager
Number of manager FE 874
Adjusted R2 for two-way fixed effects model

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Managerial Styles and Bank Styles - Factor Analysis
Panel A presents the correlations between managerial styles in bank business policy variables. The manager styles are estimated
with three-way fixed effects as in Panel A of Table 1.3. Non-interest income is bank non-interest income over the sum of interest
income and non-interest income, Loans are total loans over total assets, MBS are mortgage backed securities over total assets,
Derivatives are trading contracts over total assets, Lending diversification is 1 minus Herfindahl index of the shares of real estate,
C&I, consumer, and other loans out of total loans, Liquidity Gap is the 12-month liquidity gap over total assets, Loans/Deposits
is the ratio between total loans and total deposits, and Non-deposit funding is the ratio between non-deposit funding over total
liabilities. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Banks styles are the bank fixed
effects estimated from Panel A of Table 1.3. Panel B (Panel E) presents the top four major factors that explain most of the
total variation among managerial (bank) styles. Panel C (Panel F) shows the factor loadings on each policy style by the four
factors. Panel D (Panel G) shows four manager (bank) profiles: Asset Innovators are managers (banks) with loading on Factor1
higher than the median level and loading on Factor 2 lower than the median level, Dual Innovators are managers (banks) with
loadings on Factor 1 and Factor2 both higher than the median levels, Traditionalists are managers (banks) with loading on
Factor 1 and Factor 2 lower than the median levels, Liability Innovators are managers (banks) with loading on Factor 1 lower
than the median level and loading on Factor 2 higher than the median level. The number of managers (banks) for each profile
are included in the parenthesis.
Panel A. Manager Fixed Effects Correlation




Derivatives 0.570 -0.300 0.199
Lending Diversification 0.281 -0.226 -0.053 0.473
Liquidity Gap -0.137 -0.115 0.137 -0.144 -0.220
Loans to Deposits 0.061 -0.003 0.151 -0.042 -0.126 0.042
Non-deposit funding 0.139 -0.199 0.121 -0.118 -0.167 0.123 0.197
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Panel B. Factor Analysis - Manager Fixed Effects
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 3.91806 2.43493 0.6988 0.6988
Factor2 1.48313 1.19896 0.2645 0.9633
Factor3 0.28417 0.08931 0.0507 1.014
Factor4 0.19486 0.13989 0.0348 1.0487
Panel C. Factor Loadings on Manager Fixed Effects
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
Non-interest income 0.8382 0.3239 -0.2053 0.0577
Loans -0.9371 -0.1502 0.1326 0.1015
MBS 0.7556 0.0463 -0.0058 -0.2273
Derivatives 0.8718 -0.0785 0.1615 0.1846
Lending Diversification 0.7602 0.0465 0.3115 0.13
Liquidity Gap -0.1735 0.3591 -0.2458 0.2685
Loans/Deposits -0.627 0.6639 0.1963 -0.0177
Non-deposit funding 0.0732 0.8806 0.0486 -0.0785
Panel D. Average Factor Loadings, by Manager Style
Factor 1 (Asset Innovation) Factor 2 (Liability Innovatio)
Asset Innovator (237) 0.7329 -0.3559
Dual Innovator (146) 1.0624 0.2237
Traditionalist (146) -0.6219 -0.3919
Liability Innovator (237) -0.9586 0.0054
Panel E. Factor Analysis - Bank Fixed Effects
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.6757 1.7168 0.6658 0.6658
Factor2 0.9589 0.3982 0.2386 0.9045
Factor3 0.5607 0.1883 0.1395 1.044
Factor4 0.3724 0.3448 0.0927 1.1367
Panel F. Factor Loadings on Bank Fixed Effects
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
Non-interest income 0.7124 0.1372 -0.211 0.3175
Loans -0.8774 -0.2048 -0.0236 0.2255
MBS 0.6518 0.1669 -0.3193 -0.1829
Derivatives 0.5916 -0.1165 0.3425 0.1054
Lending Diversification 0.6002 -0.2281 0.2531 0.2555
Liquidity Gap -0.174 0.3251 -0.3369 0.2933
Loans/Deposits -0.4639 0.4666 0.2351 0.1361
Non-deposit funding 0.1336 0.6937 0.252 -0.0795
Panel G. Average Factor Loadings, by Bank Style
Factor 1 (Asset Innovation) Factor 2 (Liability Innovation)
Asset Innovating Bank (25) 0.5385 -0.428
Dual Innovation Bank (18) 0.8483 0.6589
Traditional Bank (19) -0.5318 -0.5427
Liability Innovating Bank (23) -0.8099 0.3978
Panel H. Summary Statistics for Manager and Bank Style
N Mean Median Std. P25 P75
Managerial Innovation Styles
Asset Innovation (Factor 1) 766 -0.176 -0.279 0.588 -0.566 0.057
Liability Innovation (Factor 2) 766 -0.041 -0.110 0.627 -0.478 0.322
Systemic Risk-taking Style 874 -0.091 -0.028 1.177 -0.786 0.598
Bank Innovation Styles
Asset Innovation (Factor 1) 85 0.000 -0.019 0.916 -0.088 0.097























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Systemic Risk and Credit Risk: Fixed Effects Regressions
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following fixed effects regression:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×Recessiont−1 + β3Recessiont−1
+ Lk,tγ + Bj,t−1θ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,t,k,t,
where subscript i, j, k denote the borrowing firm, the bank, the loan, respectively. t is the quarter when loan k was originated.
The regressions are run at the package level and observations are by package-lender pairs, where lenders include both lead
lenders and participants. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by bank and presented in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Distance− to−Defaulti,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Systemic Risk
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.309*** -0.184*** -0.329*** -0.201*** -0.203*** -0.200***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.028) (0.033)
CATFINt−1 -0.469*** -0.452*** -0.613***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.034)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 × CATFINt−1 0.027***
(0.003)





ln(DealAmount)k,t -0.017 -0.024** -0.024** -0.016
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
ln(Maturity)k,t 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.089***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
ln(NumberofLeads)k,t 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.084***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Securedk,t -0.043** -0.041** -0.048** -0.042**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Bank Characteristics
ln(BankTotalAssets)j,t−1 -0.047 -0.006 -0.001 -0.051
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039)
BankCapitalRatioj,t−1 0.431 -0.441 0.223 0.243
(1.049) (0.898) (0.935) (1.046)
BankReturnonEquityj,t−1 -0.899*** -0.468** -0.182 -0.766***
(0.217) (0.215) (0.220) (0.211)
Borrower Characteristics
BorrowerTangibilityj,t−1 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.130***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049)
BorrowerSizei,t−1 -0.021*** -0.018** -0.019** -0.022***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
BorrowerLeveragei,t−1 -1.171*** -1.115*** -1.100*** -1.170***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086)
DDi,t−1
0.953*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.954***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LendingRelationshipi,j,t−1 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Macroeconomic Controls
GDPt−1 -4.701 -8.943*** -4.593* -4.896
(3.309) (2.749) (2.379) (3.373)
Observations 54,987 54,987 54,987 54,987 54,987 54,987
Adjusted R2 0.901 0.902 0.892 0.893 0.894 0.893
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.11: Two-Stage Least Square Regressions (2SLS)
This table reports the results of the two-stage least square regressions. Each column corresponds to the column of the same
number in Table 1.7. Panel A reports the Anderson LM statistic for tests of identification and Sargan-Hansen statistics for test
of exogeneity for the 2SLS regressions. The null hypothesis for the test of identification is that the instruments (geographic
distance and number of banks) and endogenous variables (lending relationship) are not correlated and, in addition, that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid. Sargans chi-square statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments
are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Panel B
reports the coefficients estimates from the first stage regressions. The dependent variable LendingRelationshipi,j,t, is the dollar
amount of loans to borrower i by bank j in last 5 years over the total dollar amount of loans borrowed by borrower i in last
5 years. The two instrument variables are Distancei,j and No.ofBanksi. Distancei,j is the distance in thousand kilometers
between the location of the firm and the top holder of the lending bank at the time of loan origination. No.ofBanksi is the
number of financial institutions that filed Call Report during the quarter of loan origination in the borrowers state. Panel C
reports the coefficients estimates from the second stage. The dependent variable DDi,j,k,t, is the borrowers distance-to-default
at the time of loan origination. LendingRelationshipi,j,t is the fitted value from the first stage. Standard errors are clustered
by bank and presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Underidentification Test and Exogeneity Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Underidentification Test 33.326 33.203 29.124 29.029 28.867 29.112
(Anderson’s LM Statistic)
Chi-square P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.006 0.012 0.438 0.434 0.509 0.386
(Instrument Exogeneity Test)
Chi-square P-value 0.936 0.913 0.501 0.510 0.476 0.534
Panel B. 2SLS First Stage
LendingRelationshipi,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distancei,j -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
No.ofBanksi -0.066* -0.068* -0.052 -0.055 -0.055 -0.055
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 4909 4909 4909 4909 4909 4909
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.093 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116
Fixed Effects (Industry, Lender, Time) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C. 2SLS Second Stage
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.192*** -0.101*** -0.195*** -0.107*** -0.200*** -0.199***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.047) (0.023)
CATFINt -0.555*** -0.540*** -0.748***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.109)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 × CATFINt−1 0.033**
(0.014)




LendingRelationshipi,j,t 2.299*** 2.163*** 2.413*** 2.260*** 2.215** 2.477***
(0.817) (0.800) (0.889) (0.869) (0.867) (0.896)
Observations 4909 4909 4909 4909 4909 4909
Adjusted R2 0.842 0.849 0.841 0.848 0.850 0.838
Fixed Effects (Industry, Lender, Time) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.12: Lead-lag Effect Analysis
This table reports the coefficients estimates from the lead-lag analysis. The dependent variable in Column (1) - (4) is DDi,t, the
borrowers distance-to-default at the quarter of loan origination, and the dependent variable in Column (5) - (8) is ∆CoV aRj,t
, banks systemic risk. Standard errors are clustered by bank and presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DDi,t ∆CoV aRj,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.113*** -0.085*** -0.121*** -0.093*** 0.559*** 0.373*** 0.586*** 0.403***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
DistancetoDefaulti,t−1 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.946*** 0.945*** -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CATFINt -0.175*** -0.176*** 1.170*** 1.166***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Loan Characteristics
ln(DealAmount)k,t 0.021 0.023 -0.008 -0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
ln(Maturity)k,t 0.051** 0.045* -0.097*** -0.054**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
ln(NumberofLeads)k,t 0.096*** 0.093*** -0.043* -0.025
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Securedk,t 0.001 0.005 0.036 0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Bank Characteristics
ln(TotalAssets)j,t−1 -0.034 -0.029 0.305*** 0.276***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.054) (0.052)
CapitalRatioj,t−1 1.369 1.061 -0.803*** -8.764***
(1.263) (1.263) (1.397) (1.350)
ReturnonEquityj,t−1 1.213*** 1.287*** -5.169*** -5.660***
(0.246) (0.246) (0.272) (0.263)
Borrower Characteristics
BorrowerTangibilityj,t−1 -0.132** -0.134** -0.008 0.008
(0.056) (0.056) (0.062) (0.059)
BorrowerSizei,t−1 -0.026* -0.025* 0.033** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
BorrowerLeveragei,t−1 -0.843*** -0.847*** 0.072 0.097
(0.064) (0.064) (0.071) (0.069)
LendingRelationshipi,j,t−1 0.008 0.006 -0.039 -0.029
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Macroeconomic Controls
GDPt 0.092*** 0.086*** -0.461*** -0.427***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 22464 22464 22464 22464 22464 22464 22464 22464
Adjusted R2 0.888 0.889 0.890 0.890 0.620 0.645 0.636 0.660
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.13: Dynamic Panel GMM Regressions
This table reports the results from dynamic panel GMM regressions. The dependent variable, PortfolioDDj,t, is the value-
weighted (based on loan amount) average borrower distance-to-default for all loans originated by bank j in quarter t. AR(1)
and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals with the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation. Standard errors are clustered by bank and presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
PortfolioDDj,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRj,t -0.174*** -0.142*** -0.193*** -0.146*** -0.293** -0.372***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.062) (0.043) (0.125) (0.088)
CATFINt -0.161*** -0.361*** -0.513***
(0.042) (0.095) (0.158)






Observations 1550 1550 1505 1505 1505 1505
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of AR(1) test 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.001
P-value of AR(2) test 0.940 0.943 0.320 0.943 0.811 0.565
73
Table 1.14: Credit Risk-taking Sensitivity on Systemic Risk for Individual Banks
This table reports the estimated β1 (The credit risk-taking sensitivity to systemic risk during non-recession periods) in Equation
(3) for individual large U.S. bank holding companies for the sample period between January 1995 and December 2016.
RSSD ID Institution Name Credit Risk-taking Sensitivity to
Systemic Risk During Normal
Periods (β1 in Equation (3))
3587146 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION, THE -0.9075
1199611 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION -0.8599
1119794 U.S. BANCORP -0.8555
1068294 BANK ONE CORPORATION -0.7345
1068762 MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION -0.6312
1113514 FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION -0.6136
1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE -0.5126
1068025 KEYCORP -0.4112
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP -0.3796
1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED -0.2985
1073551 WACHOVIA CORPORATION -0.2878
1039502 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. -0.2854
1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY -0.2383
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. -0.2303
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION -0.1906
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. -0.1774
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION -0.0990
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Table 1.15: Credit Risk-taking Sensitivity on Systemic Risk - The Effect of Managerial Styles
This table reports the results of the following fixed effects regression:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×AIj,t−1 + β3∆CoV aRj,t−1 × LIj,t−1
+ β4AIj,t−1 + β5LIj,t−1 + Lk,tγ + Bj,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
where subscript i, j, k, and t indicate the borrowing firm, the bank, the package, and the time (quarter), respectively. The
regressions are run at the package level and observations are by package-lender pairs, where lenders include both lead lenders
and non-lead participants and are identified at the bank holding company level. AIj,t−1 and LIj,t−1 are the simple average
manager asset and liability innovation indexes for all managers working for bank j in quarter t − 1. The dependent variable,
DDi,j,k,t, is borrower distance-to-default at the time of loan origination and is explained by bank systemic risk ∆CoV aRj,t−1,
average innovation indexes AIj,t−1 and LIj,t−1, the interaction of systemic risk with innovation indexes, loan characteristics
Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t−1, borrower characteristics Fi,t−1, and macroeconomic controls Et−1, bank fixed effects θj ,
borrower industry fixed effects φi, and time fixed effects µt. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are
clustered by bank and presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.217*** -0.251*** -0.217*** -0.287***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×AIj,t−1 0.031*** 0.065***
(0.009) (0.010)







ln(DealAmount)k,t -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ln(Maturity)k,t 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(NumberofLeads)k,t 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Securedk,t -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Bank Characteristics
ln(TotalAssets)j,t−1 -0.026 -0.035 -0.020 -0.050
(0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
CapitalRatioj,t−1 1.344 1.170 1.558 1.301
(1.312) (1.318) (1.337) (1.336)
ReturnonEquityj,t−1 0.593** 0.613*** 0.612*** 0.702***
(0.237) (0.237) (0.238) (0.237)
Borrower Characteristics
BorrowerTangibilityj,t−1 -0.187*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.185***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
BorrowerSizei,t−1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
BorrowerLeveragei,t−1 -0.693*** -0.690*** -0.694*** -0.690***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
DDi,t−1 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LendingRelationshipi,j,t−1 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Macroeconomic Controls
GDPt−1 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.159***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 24098 24098 24098 24098
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.16: Comparing Bank Styles with Managerial Styles
This table presents the fixed effects regressions comparing the effects of bank style and manager style on banks credit risk-taking
and its sensitivity to systemic risk. The regression specification is as follows:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankAIj,t−1 + β3∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankLIj,t−1
+ β4∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×AIj,t−1 + β5∆CoV aRj,t−1 × LIj,t−1 + β6AIj,t−1 + β7LIj,t−1
+ Lk,tγ + Bj,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ + E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
where subscript i, j, k denote the borrowing firm, the bank, the loan, respectively. t is the quarter when loan k was originated.
BankAIj is bank js time-invariant asset innovation index (loading on Factor 1). BankLIj is bank js time-invariant liability
innovation index (loading on Factor 2). ManagerAIj,t−1 is the simple average manager asset innovation index (loadings
on Factor 1) for all managers working for bank j at time t − 1. ManagerLIj,t−1 is the simple average manager liability-
innovation dimension index (loadings on Factor 2) for all managers working for bank j at time t. The dependent variable
DDi,j,k,t is borrowers distance-to-default at the time of loan origination and is explained by bank one-period lagged systemic
risk ∆CoV aRj,t−1, loan characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t−1, borrower characteristics Fi,t−1, and macroeconomic
controls Et−1, bank fixed effects θj , borrower industry fixed effects φi, and time fixed effects µt. Standard errors are clustered
by bank and shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.217*** -0.213*** -0.247*** -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.213*** -0.306***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankAIj -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 0.014*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×BankLIj 0.027 0.015 0.027 -0.034*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×ManagerAIj,t−1 0.032*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.011)






Observations 24,098 24,098 24,098 24,098 24,098 24,098 24,098
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.17: Credit Risk-taking Sensitivity on Systemic Risk - Do Manager Profiles Matter?
This table presents the fixed effects regressions comparing examining the effects of manager profiles on banks credit risk-taking
and its sensitivity to systemic risk. The regression specification is as follows:
DDi,j,k,t =β1∆CoV aRj,t−1 + β2∆CoV aRj,t−1 × Profilej,t−1 + β3Profilej,t−1 + Lk,tγ + Bj,t−1δ + F i,t−1ζ
+ E t−1η + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,t
where subscript i, j, k denote the borrowing firm, the bank, the loan, respectively. t is the quarter when loan k was originated.
Asset Innovators are managers with loading on Factor1 higher than the median level and loading on Factor 2 lower than
the median level, Dual Innovators are managers with loadings on Factor 1 and Factor2 both higher than the median levels,
Traditionalists are managers with loadings on Factor 1 and Factor 2 lower than the median levels, Liability Innovators are those
managers with loading on Factor 1 lower than the mean level and loading on Factor 2 higher than the median level.
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.243*** -0.255*** -0.238*** -0.241*** -0.240*** -0.224***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×AssetInnovatorj,t−1 0.030***
(0.010)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×DualInnovatorj,t−1 -0.008 -0.023**
(0.009) (0.010)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 × Tradtionalistj,t−1 -0.079*** -0.099***
(0.025) (0.026)










Observations 20819 20819 20819 20819 20819 20819
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.896
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.18: How Do Manager Styles Matter - A Placebo Test
This table reports the coefficient estimates from a placebo test where managers from the sample in Table 1.17 are randomly
assigned into the four style groups.
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.248***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×AssetInnovatorj,t−1 -0.006
(0.026)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 ×DualInnovatorj,t−1 0.260 0.261
(0.211) (0.212)
∆CoV aRj,t−1 × Tradtionalistj,t−1 -0.000 0.006
(0.010) (0.027)










Observations 20107 20107 20107 20107 20107 20107
Adjusted R2 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.19: Manager Systemic Risk Styles
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following fixed effects regression for the connectedness sample:
DDi,j,k,m,t = β1∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,m) + β2∆CoV aR
Fit
m(j,m) × θ̂m + β3θ̂m + Lk,tγ +Bj,tδ + Fi,tζ + Etη + µt + φi + θj + εi,j,k,m,t
Where DDi,j,k,m,t is the distance-to-default of borrower i who borrows loan k from bank j at time t. The observations are
by loan-manager. θ̂m is manager ms systemic risk-taking style (manager fixed effects) estimated from Panel B of Table (1).
∆CoV aRFit
m(j,m)
is bank js systemic risk minus manager ms systemic risk style:





is thus banks systemic risk that excludes the effect of manager-specific style. DDi,j,k,m,t is explained by loan
characteristics Lk,t, bank characteristics Bj,t, borrower characteristics Fi,t, macroeconomic controls Et, and time effects µt,
borrower industry fixed effects φi, bank fixed effects θj . Standard errors are clustered by bank and shown in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DDi,j,k,t
(1) (2) (3)







× θ̂m -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
θ̂m -0.180*** -0.137*** -0.243***
(0.023) (0.033) (0.035)
Observations 61422 41625 19720
Adjusted R2 0.911 0.911 0.911
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
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Chapter 2
Do FinTech Lenders Fill the Credit Gap? Evidence from
Local Mortgage Demand Shocks
2.1. Introduction
Over the past few years, the consumer mortgage market has shifted dramatically from
domination by large traditional banks to a market where more loans are made by shadow
banks. The mortgage loan market share of non-depository financial institutions (shadow
banks) has increased from around 30 percent in 2010 to nearly 60 percent in 2017. The
withdrawal of banks from the mortgage business may be a consequence of a fundamen-
tal shifts in regulations as a response to the housing crisis. For example, the regulatory
atmosphere changed from a lax risk-management regime to a zero-tolerance, 100-percent-
compliance regime. Additionally, some rapidly growing shadow banks (FinTech lenders)
have benefited from early adoption of innovations in financial technology that automate and
simplify the mortgage underwriting process. By the end of 2016, FinTech lenders accounted
for almost 30 percent of shadow bank origination. Among the rapidly expanding FinTech
lenders is Quicken Loans, a digital marketplace for mortgages that as of the last quarter of
2017, has become the largest mortgage lender in the U.S.
A key feature of FinTech lenders is that their application and approval processes can
be completed entirely on-line through automated and centralized underwriting operations
involving no human loan officers. This contrasts with the traditional network of local brokers
or brick and mortar traditional bank branches. FinTech lenders utilize mortgage approval
algorithms that apply big data approaches to alternative sources of information, thereby
significantly reducing the constraints and frictions in mortgage lending and increasing effi-
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ciency. As suggested by Fuster, Plosser, Schnabl & Vickery (2018), FinTech lenders process
mortgage applications about 20 percent faster than other types of lenders. A more systemic
examination of the evolution of shadow banking by Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski & Seru (2018)
shows that regulation accounts for 60 percent of shadow bank growth and technology ac-
counts for 30 percent. However, besides a general view of the evolution of FinTech mortgage
lending as a whole, I know relatively little about how FinTech mortgage lenders adapt to
local demand shocks and how their responses differ from non-FinTech lenders.
In this chapter, I take a micro and local view to examine whether and how FinTech
lenders fill the credit gaps left by traditional lenders under local demand shocks. Employing
natural disasters as positive demand shocks to local mortgage market, I examine how FinTech
lenders, non-FinTech shadow banks, and traditional banks adjust their lending behaviors.
Natural disasters cause property damage to local residents, which can lead to an subsequent
increases in loan demand for the purpose of repairing, replacing, or rebuilding damaged
homes and businesses (Cortés & Strahan (2017), Dlugosz, Gam, Gopalan & Skrastins (2018)).
FinTech lenders may be more nimble in responding to demand shocks because they can
leverage their technological advantages to process applications, screen borrowers, and deliver
products more efficiently than traditional banks or non-FinTech shadow banks. In this
regard, my empirical setting complements Buchak et al. (2018) in that instead of focusing
on a general description of FinTech evolution over time, I ex-amine how different types of
mortgage lenders behave within short periods of time around local demand shocks. Natural
disasters also provides a cleaner empirical setting to identify demand shocks compared to
the times-series variation on total applications used in Fuster et al. (2018).
Our main hypothesis is that FinTech lenders are better able to respond to local demands
shocks than non-FinTech lenders. I test this hypothesis by addressing three specific ques-
tions. First, do FinTech lenders supply credit that better meets local demand? Second,
do FinTech lenders charge a higher premium for loans issued after demand shocks? Third,
do FinTech lenders tighten their lending standards or alter their risk-taking strategies after
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demand shocks? I develop my hypotheses based on two crucial facts in the current mort-
gage industry. First, a more stringent regulatory environment forces all mortgage lenders to
diligently comply with rules regarding mortgage origination and risk management (Hartman-
Glaser, Stanton & Wallace (2014)). Second, there are significant differences in the processing
capacity constraints among lenders due to different levels of financial technology adoption
(Fuster et al. (2018)). Based on these two facts, mortgage lenders may choose their optimal
lending behaviors differently under demand shocks.
FinTech lenders may be better able to respond to local demand shocks for three reasons.
First, FinTech lenders are less subject to capacity constraints under demand shocks. Dealing
with volatility in mortgage applications is a key challenge for lenders. Fuster et al. (2018)
find that processing time strongly positively correlates with application volume. During
natural disasters when application volumes rise, the traditional network of local brokers or
“bricks and mortar” branches are more subject to capacity constraints (Sharpe & Sherlund
(2016),Choi, Choi & Kim (2017), Fuster, Lo & Willen (2017)). Responding to local shocks
may require traditional lenders to request temporary banking facilities or dispatch more
temporary loan officers, which are time-consuming and costly. The automated, centralized,
and standardized processing operations, which are integrated throughout the application
intake, decision making, and closing processes, may conceivably increase the FinTech firm’s
ability to respond to demands shocks. Further, traditional banks are dependent on deposit
(and other sources) of funds to finance mortgages. In contrast, both FinTech and non-
FinTech shadow banks fund mortgages using the securitization process (i.e., selling mortgages
to the government sponsored entities, GSEs). Traditional banks located in areas impacted
by natural disasters may find their funds constrained by deposit outflows, thereby limiting
their ability to meet growing mortgage demand.
Second, FinTech lenders are able to render quality customer services, which is especially
important under local demand shocks. FinTech lenders’ automated operation allows cus-
tomers to complete the whole application and approval process on-line without meeting a
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loan officer or visiting a local branch. This creates a distinctive client experience that could
become more valuable during the difficult recovery period after natural disasters. This ad-
vantage may have important implications for mortgage pricing. FinTech lenders may charge
a higher premium for delivering convenient and timely mortgage products. Alternatively,
FinTech lenders may be better able to keep the marginal cost of expanding processing ca-
pacity low since they do not need to pay the cost associated with raising their processing
capacity like traditional lenders have to do during demand shocks. Thus, this chapter em-
pirically examine whether FinTech lenders increase mortgage rates or not in the wake of
demand shocks.
Third, FinTech lenders are more able to ensure compliance with regulatory rules and loan
risk management. Following the housing crisis, many new regulations are viewed as highly
aggressive with high compliance costs. For example, GSEs have become more aggressive in
terms of enforcing representations and warranties made by originating lenders stipulating
the quality of mortgage loans. Lenders may be required to buy back loans from GSEs for
even the smallest breach. Since it is often difficult to determine whether the breach is due
to ex ante screening lapses or ex post losses, lenders may respond by limiting loans to riskier
borrowers in order to minimize default rates and losses. Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) show
that the change in the probability of buyback requests on GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities
explains tighter mortgage lending standards. This problem may be more severe after demand
shocks, when traditional lenders face higher uncertainty, higher capacity constraints, and
higher processing costs, forcing them to tighten lending standards even more. As a remedy,
financial technologies configured to comply with new regulatory needs enable less costly and
more efficient compliance. This allows FinTech lenders to concern less about the buyback
risk and regulatory compliance, making them less likely to tighten lending standards without
hurting risk management practices.
A key function traditional banks serve is the intertemporal credit smoothing, meaning
that banks pay depositors low deposit rates during normal periods in exchange for credit
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availability during extreme periods (e.g. local shocks). During natural disasters, finan-
cial regulators encourage banks to increase credit availability, and in exchange, regulators
consider favorable regulatory treatments for banks that contribute to community recovery.
For example, banks may receive Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) consideration for
community development loans, investments, or services that revitalize or stabilize federally
designated disaster areas. Regulators also grant flexibility in regulatory reporting and pub-
lishing requirements and expedite requests to operate temporary banking facilities. With
these regulatory guidance, traditional banks should gain more incentives to help residents in
the affected communities. Indeed, Cortes (2014) and Cortés & Strahan (2017) find that, fol-
lowing natural disasters, bank lending significantly increases in the affected areas. However,
these regulatory incentives are not available for unregulated mortgage lenders like shadow
banks (FinTech and non-FinTech). Thus, their reactions to the local mortgage demand is
uncertain.
I obtain the natural disaster data between 2010 to 2016 from Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) Disaster Declarations Database and the Spatial Hazard Events and
Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS), which are then combined with mortgage
application data from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and origination data from
Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data (Fannie Mae) and Freddie Mac Single
Family Loan-Level Dataset (Freddie Mac). I design my empirical strategies using a series of
difference-in-difference specifications. The treatment sample consists of areas affected by a
natural disaster in a given period, and the control sample consists of areas in the same state
but were unaffected by a disaster during the event window. Using unaffected counties in
the same state as control group eliminates the concern that interstate differences in banking
regulations, FinTech acceptances, or the propensity of disaster declarations are driving the
results.
I find that, although application volume increases among all types of lenders after demand
shocks, only FinTech lenders and traditional banks increase lending after natural disasters.
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In terms of total original unpaid balance (UPB), FinTech lenders increase lending by 17.2
percent while traditional banks increase lending by 13.9 percent. The increase in origination
is mainly driven by loan refinancing. No evidence shows that non-FinTech shadow banks in-
crease lending. The result is robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for bank presence,
bank competition, and local unemployment rates. my finding about banks increasing lending
after natural disasters is consistent with Cortés & Strahan (2017) and Cortes (2014). The
different lending behaviors between FinTech lenders and non-FinTech shadow banks suggest
that FinTech lenders may be leveraging technological advantages to expand lending after
natural disasters.
There could be systematic changes in the applicant profiles around natural disasters,
which can affect and reflect mortgage lenders’ lending strategy. I find that although applicant
average income improves after natural disasters cross all lender types, non-FinTech lenders
increase the average income of the rejection sample by more than the increase in the average
income of the application sample. FinTech lenders do not change the average income of
rejected loans. This result suggests that although borrower profiles improve after natural
disasters, non-FinTech lenders still tighten lending standards. In contrast, no evidence shows
that FinTech lenders are changing lending standards around natural disasters.
Lending standards can also be reflected by rejection rates and lenders’ choices on loan
risk attributes. I find that the rejection rates of mortgage applications to traditional banks
significantly increased by 0.51 percent after natural disasters, while there is no evidence that
FinTech lenders or non-FinTech shadow banks raised their rejection rates. I also find that
loan risk attributes improved after natural disasters for non-FinTech lenders. Specifically,
mortgages originated by non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks after disasters
have higher FICO scores, lower debt-to-income ratios (DTI), lower cumulative loan-to-value
ratios (CLTV), and shorter terms. In contrast, I don’t observe any improvement in loan
attributes for mortgages extended by FinTech lenders after natural disasters. In contrast,
the average term of the loans originated by FinTech lenders increased. It is difficult to
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determine the exact fraction of the improved risk attributes that can be explained by either
the demand side or the supply side. Nevertheless, considering borrower income is correlated
with borrower DTI and CLTV and the previous result shows that applicant income increases
the most for FinTech mortgages, it is reasonable to argue that the lending standards of non-
FinTech lenders become relatively tighter than FinTech lenders after demand shocks.
I find that mortgage rates do not significantly change around natural disasters among
the three types of mortgage lenders. The result is robust to difference-in-difference analyses
at both the area level and the loan level, after controlling for a range of borrower and loan
characteristics as well as area-level bank presence and competition variables. This finding
is against the hypothesis that FinTech lenders charge an even higher convenience premium
among disasters areas.
I further investigate lenders’ choices on lending standards by looking at loan performance.
I check lending standards because in addition to offering different interest rates on average,
a lender may price loans differently by assigning similar interest rates to worse (or better)
borrowers. After controlling for mortgage rates, observable borrower and loan characteristics,
and other control variables, I find that loans originated by traditional lenders after the
disasters perform better than those originated before. This indicates that post-disaster
loans may be overpriced, or traditional lenders may be “cherry picking” good borrowers by
requiring higher interest rates for loans that actually deserve lower. There is no significant
difference in the performance of FinTech loans originated around the disaster. This result
again suggests that it likely that non-FinTech lenders tighten their lending standards while
FinTech lenders do not exhibit similar behaviors.
In summary, this chapter finds that FinTech mortgage lenders are better able to respond
to local demand shocks by expanding mortgage lending without tightening lending standards
or taking excessive-risk. Non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks, due to capacity
constraints and frictions, either tighten lending standards or do not expand lending after
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demand shocks. As I argue that financial technologies explain FinTech lenders’ prompt
responses to demand shocks, I also consider several other alternative explanations. First,
I argue that the relatively looser lending standards by FinTech lenders are less likely to
be driven by their heavy reliance on government mortgage guarantees, because loans in
my sample are all GSEs conforming loans originated by various types of lenders, in which
case they all equally benefit from mortgage guarantees (comparing apple to apple). Also,
although FinTech lenders sell a larger portion of their loans to GSEs than shadow banks (In
2016, shadow banks sold more than 60 percent of their loans to GSEs, while FinTech lenders
sell 80 percent to GSEs), the difference is too small to explain their drastic differences in
lending standards. Second, some may argue that under current stringent banking regulations,
traditional banks may be relying on FinTech lenders to originate less-than perfect loans that
cannot be freely originated by themselves, through offering lines of credit (warehouse lending)
to FinTech companies. Thus, the extent of cooperation may be higher than competition in
my setting of demand shocks. This possibility doesn’t hurt, or even enhance, the role of
financial technologies on reducing intermediation cost and market frictions, regardless of the
intention of traditional lenders.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Subsection 2.2 introduces the literature
and my contribution. Subsection 2.3 discusses lender classifications with a focus on intro-
ducing FinTech lenders. Subsection 2.4 introduces hypothesis development. Subsection 2.5
presents data and institutional background. Subsection 2.6 presents the empirical strategies
and results. Subsection 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2. Literature Review
This chapter brings together several strands of the literature relating to residential mort-
gage lending, the growing role of financial technology, local credit shock mitigation, and
banking regulation.
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2.2.1. The Landscape of Residential Mortgage Market
Although a large body of literature has studied the residential mortgage market and
mortgage origination chain (Campbell (2012), Badarinza, Campbell & Ramadorai (2016),
Stanton, Walden & Wallace (2014), Stanton, Walden & Wallace (2017)) with a particular
attention paid to the originate-to-distribute model (Berndt & Gupta (2009), Piskorski, Seru
& Vig (2010), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru & Vig (2010), Purnanandam (2010)), most of the
recent researches focus on securitization, the lending boom, and the run-up to the financial
crisis, rather than on the recovery after the crisis. This chapter complements this strand
of literature by focusing on a new mortgage market competitive landscape in the post-crisis
periods.
Shadow credit intermediation that happens outside the traditional banking regulation
system has attracted a lot attention (Adrian & Ashcraft (2016)) and literature focuses a lot
on their role of credit, maturity and liquidity transformation (Bord & Santos (2012)). The
lack of government liquidity and credit backstops raise people’s concern about their fragility.
This chapter specifically focuses on two crucial types of non-bank lenders, FinTech shadow
banks and non-FinTech shadow banks, and examines their risk-taking behaviors under local
demand shocks. In this regard my chapter is closely related to Buchak et al. (2018), who
give an overall examination of the recent evolution of shadow banking in mortgage market
with a focus on how increasing regulatory burden and financial technologies account for the
shadow bank growth. This chapter complements their study by taking a micro and local
view on how FinTech and non-FinTech lenders respond to local demand shocks. The natural
disaster setting allows me to separate the demand and supply factors in the market and test
the ability of different types of lenders to respond to demand shocks.
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2.2.2. Financial Technology
This chapter is also related with the growing literature on financial technology (Philippon
(2016), Greenwood & Scharfstein (2013), Fuster et al. (2018)). Philippon (2016) proposes
that FinTech can offer a way toward structural change in the financial industry, because po-
litical economy considerations can stifle change in the traditional part of the sector. Bartlett,
Morse, Stanton & Wallace (2018) study the role of FinTech lenders in alleviating discrimi-
nation in mortgage markets. They find evidence that suggests that such lenders make the
mortgage lending markets more accessible to African American and Hispanic borrowers and
provide these borrowers with fairer pricing.
In this regard this chapter is most related to Fuster et al. (2018), who study how tech-
nology impacts frictions in the mortgage origination process, such as slow processing times,
capacity constraints, and refinancing. They show that FinTech lenders process mortgage
applications faster and adjust supply more elastically than other lenders in response to
mortgage demand shocks, which suggests that technological innovation may have improved
the efficiency of financial intermediation in the mortgage market. The local demand shocks
driven by natural disasters provide an ideal setting to test the advantage of FinTech lenders,
and is also a cleaner empirical setting than that used by Fuster et al. (2018), who use time-
series variation in total applications as aggregate demand shocks. Moreover, my result that
FinTech lenders are better able to increase lending after demand shocks while not tightening
lending standards or sacrificing loan performance confirms the ability of FinTech lenders to
reduce the market friction and improve the efficiency of financial intermediation.
2.2.3. Mitigating Local Credit Shocks
This chapter also speaks to how local shocks are mitigated within the financial system.
This question has gained considerable attention in recent years as large disparities in regional
outcomes have occurred within both the United States and Europe. A large literature argue
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that an integrated tax and transfer system together with easy factor mobility can help
mitigate local shocks (Asdrubali, Sørensen & Yosha (1996)). Asdrubali et al. (1996) examine
risk sharing across US states and suggest that credit markets smooth about 23 percent of
regional shocks. Hurst, Keys, Seru & Vavra (2016) shows that despite large regional variation
in predictable default risk, GSE mortgage rates are not sensitive to local risk. This chapter
shows that mortgage rates are not sensitive to local demand shocks, which in turn leads to
quantitatively important transfers across regions that occur in state-contingent ways.
A strand of literature focuses on how traditional banks react to local shocks (Cortés &
Strahan (2017), Cortes (2014), Dlugosz et al. (2018)). They generally show that banks face
various costs when responding to local shocks, including credit constraints, capital allocation
constraints, and managerial constraints. Cortés & Strahan (2017) show that banks increase
lending in shocked areas at the sacrifice of lower lending in connected markets. Cortes
(2014) shows that banks that increase the most lending in shocked areas are those with
substantial presence in the area. Dlugosz et al. (2018) also show that the ability of bank
branches reacting to local demand shocks are constrained by whether they are authorized
to set deposit and loan rates locally. I argue that, FinTech lenders, due to their centralized
and automated processing operation, are less subject to the constraints faced by traditional
banks, thus are better able to respond to the local demand shocks.
2.2.4. Banking Regulation
Because shadow banks’ operation rely heavily on GSEs and FHA guarantees, my study
is closely related to literature on mortgage guarantees and their effects on mortgage lending,
risk-taking, regional redistribution, and social welfare (Elenev, Landvoigt & Van Nieuwer-
burgh (2016), Hurst et al. (2016), Bhutta (2012), Buchak et al. (2018)). Elenev et al. (2016)
find that underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage
originations and higher financial sector leverage. Buchak et al. (2018) suggest that increased
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regulatory burden of traditional banks combined with GSEs and FHA guarantees may have
contributed greatly to the rise of the shadow banking sector, and although FinTech lenders
do enter to help fill the gap left by the banks, they have done so by having relied almost
exclusively on explicit and implicit government guarantees as customers. This chapter pro-
vides a local comparison between the risk-taking of FinTech shadow banks and non-FinTech
shadow banks, and shows while FinTech lenders do not tighten lending standards during
demand shocks, no significant evidence shows that they are excessively taking advantage of
government mortgage guarantees.
2.3. Lender Classifications
2.3.1. What are FinTech Mortgage Lenders?
While disruption is inevitable in any industry, it is most predictable in an industry faced
with conditions that render the existing model too inefficient and costly. The mortgage
industry has reached this stage. On the one hand, the business environment has become
challenging for lenders, with rapidly evolving client needs, increasing regulatory burden, and
projected decreases in volume. On the other hand, the traditional mortgage origination
process has not fundamentally changed for decades. Thus, many believe that the mortgage
industry is ripe for disruption.
Recently entered market participants like Quicken Loans have taken market share quickly
with their new business models and capacities, and financial technologies are considered as
the foremost enabler of changes. The key feature of the new business model is “an end-
to-end on-line mortgage application platform and centralized mortgage underwriting and
processing augmented by automation.” (Fuster et al. (2018)) The automated operation
allows customers to complete the whole application and approval process on-line through
the companies’ website and call centers without meeting any loan officer or visiting any local
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branch. The automated operations are integrated throughout loan application, processing,
decision-making, and closing processes.
During the application, the borrower authorizes the mortgage lender to directly access
their bank statements, income records, tax returns, and property information through digital
data aggregation platforms, which obviate the need for the borrower to collect and send in pay
stubs, bank statements, and fill out the form giving lender access to tax returns. The lenders
also do not need to check if customers have typed the right pay stub information or check that
they used the right income to calculate the debt-to-income ratio. This significantly reduces
the borrower and the lender’s effort in assembling and delivering information, while also
improves the data quality. Web portals, mobile apps, and mobile image capture functions also
make it convenient for clients to provides information. Cross-channel data synchronization
functions allow clients to start the application process on one channel and complete it on
another. These capacities entirely automate a previous labor-intensive process and vastly
simplify the mortgage application process.
FinTech lenders also have developed a “back-end” processing operation to automati-
cally assess the information collected from the application. For example, the software for
digital document management software and pattern recognition allows lenders to automati-
cally digitize documents, recognize the document type, and intelligently extract and deliver
data to underwriters to enable easy verification or decision making. Storage of documents
and extracted data meet the latest Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization
(MISMO) and other industry standards, align with future investor and secondary marketing
requirements, and enable rigorous regulatory compliance. Also, the automated rules engines
compare borrower information to criteria in a pre-architected decision engine and if condi-
tions match those in the engine, provide an automated instant (or near instant) decision.
Exceptions are flagged for underwriters to easily review and decide on. Finally, the auto-
mated valuation models enable lenders to estimate factors such as property value without
waiting for an official appraisal or inspection. The valuation estimates based on advanced
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algorithms and proprietary property value databases can help provide a conditional under-
writing decision and significantly reduce cycle time. These capabilities dramatically reduce
the need for lenders to manually verify data back to source documents and enable automated
decisions for a potentially large portion of the portfolio.
Decision-making and closing are also accelerated by technology-enabled capabilities. The
auto clearing of loan conditions allow lenders to automatically clear conditions for the bor-
rower by using data directly from source. For example, since the lenders can access the
borrower’s bank balance, they can directly determine if there is adequate balance to cover
closing requirements. Digital loan trackers and contextual alerts and notifications allow bor-
rowers to expend less effort because conditions are cleared on their behalf and contextual
information is sent to them on a real-time or near-real-time basis. Processing and closing a
mortgage using these capabilities lead to a faster, simpler, and more transparent process.
The automated, efficient, and less error-prone process is clearly the wave of the future.
As the housing finance market continues to recover and reinvent itself in this era of rapid
technological transformation, innovations like the Quicken Loans have the potential to reduce
cost and risk, accelerated processing, improve compliance and consumer experience, and
safely expand access to credit at the same time.
2.3.2. Classifying Mortgage Lenders
Following Buchak et al. (2018) and Fuster et al. (2018), this chapter classifies mortgage
lenders into shadow banks and traditional banks, and further classifies shadow banks into
FinTech shadow banks and non-FinTech shadow banks. Based on the definition by the
Financial Stability Board, I define all “deposit-taking corporations” as traditional banks and
all “credit intermediation involving entities outside the regular banking system” as shadow
banks. Specifically, I search for mortgage lender names in the National Information Center
(NIC) database and define a lender as a traditional bank if the institutional type of the
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lender contains the words “bank” or “credit union”, or if the top holder of the lender is a
bank or bank holding company. I define a lender as shadow bank if the lender is a mortgage
company or its institutional type in NIC database is “Domestic Entities Other”.
I classify a lender as a FinTech shadow bank if it enables mortgage applicants to obtain
pre-approvals on-line. This criterion distinguishes FinTech lenders from traditional mortgage
originators that may allow on-line application at the initial stages but still require clients
to meet a loan officer in subsequent processes. As suggested by Fuster et al. (2018), this
classification is a proxy since the on-line application platform is just one dimension of the
FinTech model. However, it is a crucial component of FinTech mortgage operations and pro-
vides a consistent way for classification across a large number of mortgage lenders. Following
this definition, I identify seven FinTech lenders: Quicken Loans, Inc.; LoanDepot.com, LLC;
GuaranteedRate, Inc; Cash Call, Inc.; Movement Mortgage, LLC; Homeward Residential,
Inc., and Amerisave Mortgage Corporation. This classification matches up well with firms
considered by industry observer and media to be at the frontier of technology-based mortgage
lending.
2.4. Hypothesis Development
The main hypothesis of this chapter is that FinTech lenders are better able to respond to
local demand shocks after natural disasters. This is due to their higher processing efficiency,
higher capacity to ensure compliance with regulations, and better customer services. To
support this hypothesis, I will use several more specific hypotheses as followed.
First, higher processing efficiency may allow FinTech lenders to react to demand shocks
more promptly. Under demand shocks, the traditional network of local brokers or “bricks
and mortar” branches are more subject to capacity constraints. Existing research documents
evidence of significant capacity constraints in U.S. mortgage lending. For example, Fuster
et al. (2017) show that increases in aggregate application volumes are strongly associated
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with increases in processing times. Sharpe & Sherlund (2016) and Choi et al. (2017) also find
evidence of capacity constraints on traditional mortgage lenders. Responding to local shocks
may require traditional lenders to request temporary banking facilities or dispatch more
temporary loan officers, which are time-consuming and costly. This problem is aggravated by
the recent low loan interest rate environment, which seriously restricts the profit of mortgage
origination. With limited opportunity to raise prices, lenders are forced to cut costs. With
centralized and automated processing operation, FinTech are less subject to the constraints
faced by traditional lenders, so they may be better able to respond to the local demand
shocks. Fuster et al. (2018) show that FinTech lenders process mortgage applications about
20 percent faster than other lenders, and this efficiency is more apparent when there are
larger inflow of applications. This advantage could be even more outstanding during natural
disasters. Thus, I propose the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. Under demand shocks, FinTech lenders increase lending more elastically
than other lenders.
Second, FinTech lenders are able to render a better customer service, which is espe-
cially important under local shocks. Although facing rapidly evolving client needs, mortgage
origination process has not fundamentally changed for decades. Borrowers have to send in
income records and bank statements and fill out forms giving lenders access to tax returns.
Lenders also need to assemble and verify clients’ information. However, clients increasingly
desire a more efficient underwriting experience. FinTech lenders’ automated operation al-
lows customers to complete the whole application and approval process on-line through the
companies’ website. The automated operations are integrated throughout loan application,
processing, decision-making, and closing processes. For example, the automated rules en-
gines compare borrower information to criteria in a pre-architected decision engine and if
conditions match those in the engine, provide an automated instant (or near instant) deci-
sion. This creates a distinctive client experience that is very valuable during the recovery
phase of disasters, and may have implications on mortgage pricing. FinTech lenders may
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charge a higher premium for delivering convenient and fast mortgage products. Buchak
et al. (2018) find that FinTech lenders appear to charge a convenience premium of 14-16
basis points. Fuster et al. (2018) also find FinTech lenders demand a higher premium among
borrowers who value convenience to a greater extent. The value of convenient product may
be even higher during natural disasters when clients urgently need to fund recovery. A
counter argument is that FinTech lenders are better able to keep the margin cost of expand-
ing processing capacity low since they do not need to pay the cost associated with raising
processing capacity like traditional lenders have to do during demand shocks, so they may
not need to raise the mortgage rates. This leads to the following competing hypotheses.
Hypothesis 9.A. FinTech lenders charge a higher premium for lending under demand
shocks.
Hypothesis 9.B. FinTech lenders do not charge a higher premium for lending under de-
mand shocks.
Lastly, FinTech lenders can ensure compliance with regulatory rules and manage loan
risk more efficiently. Following the housing crisis, mortgage institutions complied with much
more stringent rules and regulations. For example, the GSE representation and warranty
framework, the TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule (TRID), and the Qualified Mort-
gage rules (QM) are viewed as highly aggressive and costly for lenders to comply with.
Lenders fear that if they make even the smallest non-substantive error in the loan docu-
ments, they will be forced to buy back a loan after it’s sold to an investor. In fear of legal
liability for riskier loans, lenders respond by applying credit overlays (i.e., much stricter
credit thresholds than the GSEs require) in order to minimize default rates and losses. As
such, stringent regulations have inadvertently hampered the flow of credit in the post-crisis
period. Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) show that the change in the probability of buyback
requests on GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities explain tighter mortgage lending standards.
This problem may be even more severe after demand shocks, when tradition lenders face
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higher uncertainty, higher capacity constraints, and higher processing costs, forcing them
to tighten lending standards even more. As a remedy, financial technologies configured to
comply with new regulatory needs enable less costly and more efficient compliance, allowing
FinTech lenders to concern less about buyback risk and regulatory compliance, making them
less likely to tighten lending standards while not sacrificing loan performance. This leads to
the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10. FinTech lenders are less likely to tighten lending standards under local
demand shocks.
I test mortgage lenders’ lending standards from a range of aspects including rejection
standards and rejection rate, borrower and loan risk attributes, and loan performance, which
will be will be explained in detail in the following sections.
2.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.5.1. Natural Disasters and Disaster Relief
I obtain the natural disaster data for the period between 2010 and 2016 from Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Declarations Database and the Spatial
Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS). FEMA Disaster
Declarations Database provides the incidence date, type, and location (county and state)
of natural disasters that were declared by the President. When a natural disaster causes
damage that is beyond the capability of the state and local governments, the governor of
the affected state can submit a request to the President within 30 days of the occurrence of
the incident to request supplemental federal assistance. Upon the request, the President can
declare a disaster and approve federal assistance if he determines the severity of the damage
is beyond the combined capability of the state and local governments. Thus, the disasters
declared by the President are relatively large-scale or serious disasters that are severe enough
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to influence mortgage demand.
There are two types of Presidential disaster declarations: Major Disaster Declarations and
Emergency Declarations. Although both declaration types authorize the President to provide
supplemental federal disaster assistance, the events related to the two types of declarations
and scope and amount of assistance differ. While the President can declare an emergency for
any occasion or instance (not limited to natural disasters), he can declare a major disaster
only for natural events, including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought, or, regardless of cause, fire, flood, or explosion, There are also more public and
private assistance available for Major Disaster Declarations than for Emergency Declarations.
The sample include and only include these two types of disasters. I supplement the FEMA
data with the data from SHELDUS, which provides the county-level monthly total property
damage and property damage per capita caused by disasters. Combining the FEMA and
SHELDUS data allows me to measure the severity of disasters.
Table 2.2 lists the frequency and scales of natural disasters included in the sample. The
sample includes 376 disasters which affect 6,560 counties. The three most frequent types
of disaster are severe storms, flood, and hurricane, followed by snow and severe ice storms.
They are also the most disastrous disasters that affect the greatest number of counties and
cause the severest damage to local communities. Severe storms, the most frequent type of
natural disaster, affect 3,234 counties, with each incidence affecting 16.9 counties on average.
Hurricane and severe ice storm affect the largest number of counties per event (26.2 counties
and 21.1 counties, respectively). Figure 2.1 shows the geographic distribution of population
density (Panel a) and frequency of natural disasters (Panel b). Although disasters are not
evenly distributed across all states and counties, they basically cover the vast majority of
U.S. regions. In additional untabulated figures, I find that the disasters that hit the middle
states are mainly severe storms and flood, and the disasters that hit the northeastern and
southeastern states are mainly hurricanes and snow. Disasters declarations also do not
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appear to be correlated with population density, which rules out the endogeneity concern
that the propensity to declare a disaster is higher in densely populated areas.
Mortgage demand increases after natural disasters because affected residents need to
rebuild or replace damaged homes and businesses. The first avenue to repair or replace
damaged home or businesses is to submit a homeowner insurance claim. However, many
homeowners in United States are underinsured for natural disasters, particularly for flooding
damage, which isn’t covered under most policies. Although homeowners can buy a separate
flood insurance policy, only about 12 percent of homeowners had flood insurance in 2016,
according to the Insurance Information Institute, and water damage accounted for 45 percent
of all property damage, according to the insurance institute, yet insurance policies often limit
or exclude coverage for water-related damage. Since many homeowners are underinsured,
they might receive only a fraction of the money needed to replace or rebuild the home.
Affected residents can also obtain funds directly from FEMA. Once a disaster is de-
clared, FEMA will provide both financial assistance (for temporary housing, repair, and
replacement) and direct assistance (i.e., construction assistance) to disaster affected areas.
Although FEMA provides grants to qualified homeowners to repair damage not covered by
insurance, it does not pay to return the home to its pre-disaster condition, because the main
purpose of FEMA assistance is to provide safe, sanitary, healthy living conditions. Instead,
the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) offers affordable financial help to homeowners
and renters in declared disaster areas. Help is available in the form of low-interest, long-
term loans for losses not fully covered by insurance or other means , and an applicant can
borrow up to $200,000 to repair or replace their primary home to its pre-disaster conditions.
However, applicants can’t use the loan to upgrade or add on to the home, unless required
by building authority or code.
If all the assistance above cannot satisfy the needs of local residents, they can supplement
their funds by borrowing from mortgage lenders. In fact, many financial regulators encourage
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regulated banks to increase credit availability after natural disasters. In exchange, regulators
consider favorable regulatory treatments for banks that help borrowers and other customers
in communities under stress and that contribute to the health and recovery of these commu-
nities. For example, they may receive Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) consideration
for community development loans, investments, or services that revitalize or stabilize feder-
ally designated disaster areas. Regulators also grant flexibility in regulatory reporting and
publishing requirements and expedite any request to operate temporary banking facilities.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) publish Supervisory Letter
SR 13-6 that highlights the supervisory practices it employs during a disaster, with the aim
to assist in disaster relief efforts by easing the regulatory burden on banks. For example, the
FRB may exercise its authority to waive real estate-related appraisal regulations and may
extend CRA consideration to activities that revitalize or stabilize a disaster area, even if
the loans, investments, or services provided are to middle- or upper-income individuals. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also publishes Financial Institution Letters
(Letter), which applies to all FDIC-supervised institutions, to encourages them to“consider
all reasonable and prudent steps to assist customers in communities affected by natural dis-
asters.” The Letter also suggests that banks use the non-documentary verification methods
permitted by the Customer Identification Program requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act for
affected customers who cannot provide standard identification documents. Similarly, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
(CSBS), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Farm Credit Admin-
istration (FCA) also issue press releases that remind regulated financial institutions to assist
the recovery of disaster affected areas.
With all the above regulatory guidance, traditional banks have incentive to help residents
in the affected areas. Indeed, Cortes (2014) and Cortés & Strahan (2017) find that, following
natural disasters, bank lending significantly increases in the affected areas. Note that these
regulatory incentives are not intended for unregulated mortgage lenders like shadow banks.
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Thus, their reactions to the local mortgage demand is uncertain.
2.5.2. Mortgage Application, Origination, and Performance
I collect mortgage application, origination, and performance data from multiple sources.
Mortgage application data are obtained from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). mort-
gage origination and performance data are obtained from Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan
Performance Data (Fannie Mae) and Freddie Mac Single Family Loan-Level Dataset (Fred-
die Mac). In this chapter, I only focus on conventional mortgages, which are homebuyers’
loans that are not offered or secured by any government entity (the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (FHA), the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), or the USDA Rural
Housing Service), but rather available through private lenders, such as banks, credit unions,
or mortgage companies .
HMDA is a United States federal law that requires financial institutions that meet certain
criteria (i.e. assets size above a specific threshold) to provide mortgage data to the public.
HMDA data include the vast majority of home mortgage applications and approved loans
in the United States, and provide lender identity, property location (county and state), loan
type, loan purpose, loan amount, applicant income, race, and application outcome, etc. As
of 2016, there were 6,762 financial institutions reporting to HMDA. In this chapter, I restrict
the sample to a subset of HMDA data that only includes conventional loans for one to four-
family properties. HMDA data record the outcomes of applications, including loan rejected,
originated, withdrawn by applicants, etc. Panel A of Table 2.3 presents the distribution of
application outcomes. HMDA data also record whether the originator retains the loan on
balance sheet for sells the loan within one year to a third party. If the originator retains a
loan through the end of the calendar year before selling it, HMDA records the loan as non-
sale. Panel B of Table 2.3 shows the distribution of purchaser types. About half of the loan
applications were not originated for various reasons or not sold in the calendar year covered
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by register. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two major purchasers of the originated loans,
purchased over 70 percent ((23.69+14.19)/(100-49.19)=73.56%) of the purchased loans. Less
than 30 percent of the purchased loans were sold to various financial institutions such as
commercial banks, saving institutions, insurance companies, or credit unions, etc.
The Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data provide loan-level monthly orig-
ination and performance information for Fannie Mae’s 30-year, fully amortizing, full doc-
umentation, single-family, conventional fixed-rate mortgages, which are the predominant
conforming contract type in the United States. The origination datasets provide detailed
information on a range of borrower, property, and loan characteristics, such as interest rate,
unpaid principal balance, property location (3-digit zip code), borrower credit score, debt-
to-income (DTI) ratio, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. The performance datasets provide
monthly payment history and delinquency status. The loans in the sample were acquired
between 2010 and 2016, and the monthly performance data run through June 2017.
Similar to the Fannie Mae data, the Freddie Mac Single Family Loan-Level Dataset
contains loan-level monthly origination, performance, and actual loss data for a subset of
Freddie Mac’s fully amortizing, full documentation, single family mortgages. Included in
the dataset are 15-year, 20-year, and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages purchased by Freddie
Mac. The monthly loan performance data run until June 2017 for all the available loans.
Combining the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac datasets gives me coverage of the majority of
conforming loans issued in the United Sates during the period of this study.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac only disclose the names of lenders who account for one
percent or more of volume within a given acquisition quarter as presented by the original
unpaid principal balance. Table 2.4 lists the top 50 most active mortgage lenders as reported
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from 2010 to 2016. The table also shows lender type and
volume of originations. The largest FinTech mortgage lender, Quicken Loans, Inc., is the
fourth largest mortgage lenders during the sample period. In fact, Quicken Loans grew to
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be the second largest mortgage lender in the U.S. in 2014, and became the largest mortgage
lender in the end of 2017. Although the sizes of other FinTech lenders are much smaller
than Quicken Loans, all seven of them are ranked among the 50 largest mortgage lenders in
the two databases.
Note that the public version of HMDA application data are in annual frequency and the
GSEs data are in monthly frequency. The annual HMDA may make me underestimate the
effect of natural disasters on local mortgage demand and changes in applicant profile, because
literature shows that most of the effects occur in the first two quarters following the shock
(Cortés & Strahan (2017), Cortes (2014)). Thus, the actual increase in mortgage demand
is likely to be higher than what I find. The frequency inconsistency between HMDA data
and GSEs data also makes quantitative comparison between the results of the two datasets
difficult, which is less of a concern because the main purposes of using HMDA application
are to first identify the demand shock and to figure out the changes in applicant profiles.
2.5.3. Merging Natural Disasters with GSEs Mortgage Origina-
tions
Although natural disasters declaration and HMDA application data are recorded at the
county-level, the GSEs origination and performance data are identified at the 3-digit zip code
level. This creates difficulty for merging the two datasets because one county can correspond
to multiple 3-digit zip code and a 3-digit zip code can also correspond to multiple counties,
so that for many cases I cannot determine whether the property is located within the disaster
affected area or not.
A fact that helps me to resolve this problem is that disasters are usually declared for
multiple, adjacent counties that cover a much larger area and can thus either fully cover or
cover a vast majority of some 3-zip codes. Those 3-digit zip codes can thus be identified
as the disaster affected areas, and mortgages originated in those areas during post-shock
103
periods are likely to be the results of disasters. This sample selection criteria may direct
me to focus on server disasters that affect larger areas which is consistent with the purpose
of catching more destructive disasters so that they can create bigger demand shock on the
mortgage market. Without hurting the representativeness of the sample, for each disaster, I
include in the treatment group those 3-digit zip codes whose 90 percent or more 5-digit zip
codes are covered by the disaster affected counties. Similarly, I include in the control group
those 3-digit zip codes whose 90 percent or more 5-digit zip codes are outside of the disaster
affected counties.
This criterion allows me to identify 1,100 disaster-zip code pairs which includes 178
unique natural disasters and 488 unique 3-digit zip codes. Concerning there are 999 3-zip
codes in U.S., the sample involves almost half of them which is fairly representative. In the
empirical strategy parts, I use county-level observations for HMDA application analyses and
zip code-level observations for GSEs origination and performance analyses.
2.5.4. Bank Presence and Competition Data and Census Data
I obtain the local population and unemployment data from the U.S. Census Bureau, a
part of U.S. Department of Commerce. I obtain the population data by Zip Code Tabulation
Areas (ZCTAs) as of 2010 and aggregate them to 3-digit zip code levels. Local bank local
presence and competition data are obtained from FDIC Summary of Deposits, which is an
annual survey branch office deposits as of June 30 for all FDIC-insured institutions, including
insured U.S. branches of foreign banks. FDIC requires all institutions with branch offices to
submit the survey and institutions with only a main office are exempt. Specifically, I use
two measures of bank local presence. The first is the number of bank branches per capita
located in the area, and the second is the total deposits per capita in the area. The two
banking competition measures are HHI and C3. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
of deposits of all bank branches in an area. C3 is the share of deposits of the three largest
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bank branches in a county. All variables definitions are listed in Table 3.1.
2.5.5. Summary Statistics
Table 2.5 presents the summary statistics for the HMDA sample (Panel A) and GSEs
sample (Panel B) for the sample period between 2010 to 2016. Loans included in the sam-
ple are conventional loans (any loan other than FHA, VA, FSA, or RHS loans) for one to
four-family properties (other than manufactured housing). Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that,
in terms of total number (amount) of mortgages originated, FinTech lenders originate 6.38
percent (6.31 percent) of loans, and non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks origi-
nate 32.36 percent (33.86 percent) and 61.27 percent (59.83 percent), respectively. Shadow
banks (FinTech and non-FinTech) loans generally have higher loan amounts than traditional
bank loans. The median income of FinTech borrowers is higher than traditional banks, but
FinTech borrowers have lower mean income. The rejection rate is lowest for shadow bank
applications, followed by FinTech applications and traditional bank applications. With re-
gard to loan purposes, FinTech lenders have a special focus on refinance than non-FinTech
shadow banks and traditional banks, and this is the case for both application sample and
origination sample.
For the GSE origination sample, I observe that FinTech lenders originate 7.84 percent
(7.71 percent in terms of total amount) of the loans during the sample period. Refinance
(both cash-out refinance and no-cash-out refinance) loans also account for an overwhelming
portion in FinTech originations. An average FinTech loan has lower amount than other
lenders. The average interests are similar across lender types. Generally, a typical FinTech
lender has a slightly higher debt-to-income ratio (DTI), lower FICO, and shorter loan term.
Their average cumulative loan-to-value ratio is similar with that of other lenders.
Figure 2.2 presents the time-series trends of the composition of loan purposes by lender
types. For all types of lenders, there is an overall trend of lower weight on refinance origina-
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tions across time, which is strongly related with an environment of increasing mortgage rate.
There are also striking differences among lender types regarding the purpose of mortgage
originations, particularly between FinTech and other lender types. Over 80% of FinTech
loans are refinance loans throughout the sample period, while non-FinTech shadow banks
and traditional banks have much lower weights on refinance. This indicates that FinTech
lenders may be well suited for mortgage refinancing rather than new purchases. Indeed,
during refinancing, many non-standardized tasks such as title check, structural examina-
tion, and negotiations have already been completed at the time of purchase, leaving more
standardized tasks that can be more easily automated by FinTech lenders. Considering the
importance of refinance originations in FinTech businesses, I decompose loan applications
and originations based on loan purposes in most of the following analyses.
2.6. Empirical Strategies and Results
2.6.1. Identifying Demand Shocks Using Natural Disasters
To confirm that natural disasters cause shocks to local mortgage demand, I first test
whether mortgage applications increase in years when natural disasters happen. While
Cortés & Strahan (2017) uses actual mortgage originations around natural disasters to iden-
tify demand shocks, I use actual mortgage application volume since it more accurately reflects
the changes in mortgage demand and are less contaminated by supply-side factors. I use a
difference-in-difference approach comparing mortgage application volume in treatment coun-
ties relative to control counties, within two years of window. The first difference is between
the treated and control counties, and the second difference is between the pre-disaster year
and post-disaster year. A county is considered a treatment county if at least one natural
disaster happens in it in a year and no disaster happened in it in the preceding year. For
counties with multiple disasters within a year, I take them as having just one disaster. A
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county is considered a control county if it is in the same state with the treatment county
and no disaster happens in it in both the disaster incidence year and the preceding year.
Specifically, I estimate the following mortgage applications regression:
ln(Applications)i,t = β1Treati×Postt+β2Treati+β3Postt+β4Controlsi,t+θd+ εj,t, (12)
where i indexes counties and t indexes years. ln(MortgageApplications) is the log of the
total number (or total original unpaid balance) of mortgage applications. Treat takes the
value of 1 for disaster affected counties and 0 for control counties. Post is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 in the disaster incidence year and 0 for the year preceding the
disaster incidence year. Controls includes a range of county-level control variables including
Branch, Deposit, HHI, C3, Unemployed, and Population. Branch is the total number
of bank branches per capita. Deposit is the amount of deposits per capita. HHI is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of deposits of all bank branches in the county. C3 is the share
of deposits of the three largest bank branches in a county. Unemployed is the share of labor
force that is jobless. Population is the county-level population.
Note that for each treatment or control county, there is one observation for the disaster
incidence year and one for the year preceding the disaster incidence year. I use with-in
shock regressions which employ state-disaster year fixed effects. Since treatment and control
counties are within the same state for a specific disaster, state-disaster year fixed effects can
uniquely identify a shock. This is a stringent method since it compares the shocked county
only with the unaffected counties in the same state within the shock window. The standard
errors that I report are clustered at the county level. If natural disasters do increase mortgage
demand, then I should observe a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term
Treat× Post.
In Figure 2.3, I explore the dynamics of the annual mortgage applications in treatment
and control counties in years around the natural disasters. I do this both to compare the
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pre-trends of the treatment and control counties, and also to preliminarily detect the impact
of natural disasters on mortgage applications. The horizontal axis displays four years around
natural disasters, where 0 represents the disaster incidence year, and -1 represents the year
preceding it. The vertical axis shows the log of unconditional annual application counts
(Panel a) or application amount (Panel b). Since the graphs cover four years around the
natural disaster, it naturally excludes those disasters that occurred at the beginning or ending
years in the sample period, allowing me to examine the comparability of the treatment and
control counties in non-disaster years more rigorously. Both Panel A and Panel B show
a clear parallel pre-trend between treatment counties and control counties in pre-disaster
years (between year -2 and year -1). This indicates that in the absence of treatments (natural
disasters), the difference between the treatment and control counties is constant over time. A
divergence occurs between year -1 and year 0, where the difference between the applications
in treatment and control counties widens with the treatment of natural disasters. This
suggests that natural disaster is exerting influence on local mortgage demand. The parallel
trend between the treatment and control counties recovers in post-disaster years (year 0 to
year 1), which again confirms the comparability of the two groups.
Table 2.6 presents the results of Equation (12). In Panel A, columns (1) to (4), I report
results of regressions using the log of annual mortgage application counts as the dependent
variable, with columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) using applications to FinTech lenders, non-
FinTech shadow banks, traditional banks, and all types of lenders. In columns (5) to (8),
I replace the dependent variable with the log of total mortgage amount. For all types of
lenders, the coefficient on the interaction term Treat × Post is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that there is a positive demand shock in the treatment counties after
natural disasters. Specifically, for the full application sample including applications to all
types of lenders, there is a 18.5 percent increase in total application counts and 19.6 percent
increase in total application amount. As there is a higher increase in total application amount
than in total application counts, I can infer that the average size of mortgage applications
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is also bigger after natural disasters.
In Panel B of Table 2.6, I replace the dependent variable with the absolute applications
(counts or amount) scaled by local county-level population (by thousands). The purpose
of scaling applications by population is to examine the actual size of the demand shock
relative to the local population for each lender type. The coefficient on the interaction
term Treat × Post stays positive and significant for all types of lenders. Economically, for
the full application sample, the application counts increase by 3.256 applications per one
thousand people and the application amount increases by 624,644 dollars per one thousand
people in the disaster incidence year. In comparison, for the FinTech application sample,
the application counts (amounts) increase by 0.085 applications (23,630 dollars) per one
thousand people in the disaster incidence year.
In Panel C and D of Table 2.6, I estimate Equation (12) by loan purpose, with Panel
C (Panel D) reporting the results for application counts (amount). All the interaction term
Treat× Post is significantly positive for both refinance and purchase applications, its mag-
nitude is larger for refinance subsample, suggesting that the demand shock is more driven by
higher refinance application volume. The total UPB for the refinance and purchase subsam-
ple increases by 24.2% and 11.2%, respectively. Among other explanations, more households
are likely using cash-out refinance to obtain fund for home restoration and renovation.
Note that the estimates of the effects of natural disasters on local mortgage demand
is conservative. This is because I examine how annual (calendar year) mortgage demand
responds to natural disasters that occur during that year, while literature suggests that
most of the increase in mortgage demand occurs in the two quarters following the shock
(Cortes (2014), Cortés & Strahan (2017), Dlugosz et al. (2018)), leading to underestimated
results. Thus, the significant results strengthen the argument that natural disasters increase
local mortgage demand.
In summary, the results in Table 2.6 suggest that there is a positive demand shock to
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the disaster affected counties during the disaster incidence year, which is consistent with the
findings of Cortés & Strahan (2017). Note that I only focus on the impact on conventional
mortgage market, which may not be the only credit market directly affected by natural
disasters. For example, higher volume of municipal bond issuances may be needed to support
the recovery of infrastructure and other public projects, and construction loan applications
may be spurred by the need of local residents and merchants to rebuild.
2.6.2. Mortgage Originations: Difference-in-Difference Approaches
In this subsection, I use GSEs mortgage origination data to further examine how different
types of mortgage lenders react to the demand shocks. I use a series of difference-in-difference
regressions to examine mortgage origination volume in treatment areas relative to control
areas. The treatment group includes 3-digit zip code areas that had a Major Disaster Decla-
ration or Emergency Declaration by FEMA, and the control group includes 3-digit zip code
areas in the same state but had no disaster within a 13-month window centered on the disas-
ter month of the treatment area. The first difference is between the treated and control areas,
and ther second difference is between the pre-disaster (6 months before) and post-disaster
(6 months after) periods. I start with the following difference-in-difference regression:
ln(Originations)i,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,t + δi + γt + εj,t,
(13)
where subscript i and t denote area (3-digit zip code) and period. Treati,t takes the value
of 1 if area i is a disaster affected area and 0 for control areas. Posti,t is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 in the first six months following the disaster incidence month and 0
for the six months before the disaster incidence month. Controls includes a range of county-
level control variables including Branch, Deposit, HHI, C3, Unemployed, and Population.
Branch is the number of bank branches per capita. Deposit is the amount of deposit per
capita. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of deposits of all bank branches in a county.
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C3 is the share of deposits of the three largest bank branches in a county. Unemployed is
the share of labor force that is jobless. Population is the county-level population.
Since I want to examine the aggregate effect of demand shocks on mortgage origination,
I collapse the dataset into one observation for the pre-shock period and one for the post-
shock period for each treatment or control area in each disaster. I do this by aggregating
all mortgage originations for a given area-shock combination for the six months before the
disaster and for the six months following the disaster month. This significantly reduces the
number of observations and will ensure I do not underestimate the standard errors. To
ensure there is at least some initial mortgage demand in the areas, I require each type of
lenders to have at least ten originations during the pre-disaster areas in each treatment and
control area. I include fixed effects γt indicating the month of disaster, and area fixed effects
δi, then cluster the standard errors at the area level. The coefficient of interest is β1 which
measures the extent to which the mortgage originations are different in disaster affected
areas in post-shock periods as compared to the controlling unaffected areas.
Panel A of Table 2.7 presents the results of Equation (2). In columns (1) to (4), I report
results of the regressions using the log of mortgage origination counts as the dependent
variable, with column (1), (2), (3), and (4) using originations by FinTech lenders, non-
FinTech shadow banks, traditional banks, and all types of lenders. In columns (5) to (8),
I replace the dependent variable with the log of total original unpaid balance of originated
mortgages.
Columns (4) and (8) show a positive and statistically significant coefficient on Treat ×
Post, suggesting that the overall mortgage originations increase following natural disasters.
The estimates are also economically significant. Mortgage origination counts increase by 9.9
percent after the natural disasters and the total original unpaid balance increases by 10.7
percent. The results in columns (4) and (8) suggest that mortgage lenders are responding
to the demand shock caused by natural disasters, which is consistent with the findings of
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Cortés & Strahan (2017) and Dlugosz et al. (2018).
Then I examine what types of mortgage lenders are contributing to the lending growth.
Columns (1) to (3) in Panel A of Table 2.7 show that FinTech shadow banks and tradi-
tional banks are the main forces of lending growth, while non-FinTech shadow banks did
not increase lending after natural disasters. The coefficient on Treat× Post is positive and
statistically significant for FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks, but not for non-
FinTech shadow banks. Economically, FinTech shadow banks increase origination counts by
10.0 percent and traditional banks increase origination counts by 13.1 percent after natural
disasters. Regarding the original unpaid balance, results in columns (5) to (7) are consistent
with those in columns (1) to (3). The coefficient on Treat×Post is positive and statistically
and economically significant for both FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks, with Fin-
Tech shadow bank increasing original UPB by 17.2 percent and traditional banks increasing
original UPB by 13.9 percent, while non-FinTech shadow banks didn’t significantly increase
lending. Note that for both FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks, the increase in
original UPB is higher than that in origination counts, meaning that the average mortgage
size is larger after natural disasters, and it is more so for FinTech shadow banks than for
traditional banks.
Although the results on mortgage originations from Panel A of Table 2.7 are not directly
comparable with the results on mortgage applications from Panel A of Table 2.6 due to
inconsistent measurement frequency, I can still determine which lender responds more to
demand shocks. For FinTech lenders, the annual mortgage applications increase by 10%
(in terms of UPB) after demand shocks and the 6-month mortgage originations increase
by 17.2%. For traditional banks, the annual mortgage applications increase by 24% and
the 6-month mortgage originations increase by 13.9%. The result suggests that FinTech
lenders may be better able to meet the local credit demand after natural disasters, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 11.
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In Panel B and C of Table 2.7, I reestimate Equation (13) by loan purpose, with Panel
B (Panel C) reporting the results for application counts (amount). The results show that
FinTech lenders and traditional banks primarily increase lending on refinance originations,
and only weakly increase lending or purchase originations. This is partially due to lower
demand shock for purchase applications, and could reflect that lenders’ perception that
refinance is less risky than new purchase under demand shocks. By comparing Panel B and
C of Table 2.7 with Panel B and C of Table 2.6, I can also conclude that FinTech lenders are
better able to respond to demand shocks, which is more striking on refinance originations.
This again supports Hypothesis 11.
2.6.3. Applicant Income and Lending Standards
Results in the previous subsections show that while FinTech shadow banks and traditional
banks increase lending after demand shocks, while non-FinTech shadow banks do not increase
lending. The hetergeneous lending behaviors can be driven either by demand-side or supply-
side reasons. On the demand side, mortgage applicants’ profiles may change differently
among different types of lenders, and it is likely that the overall creditability of non-FinTech
shadow banks deteriorates after demand shocks. On the supply side, lenders may adjust
their lending standards differently after demand shocks, possibly due to capacity constraints
or risk management concerns.
In this subsection, I first examine how the applicant profiles change across different types
of mortgage lenders after demand shocks. HMDA data provide the gross annual income of
the applicant, as well as the loan approval or rejection actions taken by the mortgage lenders.
This allows me to examine both the demand side applicant profile and supply side lender
lending standard choices.
Figure 2.4 presents the comparison of applicant income for each type of mortgage lenders.
Panel a (Panel b) shows the distribution of borrower income in the application (origination)
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sample, and Panel c (Panel d) shows the time-series trend of borrower income for each type
of lenders. Panel a shows that a typical bank mortgage applicant is less wealthy (measured
by annual income) than typical non-bank applicant, and a typical non-FinTech shadow bank
applicant is slightly less wealthy than a FinTech applicant. Similar pattern can be found
in the origination sample (Panel b). This is consistent with Buchak et al. (2018) who find
that higher income borrowers value the convenient services provided by FinTech lenders
and might be willing to pay for the convenience offered by FinTech lenders. Panel c shows
that although bank applicant income is lower than FinTech and non-FinTech Shadow bank
during the sample period, they exhibit different time-series trends. While the median income
of FinTech and non-FinTech shadow bank applicants decreases over time, the median income
of bank mortgage applicants increases over time. Similar pattern can also be observed in
Panel d. Panel e shows the differences in median borrower income between origination
sample and application sample for each type of lenders. Higher difference indicates that
the lender might be more selective when screening borrowers. Traditional banks have been
the most selective lenders since 2012, followed by non-FinTech shadow banks and FinTech
lenders. Banks’ selective lending policies can be explained by the passage of Dodd Frank
Act in 2010, the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2011, and the
implementation of Basel III capital rules, all of which may have contributed to the increase
in regulatory costs of residential mortgage lending faced by traditional banks.
Then I examine how the average income of mortgage applicants changes around demand
shocks. HMDA data not only include new mortgage applications to financial institutions, but
also include loans that were purchased by the institution. I exclude those purchased loans
from the sample because those activities are not likely to be affected by natural disasters.
Within the HMDA new application sample, I estimate difference-in-difference regressions of
the following form:
AvgIncomei,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,t + θd + εj,t, (14)
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where i indexes counties and t indexes years. AvgIncomei,t is the simple average income (in
thousands of dollars) of all mortgage applicants in county i and year t. Treat takes the value
of 1 for disaster affected counties and 0 for control counties. Post is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 in the disaster incidence year and 0 for the year preceding the disaster
incidence year. Controls includes a range of county-level control variables controlling for
local bank presence (Branch, Deposit), banking competition (HHI, C3), Unemployed, and
Population. Again, I include disaster fixed effects θd and cluster standard errors at the county
level. Since I want to compare the changes in borrower profile in the application sample and
rejection sample and also test the rejection rate around demand shocks, I restrict the sample
to areas that had at least one rejected loan in both pre-shock period and post-shock period.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.8 present the result of Equation (14). The coefficient
on the interaction term Treat × Post is positive for all types of lenders, indicating that
the annual income of mortgage applicants are generally higher after natural disasters. The
coefficient is more statistically significant for FinTech mortgage applications (significant at
1 percent level) than for traditional banks (significant at 5 percent level) and non-FinTech
shadow banks (significant at 10 percent level). Economically, the average income of FinTech
mortgage applicants increases by 3,153 dollars, while the average income of shadow banks
(traditional banks) increases by 1,296 (1,696) dollars. Combining applications to all types
of lenders, the average income increases by 2,093 dollars.
The increased income of applicants to FinTech and traditional banks may partially ex-
plain their increased lending after natural disasters, but this result cannot provide evidence
on how banks actually adjust their lending standards, which is the supply-side factor that
I are more concerned with. To test whether and how different types of lenders adjust their
lending standards, I reestimate Equation (14) using HMDA rejection sample. The intuition
is that, if the average income of the rejection sample increases by more than that of the
application sample after natural disasters, then it’s indicative that the lenders are tightening
their lending standards.
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Columns (4) to (8) of Table 2.8 present the results of Equation (14) using the rejection
sample. Column (4) shows that the coefficient on the interaction term Treat×Post is positive
and statistically significant for the full sample regression, suggesting that mortgage lenders
generally increase the average income of the rejected loans. Economically, the average income
of rejected borrowers increases by 2,968 dollars, which is higher than the increase in the
average income of applicants (2,093 dollars), meaning that mortgage lenders are tightening
lending standards after natural disasters. Columns (5) to (8) show what types of lenders
are contributing to the tightened lending standards. The interaction term is positive and
statistically significant for non-FinTech shadow banks (10 percent significance level) and
traditional banks (1 percent significance level), while is not significant for FinTech lenders.
Economically, non-FinTech shadow banks increase the average income of rejected borrowers
by 2,241 dollars, which is higher than the increase in the average income of applicants (1,296
dollars). Traditional banks increase the average income of rejected borrowers by 3,274 dollars,
which is also higher than the increase for applicants (1,696 dollars). These results suggest
that non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks are likely to be the institutions that
contribute to the tightened lending standards after demand shocks.
2.6.4. Rejection Rates
Mortgage lenders’ choices on lending standards can also be reflected on rejection rates. As
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.8 show that the applicant profile improved after demand shocks,
a higher rejection rate is suggestive that mortgage lenders are tightening lending standards.
Thus, I calculate the annual mortgage rejection rate for each type of lenders. The rejection
rate is calculated as the number of rejected loans (loans with action type application denied
by financial institution and preapproval request denied by financial institution) divided by
total number of completed applications (loans with action type loan originated, application
approved but not accepted, application denied by financial institution, preapproval request
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denied by financial institution, or preapproval request approved but not accepted). Then I
estimate the following difference-in-difference regression for each type of mortgage lenders:
RejectionRatei,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,t + θd + εj,t, (15)
where i indexes counties and t indexes years. RejectionRatei,t is the annual mortgage
rejection rate (in percentage) in county i in year t. Treat takes the value of 1 for disaster
affected counties, and 0 for control counties. Post is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 in the disaster incidence year, and 0 for the year preceding the disaster incidence year.
Controls includes a range of control variables controlling for borrower income (AvgIncome),
loan amount (LoanAmount), local bank presence (Branch, Deposit), banking competition
(HHI, C3), unemployment rate (Unemployed), and population (Population).
Table 2.9 presents the results of Equation (15). The coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and statistically significant for the full sample (1 percent significance level) and tra-
ditional bank subsample (1 percent significance level). Economically, rejection rate increases
by 0.455 percent for the full sample and 0.514 percent for the traditional bank subsample
after natural disasters. This is suggestive that traditional banks are contributing the most
to the tightened lending standards.
In summary, Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 suggest that while the increases in applicant in-
come may partially explain the increased lending by FinTech lenders and traditional banks,
different types of mortgage lenders adjust their lending standards differently. Non-FinTech
shadow banks and traditional banks tighten lending standards by raising the average income
of rejected borrowers by more than the increase in applicant income. Traditional banks also
raised the rejection rate even though the applicants’ income improves after natural disasters.
In contrast, FinTech lender neither increase the average income of rejected loans nor raise
the rejection rate after natural disasters. Thus, a conservative argument is that, although
in the face of improved applicant income, non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks
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still choose to tighten lending standards by raising the average borrower income of rejected
loans or increasing the rejection rate, or both, while FinTech lender do not choose to. This
is consistent with the argument of Hypothesis 10. Note that heavy reliance on mortgage
guarantees cannot explain why FinTech lenders do not tighten lending standards, since the
sample I are testing is the mortgages sold to GSEs by all types of lenders (an apple to apple
comparison), who also benefit from the mortgage guarantees.
2.6.5. Loan Pricing Around Natural Disasters
In this subsection, I investigate how mortgage lenders adjust mortgage interest rate in
response to natural disasters. The interest rate carried by a conventional mortgage depends
on several factors, including the terms of the loan - its length, size, and whether it is fixed-
rate or adjustable-rate - as well as current economic or financial market conditions. Mortgage
lenders also need to consider expected inflation and cost of funding when setting interest
rates. While traditional banks mainly use funds from their depositors to extend loans,
shadow banks need to have lines of credit with banks (called warehouse lines) to finance
mortgage originations. Shadow banks usually hold the loans on their balance sheets for
10-20 days until the loans are sold, and the funds obtained from loan sales are used to pay
off the warehouse borrowing.
To investigate the extent to which the interest rates change in disaster affected areas in
the post-disaster periods as compared to the control areas, I estimate the following difference-
in-difference regressions:
InterestRatei,t = β1Treati×Postt+β2Treati+β3Postt+β4Controlsi,t+δi+γt+εj,t, (16)
where subscript i and t denote area (3-digit zip code) and time. Treat takes the value of
1 if area i is a disaster affected area, and 0 if area i is a control area. Post is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 in the six months following the natural disaster. Controls in-
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cludes a range of control variables, including borrower characteristics (DTI and ln(FICO)),
loan characteristics (CLTV and Term), local bank presence (Branch and Deposit) and
competition variables (HHI and C3), unemployment rates (Unemployed), and population
(Population). All borrower and loan characteristics are aggregated to area-level average,
weighted by original unpaid balance.
Again, I collapse the dataset into one observation for pre-shock period and one for post-
shock period for each treatment or control area in each disaster, by aggregating all mortgage
originations for a given area-shock combination for the six months before the disaster and
for the six months following the disaster month (excluding the month of the disaster), and
calculate the average interest rates, InterestRate, weighted by mortgage original unpaid
balance. I then include disaster month fixed effects γt and area fixed effects δi, then cluster
the standard errors at the area level. The coefficient of interest, β1, measures the extent
to which the mortgage interest rates are different in disaster affected areas in post-shock
periods as compared to the controlling unaffected areas.
Panel A of Table 2.10 presents the results of Equation (5). The coefficient on the inter-
action term Treat× Post is insignificant across all lender types, with the coefficient for the
FinTech lenders’ regression being negative and the coefficient for the other types of lenders
being positive. This result suggests that after controlling for borrower and loan character-
istics and other control variables, mortgage pricing in the disaster affected areas does not
change with the local demand shock.
Since Equation (16) is estimated at the area level, it essentially treat areas of different
market sizes equally. This will overestimate the results of small areas with relatively few
mortgage originations and underestimate the results of large markets with large number of
originations. To confirm the findings in Panel A of Table 2.10, I estimate the following
difference-in-difference regression using loan-level observations:
InterestRatei,j,t = β1Treati×Postt+β2Treati+β3Postt+β4Controlsi,j,t+δi+γt+εi,j,t, (17)
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where subscript i, j, and t denote area (3-digit zip code), loan, and time. Treat takes the
value of 1 if area i is a disaster affected area, and 0 if area i is a control area. Post is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the six months following the natural disaster.
Controls includes loan-level borrower characteristics (DTI and ln(FICO)), loan character-
istics (CLTV , ln(UPB) and ln(Term)), local bank presence (Branch and Deposit) and
competition variables (HHI and C3), unemployment rates (Unemployed), and population
(Population).
Panel B of Table 2.10 displays the result of Equation 17. Consistent with the results in
Panel A of Table 2.10, the coefficient on the interaction term Treat × Post is insignificant
across all lender types, suggesting that mortgage pricing doesn’t change in disaster affected
areas after the demand shock. Regarding the borrower and loan characteristics, interest
rate is significantly positively related with borrower debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loan term
(ln(Term)), and cumulative loan-to-value (CLTV ), and negatively correlated with borrower
FICO score (ln(FICO)), and original unpaid balance (ln(UPB)).
Our results are consistent with Hypothesis 13. It is also consistent with the literature
showing that GSE mortgage rates are not sensitive to regional variation in predictable default
risk (Hurst et al. (2016)). The lack of risk-based pricing does not occur because this risk
cannot be observed ex ante. Instead, this is likely due to the presence of government mortgage
guarantees for GSE loans because Hurst et al. (2016) show that non-GSE loans that are
securitized in the private market increase (decrease) mortgage rates when ex ante local
default risk rises (falls). This reduction in borrowing costs may in turn offset some of the
negative local economic shock that increased default risk in the first place.
2.6.6. Lenders’ Choices on Borrower Risk Attributes
In this subsection, I investigate mortgage lenders’ choices on lending standards by ex-
amining their choices on borrower and loan risk attributes. While applicant income is the
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only applicant profile variable that is provided by HMDA application data, the GSEs data
provide detailed borrower and loan risk attributes data including borrower debt-to-income
ratio (DTI), FICO score (FICO), cumulative loan-to-value ratio (CLTV), and loan term
(Term). Since those variables are not observable in the HMDA application data, I cannot
directly test the changes in the applicant risk attributes around natural disasters or make
direct arguments about mortgage applicants’ default risk. However, using risk attributes
of the originated loans still allows me to compare the risk-taking among different types of
lenders. Thus, I estimate the following difference-in-difference regression:
RiskAttributei,t = β1Treati×Postt+β2Treati+β3Postt+β4Controlsi,t+δi+γt+εi,t, (18)
where i indexes areas and t indexes time. RiskAttribute is one of the following risk at-
tributes: DTI, FICO, CLTV , or Term. Treat takes the value of 1 for disaster affected
counties, and 0 for control counties. Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the
disaster incidence year, and 0 for the year preceding the disaster incidence year. Controls
includes a range of area-level control variables controlling for local bank presence (Branch
and Deposit), banking competition (HHI and C3), employment rate (Unemployed), and
population (Population). All borrower and loan characteristics are aggregated to the area-
level, weighted by original unpaid balance. I include disaster month fixed effects γt and area
fixed effects δi, then cluster the standard errors at the area level.
Table 2.11 presents the results for Equation 18. Due to space limitations I only report
the coefficient estimate for the interaction term Treat × Post. For the full sample, I find
that the risk attributes are changing towards the direction of lower risk after the demand
shock. Specifically, borrowers have lower DTI and higher FICO and loans have lower CLTV
and shorter term after the demand shock. The interaction is statistically significant for the
full sample across all risk attributes. Regarding the behavior of each type of lenders, I find
that non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks are contributing to the lower risk of
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mortgage lending. The interaction term is statistically significant for all risk attributes for
the two types of lenders, and also change toward the direction of lower risk. In contrast,
FinTech lenders do not improve the risk attributes. Their borrower DTI, FICO, and CLTV
stay unchanged around natural disasters, and FinTech lenders extend loans with longer
terms.
The results in Table 2.11 suggest that non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks
are likely to tighten lending standards after demand shocks, while FinTech lenders do not.
An alternative explanation is that it is improved borrower risk attributes that are driving
the results. Indeed, Panel A of Table 2.8 shows that the average applicant income is higher
after natural disasters than before. However, improved borrower profiles cannot fully explain
the results in Table 2.11 for several reasons.
First, if the results in Table 2.11 are fully driven by improved borrower profiles, as shown
by applicant income in Panel A of Table 2.8, then it cannot explain why the risk attributes
of FinTech borrowers do not improve, considering their applicant income improves the most
(economically and statistically more significant than other types of lenders). Thus, despite
the effect of borrower profiles, FinTech lenders either tightened their lending standards less,
if they did tighten, than non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks did, or loosened
their lending standards if non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks keep their lending
standards unchanged.
Second, Panel B of Table2.8 and Table 2.9 suggest that non-FinTech shadow bank and
traditional banks tightened lending standards either by increasing the average income of
rejected borrowers more than the increase in applicant average income or by increasing the
rejection rate after natural disasters, while there is no evidence that FinTech lenders are
following the same strategy. The fact is, borrower income can be correlated with some of
the risk factors typically captured during the underwriting process and used to predict loan
performance. For example, higher-income borrowers are more often able to make a larger
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down payment. Therefore, the LTV on loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers tend to
be higher, and higher LTV loans have higher default risk (Kelly (2008), An, Deng, Rosenblatt
& Yao (2012), Lam, Dunsky & Kelly (2013)). Additionally, lenders typically include DTI
when assessing credit risks. So, for any nominal level of debt, lower income borrowers
would have a higher DTI, which is associated with greater credit risk (Haughwout, Peach
& Tracy (2008), Demyanyk & Van Hemert (2009)). Considering this correlation between
borrower income and risk factors, its unlikely that banks adjust their risk-taking only through
applicant income but not through risk factors. In fact, borrower income, other than its use
as an input into the calculation of DTI, is not typically considered as a direct input to risk
models. Thus, it’s very likely that the results I observe in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2.8 are
reflecting non-FinTech shadow bank and traditional banks’ adjustment on risk attributes.
In summary, the improved applicant profile is unlikely to fully explain the results in
Table 2.11, and non-FinTech shadow bank and traditional banks may tighten their lending
standards relative to FinTech lenders by requiring improved borrower risk attributes.
2.6.7. Loan Performance Around Natural Disasters
In previous subsections, I document that FinTech lenders are able to increase lending
after demand shocks while not increasing rejection rate or tightening lending standards by
requiring higher income or better risk attributes, whereas traditional banks increase lending
but tighten lending standards. Non-FinTech shadow banks, while not increase lending, also
tighten lending standards. In this subsection, I further investigate the lending standards of
mortgage lenders by looking at ex post loan performance. I do this because mortgage lenders
can price loans not only through requiring different levels of interest rates on average, but also
through charging differential prices for loans with different performance. It is first necessary
to discuss originators’ exposure to the performance of loans sold to GSEs. By selling loans to
GSEs, loan originators pass virtually all mortgage risk to the market, raising concerns about
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lax lending practices. In order to align the incentives of originators with those of investors in
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), originators are subject to buyback risk for
violations of representations and warranties, which is a contractual agreement between loan
seller and purchaser aiming at assuring maintenance of underwriting standards. In cases
when the representation and warranty is breached, the seller, at the purchaser’s option, shall
repurchase the mortgage loan at issue at the purchase price.
In the aftermath of financial crisis, the GSEs became more aggressive in terms of enforcing
the representations and warranties. In some cases, lenders were required to repurchase loans
from the GSEs for relatively minor breeches with little obvious impact on credit risk. Lenders
were also forced to repurchase loans because of changes in borrowers’ financial situations that
occurred several years after origination. Furthermore, there were inconsistencies in the timing
of enforcement, leading to greater uncertainty for lenders. Some sanctions are overkill in the
absence of knowing fraud. Thus, in fear of legal liability for riskier loans, lenders respond
by applying credit overlays (i.e., much stricter credit thresholds than the GSEs require) in
order to minimize default rates and losses. As such, representations and warranties and
loan buyback risk have inadvertently hampered the flow of credit in the post-crisis period.
Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) show that the change in the probability of buyback requests
on GSE MBS explains tighter mortgage lending standards.
In cases of natural disasters, lenders facing invasive regulations and capacity constraints
may tend to tighten lending standards by picking potential well-performing loans for a same
interest rate, and how much do lenders tighten their lending standards depends on their
ability to processing applications, assessing risk, and screen borrowers. FinTech lenders, who
are considered better able to screen potential borrowers by leveraging alternative sources of
information and the big data approaches, may be less likely to “cherry-pick” well-performing
loans. Also, the traditional network of local brokers or “bricks and mortar” branches may
be more subject to capacity constraints than centralized automated processing operations
under demand shocks, and to compensate for the additional cost of providing extra capacity
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(i.e. temporarily hiring more loan officers), traditional lenders may need to charge a higher
interest rate than FinTech lenders need from borrowers.
With this in mind, I test how loans perform across lender types after demand shocks
using difference-in-difference approaches. Similar with previous methodologies, I need to
compare loans originated after the demand shock with those originated before the shock.
However, for loans originated before the shock, their payment history has to go through the
period of natural disasters which may adversely affect their performance. This makes the
loans originated before and after the natural disasters less comparable. To alleviate this
concern, I shorten the loan evaluation window by comparing the six-month performance
of loans originated in month -12 to -7 (month 0 is the disaster incidence month) with the
six-month performance of loans originated in month 1 to 6. In this way, I prevent natural
disasters from affecting the results and more precisely evaluate borrower credit worth.
To measure loan performance, I create a dummy variable, Delinquencyi,j,t, which equals
1 if loan j has at least one record of 30 days (or longer) delinquent within six months
of origination, and 0 otherwise. Then , I estimate the following difference-in-difference
regression for delinquency:
Delinquencyi,j,t = β1Treati×Postt+β2Treati+β3Postt+β4Controlsi,j,t+δi+γt+εi,j,t, (19)
where i indexes counties, j indexes loans, and t indexes period. Control variables include
mortgage interest rate (IntRate), borrower and loan characteristics (FICO, DTI, CLTV ,
Term), and area-level control variables (Branch, Deposit, HHI, C3). I include disaster
month fixed effects γt and area fixed effects βi, and cluster the standard errors at the area
level.
Table 2.12 presents the results of Equation (19). In columns (1) to (4), I include loans
of all purposes for each of the lender types. The interaction term is negative and statisti-
cally significant for non-FinTech shadow banks and traditional banks, suggesting that loans
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originated in treatment areas after demand shocks by these lenders perform better, after
controlling for interest rate and other control variables. Similar results are not found for
FinTech loans. This indicates tightened lending standards by shadow banks and traditional
banks after demand shock, while similar tighter lending standards are not found on Fin-
Tech loans. It also indicate that although mortgage lenders generally keep mortgage interest
rate stable around demand shocks, non-FinTech lenders tend to “cherry-pick” good borrow-
ers through some borrower characteristics that are unobservable to econometricians, while
FinTech lenders do not follow similar strategy.
In columns (5) to (12), I divide the sample by loan purpose into refinance subsample
and new purchase subsample. I do this to test if the pricing policies of different lenders
differ between refinance mortgages and purchase mortgages. Mortgage lenders may be less
likely to “cherry-pick” refinance borrowers because those borrowers are more likely to be
their current relationship borrowers. This is because it is usually cost-saving for a typical
borrower to refinance with the original lender because many lenders do not require a new
title search or property appraisal and might waive or reduce some of the closing costs, such
as loan origination fee, attorney fees, or recording fee for existing customers. Many lenders
will actually offer a better price to borrowers looking to refinance. Thus, a better rate can
be obtained by staying with the original lender. Thus, consider refinance loans are less likely
to be subjective to tighter lending standards, if I still observe a negative and significant
interaction term, then I can be more certain that the lender is tightening lending standards
by “cherry-picking” good borrowers.
Columns (5) to (12) show a negative and statistically significant interaction term for both
bank refinance loans and new purchase loans, indicating that banks are “cherry-picking” both
refinance and new purchase borrowers. The magnitude of the coefficient on Treat × Post
is similar between refinance sample and new purchase sample. Non-FinTech shadow banks
tighten lending standards only on purchase subsample, while FinTech lenders do not tighten
lending standards on any subsample.
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2.7. Conclusion
The financial services sector is currently undergoing a profound transformation. FinTech,
which is the use of technology to deliver financial services to consumers, is redefining and
reshaping the sector in fundamental ways.
This chapter focuses on the impact of FinTech on the largest consumer loan market in the
United States - the consumer mortgage market, and examines how FinTech and non-FinTech
lenders react to local demand shocks caused by natural disasters. Results show that FinTech
lenders increase lending after demand shocks and the increased lending is not associated with
changes in mortgage rates, lending standards, or loan performance. Traditional banks also
increase lending after demand shocks but tighten lending standards. Non-FinTech shadow
banks do not increase lending after demand shocks but still tighten lending standards. I
find evidence showing that non-FinTech lenders “cherry-pick” good borrowers after demand
shocks, and do not find similar behaviors on FinTech lenders. In summary, empirical results
suggest that FinTech lenders help fill the credit gaps under local demand shocks, thus reduce
market friction and improve lending efficiency.
Although all FinTech lenders in the sample of this study are stand-alone mortgage orig-
inators, many view them as complementary, rather than fierce competitors of traditional
banks, thereby providing synergy to banks’ “brick and mortar” operations. Indeed, many
traditional banks have substantially integrated FinTech companies and applications into
their operations. Since the traditional mortgage origination operations haven’t fundamen-
tally changed for decades, whether the mortgage industry will be the next area of integration




Figure 2.1. Distribution of Population and Natural Disasters from 2010 to 2016
Panel a presents the distribution of population density (thousand per square mile, based on
2010 United States Census Data). Panel b presents the distribution of frequency of natural
disasters during the period between 2010 to 2016.
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Figure 2.2. Time-series Trends of Loan Purposes
This table shows the composition of loan purposes by lender type using Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac origination data between 2010 to 2016. Loans included are conventional loans




Figure 2.3. Mortgage Applications Around Natural Disasters
This figure presents the dynamics of the annual mortgage applications in treatment and
control counties in years around the natural disasters. The horizontal axis displays four years
around natural disasters, where 0 represents the disaster incidence year, and -1 represents
the year before the disaster incidence year. The vertical axis shows the log of unconditional





Figure 2.4. Distribution and Time-Series Trend of Applicant Income
This figure shows the distribution and time-series trend of borrower income by lender type.
Panel a (Panel b) shows the distribution of applicant income (by thousands of dollars) for the
application (origination) sample. Panel c (Panel d) shows the time-series trend of median
applicant income for the application (origination) sample by lender type. Panel e shows the
time-series trend of difference between median income for the origination sample and the
median income for the application sample.
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Income Applicant’s total gross annual income. HMDA
Loan Amount In thousands of dollars. The original amount of the mortgage loan as indicated
by the mortgage documents. Also known as the original loan amount, original
principal balance, or original loan size.
HMDA, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac




DTI Debt-to-Income Ratio. Calculated at origination derived by dividing the bor-
rower’s total monthly obligations (including housing expense) by her stable
monthly income. This calculation is used to determine the mortgage amount
for which a borrower qualifies.
Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac
FICO The classic FICO score developed by Fair Isaac Corporation. It’s a numer-




CLTV Original Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio. A ratio calculated at the time of
origination for a mortgage loan. The CLTV reflects the loan-to-value ratio
inclusive of all loans secured by a mortgaged property on the origination date
of the underlying mortgage loan.
Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac
Term The number of months in which regularly scheduled borrower payments are
due under the terms of the related mortgage documents.
Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac
Loan Purpose An indicator that denotes if a mortgage loan in a pool is either a purchase
money mortgage or refinance mortgage. Referring to home purchase, home
improvement, or refinance in HMDA. Referring to purchase, cash-out refi-
nance, no cash-out refinance in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
HMDA, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac
Loan Type Loans in HMDA database are one of the following types: conventional (any
loan other than FHA, VA, FSA, or RHS loans), FHA-insured (Federal Hous-
ing Administration), VA-guaranteed (Veterans Administration), or FSA/RHS
(Farm Service Agency or Rural Housing Service).
HMDA
Property Type A property in HMDA database can be one of the following types: One to
four-family (other than manufactured housing), Manufactured housing, or
Multifamily.
HMDA
Branch Number of bank branches per capita in an area. FDIC Summary of De-
posits
Deposit Amount of deposits per capita in an area. FDIC Summary of De-
posits
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, computed in terms of deposits. FDIC Summary of De-
posits
C3 The share of deposits of the three largest deposit taking institutions in an
area.
FDIC Summary of De-
posits
Unemployed The share of the labor force that is jobless. U.S. Census Bureau
Population Population in an area (in thousands). U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 2.2: Natural Disaster Frequency and Affected Counties
This table reports the natural disasters that triggered Major Disaster Declaration or Emergency Declaration
by the President during the period between 2010 and 2016.
Total Counties Average Number Total
Incident Type Frequency Affected of Counties Damage ($bil)
Severe Storm 191 3,234 16.9 152.88
Flood 75 1,312 17.5 78.49
Hurricane 63 1,331 21.1 437.30
Snow 14 255 18.2 1.38
Severe Ice Storm 13 341 26.2 1.37
Tornado 7 49 7.0 40.23
Earthquake 3 13 4.3 7.97
Tsunami 3 9 3.0 0.51
Coastal Storm 2 9 4.5 0.01
Mud/Landslide 2 2 1.0 3.72
Typhoon 2 4 2.0 N.A.
Volcano 1 1 1.0 N.A.
Total 376 6,560 17.4 723.85
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Table 2.3: Distribution of Lender Actions and Purchaser Types
Panel A presents the distribution of mortgage lenders’ actions on loan applications based on HMDA data.
Panel B shows the composition of purchaser types. Loans categorized as “unsold” are not sold within the
calendar year of origination, although they may be sold some time later. Loans included are conventional




Action Type Frequency Percent Percent
Loan originated 31,745,774 52.27 52.27
Application approved but not accepted 2,182,243 3.59 55.86
Application denied by financial institution 10,037,653 16.53 72.39
Application withdrawn by applicant 5,476,750 9.02 81.41
File closed for incompleteness 2,066,785 3.40 84.81
Loan purchased by the institution 8,564,689 14.10 98.91
Preapproval request denied by financial institution 394,020 0.65 99.56




Purchaser Type Frequency. Percent Percent
Loan was not originated or was not
sold in calendar year covered by register 29,874,232 49.19 49.19
Fannie Mae (FNMA) 14,387,341 23.69 72.88
Freddie Mac (FHLMC) 8,618,327 14.19 87.07
Farmer Mac (FAMC) 1,535 0.00 87.07
Private securitization 257,174 0.42 87.49
Commercial bank, savings bank or savings association 3,244,453 5.34 92.84
Life insurance company, credit union,
mortgage bank, or finance company 1,594,058 2.62 95.46
Affiliate institution 1,447,625 2.38 97.84
Other type of purchaser 1,309,460 2.16 100
Total 60,734,205 100
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Table 2.4: List of Largest Mortgage Lenders
This table lists the largest U.S. mortgage lenders with their classification and origination volume between
2010 to 2016.
Number of Original
Lender Name Lender Type Originations Unpaid Balance
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 4,051,618 939.803
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 1,268,704 304.198
Bank of America, N.A. Traditional Bank 891,574 194.279
Quicken Loans Inc. FinTech 869,858 193.186
US Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 761,551 173.610
CitiMortgage, Inc. Traditional Bank 533,903 131.578
Branch Banking & Trust Traditional Bank 461,940 92.054
SunTrust Mortgage Inc. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 353,854 83.365
PHH Mortgage Corporation Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 331,430 70.672
Flagstar Capital Markets Corporation Traditional Bank 297,024 74.738
Franklin American Mortgage Company Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 294,003 61.360
Provident Funding Associates, L.P. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 263,787 70.667
Flagstar Bank, FSB Traditional Bank 231,505 58.612
Stearns Lending, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 198,564 53.283
PennyMac Corp. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 195,750 49.510
United Shore Financial Services, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 165,250 43.109
LoanDepot.Com, LLC FinTech 156,205 41.873
Caliber Home Loans, Inc. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 146,351 37.592
Fifth Third Bank Traditional Bank 126,651 26.344
U.S. Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 107,954 21.492
Ditech Financial LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 103,265 22.580
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 101,083 24.225
Freedom Mortgage Corp. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 89,964 22.569
Chase Home Finance, LLC Traditional Bank 89,740 21.422
Guaranteed Rate, Inc FinTech 85,243 22.876
AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 83,968 22.051
MetLife Home Loans Traditional Bank 63,438 16.027
NYCB Mortgage Company, LLC Traditional Bank 61,427 15.432
Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago Traditional Bank 58,140 8.529
Ally Bank Traditional Bank 46404 10.636
PNC Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 43,319 7.956
Union Savings Bank Traditional Bank 42,252 6.832
GMAC Mortgage, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 36,420 8.487
Fairway Independent Mortgage Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 34,899 8.311
Stonegate Mortgage Corporation Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 29,588 6.734
IMPAC Mortgage Corp. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 29,456 9.185
Cashcall, Inc. FinTech 28,322 8.157
Finance of America Mortgage LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 27,006 7.734
Fremont Bank Traditional Bank 23,305 5.874
Movement Mortgage, LLC FinTech 22,332 5.293
New York Community Bank Traditional Bank 21,762 6.249
Chicago Mortgage Solutions DBA
InterFirst Mortgage Company Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 21,433 5.635
Caliber Funding, LLC Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 20,901 5.196
Homeward Residential, Inc. FinTech 20,132 5.184
PMT Credit Risk Transfer Trust 2016-1 Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 19,712 5.973
PrimeLending, Inc. Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 17,676 4.201
Citizens Bank, N.A. Traditional Bank 16,974 2.880
Greenlight Financial Non-FinTech Shadow Bank 16,170 4.474
Amerisave Mortgage Corporation FinTech 15,343 3.970




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: Rejection Rates
This table examines the rejection rates by lender type around natural disasters by estimating the following
difference-in-difference regression:
RejectionRatei,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,t + θd + εj,t,
where i indexes counties and t indexes years. RejectionRatei,t is the annual mortgage rejection rate (in
percentage) in county i in year t, which is calculated as the number of rejected loans (loans with action type
application denied by financial institution or preapproval request denied by financial institution) divided by
total number of completed applications (loans with action type loan originated, application approved but
not accepted, application denied by financial institution, preapproval request denied by financial institution,
or preapproval request approved but not accepted). Treat takes the value of 1 for disaster affected counties
and 0 for control counties. Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the disaster incidence year
and 0 for the year preceding the disaster incidence year. Controls includes a range of control variables
controlling for borrower income (AvgIncome), loan amount (LoanAmount), local bank presence (Branch,
Deposit), banking competition (HHI, C3), unemployment rate Unemployed, and population Population.
All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and shown in
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
RejectionRatei,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt -0.290 -0.041 0.514*** 0.455***
(0.529) (0.349) (0.180) (0.166)
Treati 0.260 0.568* -0.460* -0.208
(0.421) (0.328) (0.243) (0.205)
Postt 1.908*** 2.981*** 1.783*** 2.237***
(0.239) (0.168) (0.112) (0.099)
AvgIncomei,t -0.011* -0.057*** -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
LoanAmounti,t -0.023*** -0.023** -0.011 -0.017***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Branchi,t 0.646*** 0.528*** 0.315*** 0.408***
(0.114) (0.131) (0.089) (0.085)
Depositi,t -0.080*** -0.017 -0.041** -0.039**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.020) (0.019)
HHIi,t -1.193 -3.085** -0.995 -1.606
(2.326) (1.547) (1.497) (1.190)
C3i,t 5.487*** 12.060*** 6.828*** 8.094***
(1.879) (1.440) (1.306) (1.124)
Unemployedi,t 0.613*** 0.899*** 1.037*** 0.986***
(0.100) (0.119) (0.097) (0.098)
Populationi,t -0.001*** -0.001 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4,802 4,802 4,802 4,802
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.450 0.478 0.507
Disaster FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.10: Mortgage Pricing Around Natural Disasters
This table shows the results of the following difference-in-difference regression for loan interesting rate around
natural disasters, using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac origination data from 2010 to 2016:
InterestRatei,j,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,j,t + δi + γt + εi,j,t,
where i, j, and t index area (3-digit zip code), loan, and time. Panel A shows the results for area
level regressions. Panel B shows the results for loan level regressions. Interestrate is defined as the
original mortgage interest rate minus the return on 10-year Treasury note. Treat takes the value of 1
for disaster affected areas, and 0 for control areas. Post takes a value of 1 in the six months following
the natural disaster and 0 for the six months before the natural disaster. Controls includes loan-level
borrower characteristics (DTI and ln(FICO)), loan characteristics (CLTV , ln(UPB) and ln(Term)),
local bank presence (Branch and Deposit) and competition variables (HHI and C3), unemployment rates
(Unemployed), and population (Population). All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors are
clustered at the zip code level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Area Level
InterestRatei,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt 0.011 0.036 0.038* 0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Treati 0.001 -0.011 -0.005 0.002
(0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Postt 0.074*** 0.109*** 0.096*** 0.107***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
DTIi,t 0.004* 0.003 -0.026*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
ln(FICO)i,t -0.065 -0.544 1.303** 2.347***
(0.352) (0.428) (0.563) (0.721)
CLTVi,t -0.000 0.001 0.006*** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Term)i,t 1.291*** 0.684*** 0.865*** 0.707***
(0.056) (0.076) (0.142) (0.148)
Branchi,t -0.042 -0.000 0.001 -0.031**
(0.050) (0.026) (0.020) (0.015)
Depositi,t -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHIi,t 0.216 -0.050 -0.125 0.057
(0.204) (0.111) (0.087) (0.084)
C3i,t 0.083 0.053 -0.052 -0.161
(0.301) (0.134) (0.100) (0.115)
Unemployedi,t -0.548 -0.209 0.110 0.234
(0.336) (0.339) (0.229) (0.198)
Observations 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010
Adjusted R2 0.630 0.513 0.519 0.529
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disaster Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Loan Level
InterestRatei,j,t
(1) (2) (3)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank
Treati × Postt -0.004 -0.019 0.031
(-0.14) (-0.81) (0.78)
Treati -0.001 0.014 -0.019
(-0.05) (1.04) (-0.96)
Postt 0.031** 0.076*** 0.049***
(2.33) (6.40) (3.68)
Branchi,t -0.027 -0.025 -0.003
(-0.83) (-1.03) (-0.23)
Depositi,t -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(-2.25) (-0.22) (-0.10)
HHIi,t 0.029 0.034 -0.043
(0.29) (0.30) (-0.72)
C3i,t 0.012 0.031 0.028
(0.14) (0.30) (0.19)
Unemployedi,t 0.163 0.131 -0.220**
(0.71) (0.75) (-2.58)
DTIj,t 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(9.04) (8.74) (8.90)
ln(FICO)j,t -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-38.84) (-6.06) (-9.61)
ln(Term)j,t 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(173.12) (101.62) (149.31)
CLTVj,t 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(17.87) (23.83) (14.76)
ln(UPB)j,t -0.236*** -0.179*** -0.149***
(-48.43) (-26.04) (-21.27)
Observations 153,925 479,346 1,764,226
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.56 0.48
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Disaster Month FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.11: Lenders’ Choices on Borrower Risk Attributes
This table examines the risk attributes of originated loans around natural disasters. The following difference-
in-difference regression for risk attributes is estimated:
RiskAttributei,t = β1Treati × Postt + β2Treati + β3Postt + β4Controlsi,t + δi + γt + εi,t,
where i indexes areas and t indexes time. RiskAttributei,t is one of the following borrower or loan
risk attributes: DTI, FICO, CLTV, or Term. Treat takes the value of 1 for disaster affected areas,
and 0 for control areas. Post takes a value of 1 in the first six months following the disaster incidence
month (excluding the disaster month), and 0 for the six months before the disaster incidence month
(excluding the disaster month). Controls includes a range of area-level control variables controlling
for local bank presence (Branch, Deposit), banking competition (HHI, C3), and Unemployed. All
borrower and loan characteristics are aggregated to area-level, weighted by original unpaid balance.
All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level and shown
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
DTIi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt -0.346 -0.592** -0.431*** -0.422***
(-1.20) (-2.43) (-3.24) (-3.55)
Observations 2,158 2,200 2,218 2,220
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.37 0.63 0.74
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disaster Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FICOi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt 2.246 5.716*** 1.737** 2.637***
(1.60) (3.34) (2.41) (4.17)
Observations 2,158 2,200 2,217 2,220
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.29 0.55 0.70
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disaster Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
CLTVi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt 0.053 -0.899** -0.563*** -0.609***
(0.12) (-2.36) (-2.98) (-3.64)
Observations 2,158 2,200 2,218 2,220
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.68 0.81 0.88
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disaster Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Termi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinTech Shadow Bank Bank Full Sample
Treati × Postt 6.783** -5.562*** -2.337** -1.931*
(2.05) (-2.63) (-1.99) (-1.82)
Observations 2,158 2,200 2,218 2,220
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.49 0.70 0.77
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Social Interactions and Peer-to-Peer Lending Decisions
A fundamental observation about human society is that people who communicate regularly
with one another think similarly....Word-of-mouth transmission of ideas appears to be an
important contributor to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market fluctuations.
- Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance
3.1. Introduction
While classical investment theories assume that investment ideas are transmitted among
investors through asset prices and quantities in impersonal markets, recent theoretical mod-
els and empirical evidence suggests that various forms of direct social interaction also impact
investment decisions. For example, individual investors often purchase stocks upon recom-
mendation of their friends and relatives (Shiller & Pound 1989), and mutual fund managers
are more likely to buy a particular stock if other managers in the same city are buying
that same stock (Hong, Kubik & Stein 2005).9 In the past two decades, the proliferation of
online social media and social networking service companies such as Facebook and Linkedin
provide innovative and efficient tools for social interaction, thus potentially impacting in-
vestment and lending decisions. However, the empirical case for the importance of these
social media sites on economic decision making has not yet been well developed.
In this chapter, I explore the economic role of social interactions by investigating how
they affect individual borrowing and lending decisions on the largest peer-to-peer (P2P)
lending platform in the U.S., LendingClub. My analyses focus on both the demand side and
9 For other studies showing how social interactions impact investment decisions, see Kelly & O’Grada
(2000), Duflo & Saez (2003), Hong, Kubik & Stein (2004), Massa & Simonov (2005), Ivković & Weisbenner
(2007), Cohen, Frazzini & Malloy (2008, 2010), and Shive (2010).
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the supply side: how borrowers’ social interaction intensity affects their borrowing decisions
and how it affects loan approval, pricing, and performance. I study these questions using
a novel measure of social interactions, “Social Connectedness Index”, which is produced by
Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) using the aggregated and anonymized infor-
mation from the universe of friendship links between all Facebook users.10 I show that social
interactions not only enable borrowers to learn from friends’ past borrowing experiences and
make their own borrowing decisions, but also allow lenders to extract valuable information
about the borrowers and make improved investment decisions. My findings supports the
argument that social interactions affect individual economic decisions through the channel
of enhancing information transmission and diffusion.
The Facebook “Social Connectedness Index” (SCI) proposed by Bailey, Cao, Kuchler,
Stroebel & Wong (2017) provides a snapshot of the county-pair intensities of social interac-
tions for all counties in the U.S.. Facebook is the world’s largest online social network with
more than 2.2 billion monthly active users worldwide and 169.5 million monthly active users
in the U.S. as of 2018. In January 2018, around two-thirds (68%) of U.S. adults use Face-
book and 70% of users visit the site on a daily basis,11 making Facebook the most popular
social media site in the U.S.. People primarily use Facebook to connect, share, discover, and
communicate with their real-world friends and acquaintances. Its immense scale, great mar-
ket penetration, and high popularity make Facebook’s friendship linkage data a reasonable
representation of real-word friendship interactions.
I first hypothesize that borrowers can learn from their socially connected friends about
their past borrowing experience on LendingClub and make borrowing decisions accordingly.
It essentially argues that social interactions facilitate the spread of new financial products
across geographic areas by disseminating the customers’ perception and recognition of these
products through social network. Specifically, I examine how the number of loan applications
10 I acknowledge Michael Bailey, Ruiqing Cao, Theresa Kuchler, and Johannes Stroebel for providing the
county-level Facebook friendship link data.
11 “Social Media Use in 2018”, http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/.
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in an area changes when their socially connected areas experienced high growth in loan appli-
cation, origination, or high approval rates. In order to confirm a causal relationship between
friend areas’ past borrowing experience and own borrowing decisions, I need to rule out a
confounding effect which arises when borrowers make borrowing decisions by extrapolating
from their own borrowing experiences, which could be correlated with the borrowing expe-
riences of friend areas. To extract only variation in friend areas’ past borrowing experiences
that are orthogonal to an area’s past own experience, I instrument for the past experience of
all friend areas with the experiences of only geographically distant friend areas (out-of-state
areas or out-of-commuting-zone areas).
I find that the past LendingClub borrowing experiences of friend areas have a quantita-
tively large impact on the area’s subsequent borrowing decisions. An area experiences higher
growth in loan applications when their distant friend areas experienced high growth in loan
application. On average, if the growth of applications per one thousand people increases
by 10 applications between 2010 to 2013 in friend areas, then the growth of applications
per one thousand people increases by 2.8 applications between 2013 to 2016. The results
are robust if I replace friend areas’ past loan application experiences with loan origination,
average approval rates, or increases in approval rates. The results imply that local borrowers
are likely to form their own perceptions about P2P financing by learning their friends past
borrowing experiences and then make their own borrowing decisions accordingly.
I then hypothesize that social network interaction may also impact lending outcomes.
Social interactions can affect lending outcomes through two competing channels: Emotional
and Cognitive Biases Channel versus Information Dissemination Channel. The emotional
bias channel hypothesizes that friendship connections create emotional attachments, which
makes a person feel concern, caring, or affection for the other person. This attachment may
hinder the investor’s judgment and interfere with the ability to make rational investment
decisions. That is, online lenders may lend to borrowers in the same geographic areas as
their Facebook friends even when these socially connected borrowers are not particularly
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creditworthy. The cognitive bias channel suggests that strong social connections may gener-
ate persuasion bias (DeMarzo, Vayanos & Zwiebel 2003) and overconfidence bias (De Bondt
& Thaler 1995, Barber & Odean 2000) that may lead to poor investment decisions. De-
Marzo et al. (2003) show that the failure of receivers to account for possible repetition in
the messages they hear from others (i.e., persuasion bias) plays an important role in the
process of social opinion formation. Thus, one’s influence on group opinions depends not
only on accuracy, but also on popularity and the extent of one’s social connections. In my
context, loan requests from a well-connected area may be more easily received and accepted
by investors simply because of familiarity generated through online interactions with others
in the borrower’s geographic area. Overconfidence bias may arise when well-connected in-
vestors erroneously believe that they have an edge that others do not have. DeMarzo et al.
(2003) and Barber & Odean (2000) show that excessive trading is often attributed to investor
overconfidence. Online social interactions may exacerbate this trading aggressiveness (Han,
Hirshleifer & Walden 2018). In my context, lenders may mistake emotional and cognitive
biases for information, and therefore irrationally favor borrowers from socially connected
regions.
In contrast, the information dissemination channel hypothesizes that tighter social con-
nections across regions may facilitate communication, reduce uncertainty, and reduce cultural
differences, thereby lowering the cost of information dissemination and facilitating learning
(Golub & Jackson 2012). Further, literature on informal lending markets (such as micro-
finance in rural areas) suggests that reputational concerns within localized areas enhance
credit outcomes (Ghosh & Ray (2016)). Social media can act as a reputation enforcement
mechanism if repayment performance improves because of peer pressure through publicly
disclosed defaults. For example, Ge, Gu & Feng (2017) find that loan performance is better
for a group of borrowers that choose to disclose their social media identities. Thus, stronger
online social networks may help overcome information asymmetries between borrowers and
lenders, and enable investors to more accurately screen loan requests. For example, online
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social connections enable the rapid and accurate dissemination of information about the eco-
nomic environment in geographically dispersed regions. This could allow investors to better
assess the creditworthiness of loan applications from these regions. Similar to physical prox-
imity promotion of interactions among mutual fund managers in Coval & Moskowitz (1999),
I hypothesize that online proximity facilitates information transmission, thereby reducing
both information acquisition costs and the perceived risk of loan applications from socially
connected areas.
I test both competing hypotheses by first establish an association between loan approval
and social connectivity. I examining both loan-level approval and area-level approval rates
while controlling for borrower and loan characteristics as well as local social, economic, and
demographic characteristics. I find that loan applications from more socially connected ar-
eas are more likely to get approval, obtain funding, and receive lower interest rates and
better loan grades. I show that the results are more likely to be driven by the information
dissemination channel since social connections are found to enhance the information con-
tent of credit grades based on FICO scores, leading to more approvals for higher credit risk
borrowers in socially connected areas. Furthermore, all else equal, loans from more socially
connected areas are less likely to experience delayed payment or default. The improvement
in loan performance is found for all levels of credit grades. Hence, my results support the in-
formation dissemination hypothesis that social networks improve information dissemination
and reduce information asymmetries.
Then I eliminate endogeneity concerns and show that the positive relationship between
social connectivity and loan approval is likely to be causal. Endogeneity may arise from the
possibility that social connectivity can be the outcome of some hidden ex ante advantages,
qualities, or skills, which may also affect loan approval and loan rates. For example, some
unobserved intangible attitudes and beliefs, or similarity with other areas (homophily) can
potentially affect both social connectivity and lending outcomes.
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To address this endogeneity concern, I employ an exogenous shock that temporarily
weakens information diffusion through social connectivity network while not affecting other
determinants of lending outcomes: regional flu epidemics. Flu infection causes symptoms
such as fever, cough, headache, or fatigue, which directly weaken an investors attention and
information processing capabilities. Even if the investors and analysts themselves are not
infected, infected family members and relatives can also distract investors attention from
work and indirectly slow down information diffusion. The duration of flu symptoms, typi-
cally a few days to two weeks, is sufficiently long to impair investors or analysts attention
and capability of information processing, which further weaken the capability or efficiency
of extracting information from social connections. Although I cannot observe whether each
specific person is infected with flu or not, it is safe to assume that investors and their social
connections are more likely to be infected if they reside in areas experiencing flu epidemics.
I show that regional flu epidemics exhibit significant time-series and cross-sectional varia-
tions, which facilitate the implementation of my identification strategies. The identification
strategy allows me to test what will happen to loan origination in an area whose connected
areas are experiencing flu activities.
I find that an area’s loan approval rate is significantly weakened when its distant but
socially connected areas are experiencing flu epidemics. For each one standard deviation
increase in the flu measures in friend areas, the effect of social connectivity on loan approval
rate is reduced by 40.35% to 67.11% relative to the unconditional mean. The results confirms
that information processing and diffusion capacities are weakened when borrowers’ friend
areas are experiencing flu activities. In sum, my findings suggest that Fintech lending sites
allow both borrowers and lenders to make better investment decisions, thereby facilitating
more efficient capital allocation.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Subsection 3.2 introduces the litera-
ture and hypothesis development. Subsection 3.3 discusses the data and social connectivity
measures. Subsection 3.4 presents the empirical tests of the hypotheses. Subsection 3.5
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concludes the chapter.
3.2. Literature and Hypothesis Development
Social networks play an important role in shaping human life and have large effects on
social and economic activities. Studies have shown that social interactions are important in
information dissemination and preferences formation, thereby influencing the outcomes of
trade, labor market, and organizational relations. Using a new measure of social connected-
ness, Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) document that social connectedness is
related to a vast array of social and economic characteristics. Although social connectedness
is strongly decreasing in geographic distance between counties, the populations of counties
with more geographically dispersed online networks are richer, more educated, and have a
higher life expectancy. More importantly, Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017)
show that the effects of social connections may spill over to demographic, economic and
technological decisions. They find that more socially connected regions have higher trade
flows, more cross-region migration and patent citations.
Social interactions can affect economic decisions in a wide range of mechanisms. Hong
et al. (2005) find that investors spread information about stocks to one another by word of
mouth. Bakshy, Eckles, Yan & Rosenn (2012) identify the effect of social cues on consumer
responses to advertisements, measured in terms of ad clicks and the formation of connections
with the advertised entity. Agrawal, Kapur & McHale (2008) examine how the spatial and
social proximity of inventors affects access to knowledge and suggest that although spatial
and social proximity both increase the probability of knowledge flows between individuals,
the marginal benefit of geographic proximity is greater for inventors who are not socially
close. Gee, Jones, Fariss, Burke & Fowler (2017) show that people find jobs through their
social networks using ties of different strengths. Hong et al. (2004) find that stock-market
participation is influenced by social interaction.
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In addition to promoting the volume of information transfers, social connectivity may
enhance the quality of information dissemination, thereby lowering information acquisition
costs and reducing information asymmetries that inhibit economic and financial activities
across regions. Golub & Jackson (2012) shows that social networks facilitate agreement by
lowering the cost of information dissemination and increasing the speed of learning. Han &
Yang (2013) analyze a rational expectations equilibrium model to explore the implications of
information networks for the financial market, and show that social communication improves
market efficiency when information is exogenously endowed.
In addition to the literature showing that closer social connections across regions facilitate
communication, reduce cultural differences, cultivate friendships, and enhance mutual under-
standing, there is a literature that demonstrates how social connections may bias attitudes
and preferences (e.g., Rosenblat & Mobius (2004)). People from socially connected regions
may build stronger emotional attachments with people from other areas. Occasionally un-
deserved favorable preferences and opinions may form across socially connected regions as a
result of strong mutual recognition. These emotional connections may spill over to financial
decisions in that people from more socially connected regions are more recognized by others,
and thus are more likely to interact financially and economically (i.e., engage in P2P lending
in the context of this chapter). For example. Azouzi & Anis (2012) focus on how CEO be-
havioral biases undermine shareholder value and impact investment decisions by hampering
the ability to accurately assess alternatives (optimism and overconfidence) and skewing risk
perception (loss aversion).
Cognitive biases engendered by strong social connections may generate persuasion bias
((Rosenblat & Mobius 2004), De Bondt & Thaler (1995) , Barber & Odean (2000)) that may
mislead investment decisions. DeMarzo et al. (2003) show that persuasion bias, the failure
of receivers to account for possible repetition in the messages they hear from others, plays an
important role in the process of social opinion formation. Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel &
Wong (2017) show that past migration patterns are important determinants of present-day
155
social connectedness. Two regions with the same ancestor are more likely to build strong
emotional ties which can affect lending decisions. However, strong attachments may hinder
the investor’s judgment and interferes with her ability to make rational investment decisions.
This may lead to overconfidence and excessive trading (see DeMarzo et al. (2003), Barber &
Odean (2000) and Han et al. (2018)).
This chapter contributes to the current literature by focusing on the role of social in-
teraction in P2P lending decisions. I examine these decisions from both the demand and
supply side. Examining the demand side, both the cognitive bias and information dissemina-
tion channels suggest that online social connections encourage loan demand on P2P Fintech
sites. That is, I test the following hypothesis against the null hypothesis that online social
interactions have no impact on P2P applications:
Hypothesis 11. Loan applications on online P2P Fintech platforms grow faster in regions
whose geographically distant, but socially connected areas experienced larger recent increase
in P2P borrowing.
Further, both cognitive bias and information dissemination channels imply that more ex-
tensive social connections enhance loan approval rates either irrationally through behavioral
biases or rationally through enhanced screening. This implies the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 12. Loan applications from socially connected areas experience increased ap-
proval rates.
The cognitive bias channel implies that socially connected lenders irrationally lend to
lower quality borrowers, whereas the information dissemination channel hypothesizes that
social connections facilitate the exchange of accurate information used by lenders to screen
borrowers. Thus, whether lenders irrationally or rationally favor connected borrowers, I
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 13. Conditional on being approved, loans from socially connected areas have
lower interest rates and receive higher risk grades.
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While both cognitive bias and information dissemination channels have the same im-
plications for the greater likelihood and lower cost of lending across socially connection
regions, they have very different implications regarding loan performance. The cognitive
bias channel specifies an irrational emotional connection that might favor less creditworthy
borrowers from socially connected regions. These loans should experience relatively poor
ex post performance (Hypothesis 4a). In contrast, the information dissemination channel
specifies that social connections enhance information flows, thereby allowing lenders to base
decisions on loan applications from connected regions on accurate information. These loans
should experience relatively good ex post performance (Hypothesis 4b). Formally stated:
Hypothesis 14.A. Ceteris paribus, loans granted to borrowers in socially connected areas
experience worse ex post performance than loans originated in areas with less extensive online
networks.
Hypothesis 14.B. Ceteris paribus, loans granted to borrowers in socially connected areas
experience better ex post performance than loans originated in areas with less extensive online
networks.
3.3. Data and Variables
3.3.1. Social Connectivity
I adopt the Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) measure of social connection
index, SCI, which is a county-pair level measure of social connectivity index that uses
aggregated and anonymized information from the universe of friendship links between all
Facebook users. Facebook, created in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, is a social networking site
that makes it easy for users to connect and share with their family and friends online. Today,
Facebook is the world’s largest social network with more than one billion users worldwide.
Its success is attributed to its ability to appeal to both people and businesses and its ability
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to interact with sites around the web. Figure 3.1 exhibits the findings of a national survey
of 1,520 adults conducted in 2016, which shows that Facebook is American’s most popular
social networking platform by a substantial margin.12 Nearly eight-in-ten online Americans
(79%) used Facebook, more than double the share that used Twitter (24%), Pinterest (31%),
Instagram (32%) or LinkedIn (29%) in 2016. This implies, on a total population basis
(accounting for Americans who do not use the internet at all), that 68% of all U.S. adults
were Facebook users in 2016, as compared to 28% on Instagram, 26% on Pinterest, 25% on
LinkedIn and 21% on Twitter.
Establishing a friendship link on Facebook requires the consent of both individuals, and
there is an upper limit of 5,000 on the number of friends a person can add. Bailey, Cao,
Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) and Bailey, Cao, Kuchler & Stroebel (2017) find that
Facebook’s enormous scale, the relative representativeness of its user body, and the fact
that individuals primarily use Facebook as a tool to interact with their real-world friends
and acquaintances, account for the unique ability of the Facebook social graph to provide
a large-scale representation of real-world U.S. friendship networks. In the U.S., Facebook
mainly serves as a platform for real-world friends and acquaintances to interact online, with
people usually only adding connections on Facebook to individuals whom they know in
the real world (Jones, Settle, Bond, Fariss, Marlow & Fowler (2013), Gilbert & Karahalios
(2009), and Hampton, Goulet, Rainie & Purcell (2011)).
The Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) SCI measure corresponds to the
relative frequency of Facebook friendship links between every county-pair. Based on this
county-pair-level SCI measure, I calculate an overall connectedness index for each county




12Pew Research Center, November 2016, “Social Media Update 2016.”
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where SCIi,j is the normalized total number of friendship links between county i and county
j constructed by Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017). The normalized SCIi,j
has a maximum value of 1 and minimum value of 0, and relative differences in the SCI
correspond to the relative differences in the total number of friendship links. SCIi is thus
the total connectedness of county i with all other counties in the U.S. Let ShareFrndi,N,j





Network N can be the broadest network that includes all Facebook connections or some
other subnetworks such as out-of-commuting zone connections or out-of-state connections.
Higher ShareFrndi,N,j means that more of county i’s friends live in county j.
Note that SCIi,j is not adjusted for local population, so it is biased up in counties
with higher population. Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) thus construct an








where Popi is the population in county i. Popi can be replaced with the number of Facebook
users in county i, and Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) show that the two
choices lead to very similar effects. In the rest of this chapter, I will use RSCIi as the main
measure of social interaction between region i and the rest of the country.
3.3.2. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending
I obtain personal loan data from the largest P2P lending platform, LendingClub, which
provides detailed information regarding borrower creditworthiness, including FICO scores,
debt-to-income ratio, home ownership, employment length, etc. P2P lending platforms offer
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lending-based crowd-funding for consumers and small businesses where multiple lenders lend
small sums of money online to consumers or small businesses with the expectation of periodic
repayment. LendingClub launched the first online P2P lending platforms in the US in
2007, followed by other companies such as Upstart, Funding Circle, CircleBack Lending
or Peerform. In December 2014, LendingClub became the first publicly traded online P2P
lending platform in the U.S. after its Initial Public Offering on the New York Stock Exchange.
As of September 2017, LendingClub has intermediated $28 billion of loans, followed by
Prosper, which issued $10 billion of loans.
Consumer loan amounts vary between a minimum loan of $500 and a maximum loan of
$35,000 ($300,000 for businesses). The platform funds various types of projects ranging from
credit card debt consolidation to home improvement, short-term and bridge loans, vehicle
loans or engagement loans. As in many other two-sided markets (see Rysman (2009)), on-
line lending marketplaces try to attract two different groups of users, namely borrowers and
investors, by choosing an appropriate structure of fees that depends on the magnitude of
cross-network externalities. On the borrower side of the market, online lending marketplaces
compete with banking institutions, credit unions, credit card issuers and other consumer
finance companies. Platforms claim that their prices are lower on average than the interest
rates and fees that consumers pay on outstanding credit card balances or unsecured install-
ment loans funded by traditional banks. Online lending marketplaces perform some of the
traditional screening function of banks by defining various broad criteria that must be met
by borrowers. However, online lenders screen the individual loan applications individually
using their own information sources.
Social connectivity across Facebook users can be relevant for P2P lending behaviors
since both sites interact with the same pool of participants. The main group of Facebook
users are young people who are also the largest group of borrowers on LendingClub. For
example, Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of employment length for LendingClub loan
applicants between 2016 and 2017, as compared to the age distribution of Facebook users
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according to a survey conducted in January 2018. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that most of
the LendingClub borrowers have employment length shorter than 2 years, indicating that
they are mainly young people. Similarly, Facebook users are dominated by those in the
18-29 age bracket. Thus, even though I are not sure about whether a specific Facebook user
is also a LendingClub borrower, I can generally infer that the social connectivity index by
Facebook is relatively representative for the population of LendingClub borrowers. Further,
both LendingClub and Facebook target individuals (either as consumers or small business
owners), thereby eliminating any distortions from institutions and their online networks.
Thus, the social connectivity data from Facebook provides valuable insights into the P2P
online loan market.
The social interaction measure of Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) is at the
county-pair level, whereas the geographic locations of loan borrowers are identified by state
and 3-digit zip code on LendingClub. In U.S., each county can contain multiple different
3-digit zip codes, and a 3-digit zip code can reside different counties. To match counties with
zip codes in each state, I combine all counties containing a specific 3-digit zip code and treat
them as a single area. For example, six counties (Fayette, Lee, Colorado, Austin, Bastrop,
Gonzales) in Texas contain the 3-digit zip code 789. In this case, I combine these six counties
and treat them as the area corresponding to the 3-digit zip code 789. The connectedness
between this area and other counties are then calculated. The sample contains 911 unique
3-digit zip codes and 3,136 unique counties and county equivalent entities, covering the vast
majority of the U.S. The sample covers the periods between 2010 to 2017. Table 1 provides
a list of variables used with definitions of each variable.
LendingClub assigns each approved loan a loan grade (A, B, C, D, E, F, or G) based on
its internal credit evaluation methodologies. Grade A loans are the least risky and Grade
G loans are most risky. Each grade is further categorized into five subgrades (e.g., Grade A
has subgrades of A1, A2, A3, A4, A5) based on loans credibility. Thus, there are in total 35
subgrades of loans. I create a LoanGrade variable with value of 35 for A1 and decrease its
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value by 1 for each subgrade below A1.
3.3.3. Control Variables
I control for a wide range of control variables that are potentially related to social con-
nectivity and also affect borrowing choices and lending outcomes. A large literature has doc-
umented that many individual characteristics, including racial identity, gender, education
are associated with social connectivity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001). I obtain
local social, economic, and demographic characteristics data from the 5-year estimates of
the American Community Survey. Demographic characteristics include population, share of
senior population (65+ years old), share of white population, share of female population.
Economic characteristics include income per capita, unemployment rate, share of labor force
in manufacturing industry, share of labor force working in information industry, number of
bank branches per capita, amount of bank deposit per capita and local bank deposit concen-
tration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Social characteristics include
the share of people with higher than a high school education in the population aged 25 years
or older.
3.3.4. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the LendingClub summary statistics for loan applications and origina-
tions during the sample period of January 2010 through December 2017. Panel A presents
the summary statistics for the loan application sample, including both approved and rejected
loans, and Panel B presents summary statistics for approved loans only. During the sample
period, there are 9,827,198 loan applications, of which 1,722,890 applications were approved,
equivalent to an approval rate is 17.5%. The median loan amount of the application sample
is $10,000, whereas the median amount of approved loans is $12,000. The median FICO
score in the application sample is 652, whereas the median FICO in the approved loan sam-
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ple is 692. The median debt-to-income (DTI) ratio in the application sample is 20%, and the
median DTI ratio in the approved loan sample is 17.96%. The median employment length
is 1 year in the application sample, and 6 years in the approved loan sample. The annual
income of borrowers in the approved loan sample is $65,000. The average loan rate is 13.2%
in the origination sample. In sum, approved loans have larger amounts, higher FICO scores,
lower debt-to-income ratios, and longer employment lengths.
The summary statistics shows that the average RSCI is slightly higher in the origina-
tion sample than in the application sample, implying a positive relationship between loan
approval and online social connectivity. In the application (origination) sample, the RSCI
measure has a mean value of 0.132 (0.133) and standard deviation of 0.040 (0.039). A t test
significantly rejects the null hypothesis that the mean values of RSCI in the application
sample and approved sample are the same. Table 3.3 presents an area-level correlation ma-
trix for variables included in the origination sample. It shows that loan rates are positively
correlated with loan grade, funded amount, loan term, and debt-to-income ratio, and are
negatively correlated with employment length, FICO scores, and annual income. Interest
rates are positively correlated with RSCI measures, but statistically insignificant. Borrower
annual income is also positively related to larger funded amount, longer loan term, longer
employment length, and higher FICO score.
Panels C and D of Table 3.2 present the summary statistics of loan statuses for all loans
originated in 2015. I focus on 24 months after loan origination, and each loan in each month
is assigned a status. Panel C shows the observed status for all loans originated in 2015.
Panel D shows the number of normal (i.e., performing) and abnormal (i.e., delinquent) loans
originated in 2015. Panel C of Table 3.2 shows that 66,292 out of 421,095 loans originated
in 2015 experience at least one form of bad performance, with the most frequent form of bad
performance being late payment by 31-120 days.
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3.4. Empirical Strategies and Results
3.4.1. The Effects of Social Interactions on Borrowing Decisions
To examine the demand side and test Hypothesis 11, I examine the relationship between
loan applications and social connectivity. Specifically, I test whether there is a causal rela-
tionship between P2P borrowing decisions and past P2P borrowing experiences of connected
friends in geographically distant regions. I start by constructing region i’s connected friends’




ShareFrndi,N,j × Expj,t1,t2 . (23)
where Expj,t1,t2 is region j’s P2P borrowing history during the period between time t1 and
t2. Borrowing history is measured using four different metrics: changes in loan application
(∆FrndAppi,t1,t2), changes in loan origination (∆FrndOrgi,t1,t2), changes in approval rate
(∆FrndRatei,t1,t2), and the aggregate approval rate (FrndRatei,0). Both loan application
and origination measures are scaled by local population.
I regress current P2P borrowing decisions on the past borrowing history (using the four
different metrics) of connected regions. Specifically, this is implemented by regressing area
i’s P2P borrowing decisions, as measured by changes in loan applications between time t2




. I control for a wide range of demographic, economic, and social
characteristics that may also affect the P2P borrowing decisions and outcome. Specifically,




+ γXi,t2 + εi,t2,t3 (24)
I focus on area i’s broadest network so N represents all of area i’s Facebook friends. With
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regard to time periods, I observe and aggregate region i’s connected regions’ borrowing
history between the years 2010 to 2013 (past experience period between t1 and t2), and
examine regions i’s borrowing decisions between 2013 to 2016 (response period between t2
and t3). Thus, in all the equations, t1, t2, and t3 represent year 2010, 2013, and 2016,
respectively.
To ensure that the estimates of β in Equation (24) represents a causal relationship, I
must eliminate alternative endogenous and non-causal channels that can also explain the re-
lationship between region i’s P2P borrowing decisions and its connected regions’ borrowing
experiences. That is, endogeneity may be introduced if both past and current P2P bor-
rowing activity is driven by the local region’s own borrowing experiences rather than social
interactions. To address this endogeneity concern, I employ an instrumental variables (IV)
approach, where I instrument for area i’s friend experience in the broadest network (all Face-
book connections) with the past borrowing history of area i’s geographically distant friends
only, such as out-of-state connections in order to remove underlying economic conditions that
may impact nearby regions jointly. Then the first and second stages of this IV regression
are as follows:
FrndExpAlli,t1,t2 = β





+ γXi,t2 + sk + εi,t2,t3 , (26)
where FrndExpAlli,t1,t2 is the average borrowing history of area i’s all connections between
time t1 and t2. FrndExp
OutState
i,t1,t2
is the average borrowing history of area i’s out-of-state
connections between time t1 and t2. The two variables are highly correlated because the
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+ (1− ShareFrndOutStatei,N,j )× FrndExpInStatei,t1,t2
(27)
Xi,t1 is a vector containing local demographic, economic, and social characteristics that
may also affect local P2P borrowing decisions. It includes local bank branches per one
thousand population (Branch), deposit per capita (Deposit), local banking competition
(HHIi,t), local population (Population, in millions), share of white people (White) in local
population, share of female (Female) in local population, share of people with higher than
high school education (Education) ) in the population aged 25 years or older, share of people
older than 65 (Seniori,t), income per capita (Income), unemployment rate (Unemployment),
share of labor force working in the manufacturing industry (Manufacuture), and share of
labor force working in the information industry (Information). I include state fixed effects
(sk) to control for with-in state patterns of P2P demand, and cluster standard errors at the
state level.
Table 3.4 presents the results for Equation (25), the first stage regression of the IV ap-
proach for 2010 to 2013, with Column (1) to (4) reporting the results on loan application,
origination, growth in approval rates, and average approval rates. βFS is positive and sig-
nificant across different measures of borrowing history in connected regions, indicating that
friends’ P2P activity across all connected regions is positively correlated with friends’ P2P
history in out-of-state connected regions.
Table 3.5 shows the results for Equation (26), the second stage regression of the IV
approach. The fitted value of instrumented variable from the first stage is used as the main
independent variable. Table 3.5 shows that region i’s loan applications experience larger
increases if connected regions had larger past increases in loan applications. Economically,
on average, if the growth of applications per one thousand people increases by 10 applications
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between 2010 to 2013 in friend areas, then the growth of applications per one thousand people
increases by 2.8 applications between 2013 to 2016. The results are robust if I replace friend
areas past loan application experiences with loan origination, average approval rates, or
increases in approval rates. The results imply that local borrowers are likely to form their
own perceptions about P2P financing by learning their friends past borrowing experiences
and then make their own borrowing decisions accordingly.
3.4.2. Loan Approval and SCI
To test Hypothesis 12, I utilize a logit regression using loan application outcome as
the dependent variable. A loan application can either be approved or rejected. Approved
loans that cannot be sufficiently funded are also categorized as rejected in the LendingClub
database. The specification includes regressions of applications on the social interaction
index of the region where the borrower lives using the following specification:
Approvali,k = βRSCIi + γX i,k + sk + qk + εi,k (28)
where i indexes region and k indexes loan. The unit of observation is a loan. Approvali,k
is 1 for approved loans and 0 for rejected loans. RSCIi is the relative social connectedness
index of region i. X k is a vector of loan, borrower, demographic, economic, and social
characteristics. si indexes state fixed effects and qk indexes application quarter fixed effects.
LendingClub’s rejected loans database contain fewer borrower characteristics variables than
the approved loan database, which also provide borrower income and loan maturity, so the
variables in the regressions are limited to variables included in both approved and rejected
databases. Based on Hypothesis 12, I expect β to be significantly positive.
Table 3.6 presents the results for Equation (28). The coefficient on RSCI is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 12.
Economically, the full regression results in Column (3) of Table 3.6 show that for each one
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standard deviation increase in RSCI, the likelihood of loan approval increases by 0.549% as
compared to the average approval rate of 17.50%. The signs of coefficients on control variables
are as expected. Borrowers with higher FICO Score, lower DTI, and longer employment
length have greater likelihood of receiving loan approvals. Loans with larger amounts are
less likely to be approved.
In Panel B of Table 3.6, I break my sample into low, medium and high FICO groups.
I find a more positive relationship between social connectivity and loan approval for higher
credit score borrowers. Unreported tests show that the coefficients on RSCI across FICO
scores are significantly different from each other at the 1% significance level. This suggests
that social connectivity allows creditworthy borrowers to obtain loans more easily than other
borrowers. As I will show below, the loans granted to creditworthy borrowers perform better
when social connectivity increases (even after controlling for interest rates and other loan
and borrower characteristics), implying that social connections allow lenders to extract more
information on creditworthy borrowers and improve investment decisions.
Further, I test the robustness of my results in Table 3.6 by performing an area level
analysis. I aggregate loan applications to the region-quarter level and calculate the quarterly
approval rate of each region. The quarterly approval rate is defined as the total count (or
amount) of originated loans divided by the sum of originated loans and non-originated loan
applications. Note that the approval rate is an approximate estimate of the true lender
approval rate, since some applications were withdrawn by the borrower or the loans were
not funded to the required amount. I then estimate the Tobit regressions of the approval
rate on social interaction and a range of control variables:
ApprovalRatei,t = βRSCIi + γX i,t + sk + qt + εi,k (29)
Table 3.7 presents the results of Equation (29). The coefficient on RSCI is positive and
significant, indicating that loans borrowed from more socially connected areas are more likely
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to get approved, which confirms the results in Table 3.6.
Some areas experienced very low volume of applications during some periods and ex-
perienced either 0% or 100% approval rates, in which case it is hard to draw economic
and statistical inference from the approval rates. To further confirm the robustness of the
relationship between social connectivity and loan approval, I drop those area-month observa-
tions with either 0% or 100% approval rates, which constitute about 5% of all observations.
Dropping observations at lower and upper bounds allows me to estimate 29 using linear
estimation method. 3.8 shows the results of linear regressions, which exhibit similar results
as non-linear regressions.
3.4.3. Flu Epidemics as Exogenous Shocks to Social Connectivity
Intensity
Endogeneity may arise from the possibility that social connectivity can be the outcome
of some hidden ex ante advantages, qualities, or skills, which may also affect loan approval
rates, interest rates, and likelihood of default. Although I have controlled for a range of ob-
servable local social, economic, and demographic characteristics that can explain both social
connectivity and lending outcome, there still could be some other unobserved characteristics,
such as intangible attitudes and beliefs, or similarity with other areas (homophily), that can
potentially affect both social connectivity and lending outcomes.
To address this endogeneity concern and isolate the causal effect of social connectiv-
ity on lending outcome, I employ an exogenous shock that temporarily weakens information
diffusion through social connectivity networks while not affecting other determinants of lend-
ing outcomes: regional flu epidemics. Flu infection causes symptoms such as fever, cough,
headache, or fatigue, and investors’ attention and information processing capabilities are
directly weakened when they are infected with the flu. Even if the investors and analysts
themselves are not infected, infected family members and relatives can also distract investors’
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attention from work and indirectly slow down information diffusion. Infected colleagues can
also reduce capability of information processing due to weaker collaboration and support.
The duration of flu symptoms, typically a few days to two weeks, is sufficiently long to
impair investors’ or analysts’ attention and capability of information processing, which fur-
ther weaken the capability or efficiency of extracting information from social connections.
Although I cannot observe whether each specific person is infected with flu or not, it is safe
to assume that investors and their social connections are more likely to be infected if they
reside in areas experiencing flu epidemics.
I obtain flu epidemic data spanning 2010 to 2017 from the Outpatient Illness and Viral
Surveillance database provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
WHO/NREVSS. I employ two measures of flu epidemics: one is ‘the percentage of patient
visits to healthcare providers for influenza-like illness’ (ILI) and the other is ‘the percentage
of flu tests with positive results’ (POS), both of which are observed at the state level on
weekly basis. I aggregate the measures into monthly values to keep consistency with my
measurement of loan origination.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the statistical properties of the two measures of flu epidemics.
Figure 3.3 shows the monthly time-series of the flu measures. Flu epidemics usually occur
in winter and spring seasons, highlighting the importance of controlling for seasonality in
empirical tests. The figure also shows that the duration and severity of flu epidemics vary a
lot across years, which provides enough time-series variations for my identification strategies.
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between the monthly national-level value of flu measures
and monthly cross-sectional variations in flu measures across all U.S. states (each dot rep-
resents a month). I can observe the severity of flu epidemics is positively associated with
variations in flu activities across U.S. states. This ensures enough cross-sectional variations
for the identification strategies.
My identification strategy allows me to test what will happen to loan originations in an
170
area whose connected areas are experiencing flu activities. For example, assume Area A and
Area B are a pair of well-connected areas. When Area B is affected by a serious flu epidemic
that lasts for one month, the social, economic, demographic fundamentals of Area A are not
affected, but social connection of Areas A with Area B is temporarily weakened. I then test
what will happen to the loan origination in Area A during this flu period of Area B, relative
to other areas with friend areas that are not affected.
To measure the aggregate severity of flu activities in all area i’s connected areas, I first
construct the following flu severity measure for area i that is customized for each region’s
geographic distribution of online social connections:
FluImpacti,t = Σ
J
j=1RSCIi,j × FluMeasurej,t, j 6= state(i) (30)
where i, j, t respectively denote own area (Zip Code), friend state, and time (month),
where j excludes the state where area i is located in. Flu Measure is one of two measures
of flu epidemics, ILI or POS. RSCIi,j represents the relative social connectivity index
between area i and state j. Higher Flu Impact indicates that area i’s friend areas are more
severely affected by the flu during month t.
Based on the premise that investors, analysts, and their family and friends are more
likely to be infected with flu in flu-affected areas, I identify regional peaks of flu pandemics
that are severe enough to impact investors. I define regional peaks of flu pandemic as those
months when the flu measures (ILI, POS, or both) are higher than both the time-series
average for the state and the concurrent average flu measures across all U.S. states. Thus,
the FluImpact variable can be revised to:
FluImpactPi,t = Σ
J
j=1RSCIi,j × FluPeakj,t, j 6= state(i) (31)
where i, j, t denote own area (Zip Code), friend state, and time (month), where j excludes
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the state where area i is located in. RSCIi,j represents the relative social connectivity index
between area i and state j. FluPeak is a dummy variable with the value one if the flu measure
(ILI, POS, or both) is simultaneously higher than the time-series average for the state
and the concurrent average across all U.S. states, and zero otherwise. Thus, FluImpactPi,t
measures the extent to which an area’s friends are affected by serious flu pandemics.
To analyze how loan approval rates change when flu epidemics shock an area’s online
social connections, I estimate the following fixed effects regression:
ApprovalRatei,t = β1RSCIi + β2FluImpacti,t + γXi,t + sk + θt + εi,t (32)
where i and t denote area and time (month). ApprovalRatei,t is the loan approval rate
(total origination count or amount divided by total application count or amount). Xi,t is
a vector of loan, borrower, demographic, economic, and social characteristics. sk indexes
state fixed effects and t indexes application time fixed effects. FluImpacti,t is the flu impact
measure I constructed in Equation (30) and can be either FluImpactILIi,t or FluImpact
POS
i,t
depending on the flu measure used. Flu Impact can further be replaced with FluImpactPi,t
calculated from Equation (31).
Although I are testing how a weakened social connectivity caused by flu epidemics affects
loan origination, note that in Equation (3) there is no interaction term between RSCI and
FluImpact. This is because Flu Impact, by construction, already includes an interaction
between social connection and flu measures, and the coefficient on it measures the marginal
impact of social connectivity on loan origination that is driven by flu epidemics.
Table 3.9 presents the estimation results for Equation (32). Panel A uses the FluImpact
measure constructed in Equation (30) and Panel B uses the FluImpactPi,t constructed in
Equation (31). I observe two results in Panels A and B. First, the positive relationship
between RSCI and loan approval rate persists in both sets of tests. Second, the coefficients
on FluImpact measures are negative and significant at the 1% level across all specifications,
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indicating that the positive relationship between RSCI and loan approval rate is weakened
if the friend areas are experiencing flu epidemics. For example, the coefficient estimate on
FluImpact in Column (1) of Panel A is -6.679, which is statistically significant at the 1%
level. This result suggests that, when an area’s friend areas are experiencing flu activities
(i.e., the ILI measure increases by one standard deviation in all the friend areas), the effect of
social connectivity on loan approval rate is reduced by 67.11%, relative to the unconditional
mean. Similarly, when using the measure POS as reported in Column (3), the effect of social
connectivity on loan approval rate is reduced by 40.35% for each one standard deviation
increase in flu measure. Similar results are shown in Panel B.
One concern about Equation (32) is that the values of the dependent variable, the ap-
proval rate, are economically restricted to lie in a certain interval between 0 and 1. However,
OLS regressions like Equation (32) do not account for this fractionality and assume that the
dependent variable can take on every negative or positive real number, which leads to biased
estimation (Heckman 1979, Elsas & Florysiak 2015). To resolve this concern, I re-estimate
Equation (32) using a double boundaries Tobit estimation (with boundaries 0 and 100). Ta-
ble 3.10 reports the results for the Tobit models. The results do not qualitatively change in
the Tobit model estimations.
3.4.4. Loan Pricing and SCI
To investigate the relationship between loan pricing and social interaction (Hypothesis
13), I focus on approved loans and estimate fixed effects regressions using either the loan
interest rate or LendingClub assigned loan grades as the dependent variable. I start with
the following fixed effects regressions:
InterestRatei,k = α + βRSCIi + γX i,t + sk + qt + εi,k (33)
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where i indexes county and k indexes loan. InterestRatei,k is the interest rate for loan k
granted to a borrower in county i. X k is a vector of loan, borrower, demographic, economic,
and social characteristics. Based on Hypothesis 13, I expect β to be negative and significant.
If social connectivity helps borrowers obtain better loan terms, then loans from higher so-
cial connectivity areas should be assigned better loan grades, thus I replace the InterestRatei,k
with LoanGradei,k and run the following regression:
LoanGradei,k = α + βRSCIi + γX i,t + sk + qt + εi,k (34)
Based on Hypothesis 13, I expect β to be negative and significant.
Table 3.11 presents the results for Equation (33). Consistent with Hypothesis 13, the
coefficient on RSCI is negative and significant at the 1% level. Economically, using the
full regression results in Column (3), for each one standard deviation increase in RSCI,
interest rate decreases by 7 basis points. With regard to the control variables, borrowers
with higher FICO score, higher annual income, lower DTI, and longer employment length
obtain better interest rates from lenders. Table 3.11 also shows that LendingClub charges
higher interest rates on larger funded amounts and longer term loans. Loan rates are also
lower in areas with higher populations, more bank branches per one thousand population
and higher deposits per capita. Areas with higher shares of white people, better education,
and lower unemployment rates also get lower interest rates.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.11 present the results for Equation (34). Consistent with
Hypothesis 13, the coefficient on RSCI is negative and significant at the 1% level. Eco-
nomically, using the full regression results from Column (3), for each one standard deviation
increase in RSCI, loan grade increases by 0.1 sub-grade out of a total of 35 grades. Both
the borrower financial profile and loan characteristics are important elements in evaluating
Loan Grades. Loans initiated by good borrowers with higher FICO score, higher annual
income, lower DTI, and longer employment length are assigned better grades. Larger loans
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with higher funded amounts tend to get worse grades. Short term loans get better grades
compared to long term loans. Loans to borrowers in areas with more bank branches and
deposits per capita, a higher share of white population, better education, higher income,
lower unemployment rate all are assigned better loan grades.
In sum, Table 3.11 provides evidence on the pricing implication of social interactions.
More socially connected areas receive lower loan rates and higher loan grades.
3.4.5. Loan Performance and SCI
In this section, I differentiate between the cognitive bias and information dissemination
hypotheses using ex post loan performance. That is, if the positive relationship between so-
cial connections and lending activity is driven by the emotional and cognitive bias channel,
then I should observe more defaults and late payments for loans with the same ex ante loan
grade and interest rate designations (Hypothesis 14.A). Alternatively, if social connected-
ness reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, then loans originated
in more connected areas should experience lower default rates or fewer late payments (Hy-
pothesis 14.B). I utilize all loans originated during out sample period and investigate their
24-month performance. LendingClub provides the performance data for all loans originated.
For each loan in each month, the performance database provides loan status, beginning
balance, principal and interest paid, amount due, amount paid.
The loan status at the end of each month after loan origination is one of the followings:
Issued, Current, In Grace Period, Late (16-30 days), Late (31-120 days), Default, Charged
Off, and Fully Paid. A loan is at the status of Issued in the month of origination. The status
is Current if a monthly payment is made before due date. When a borrower misses a loan
payment, the loan status changes from Current to Late.
LendingClub gives all borrowers a 15-day grace period to make payments with no penalty.
Thus if a borrower misses a monthly payment and the end of that month is within 1-15 days
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after the due date, then the status becomes In Grace Period for that month. If borrowers
made a payment within the first 15 days after their due date, they would not accrue a late
fee. Before Feb 24, 2017, if a borrower pays between 1-15 days past their due date, then
any interest accrued during grace period would be waived. This grace period interest waiver
policy was eliminated after Feb 24, 2017. If LendingClub did not receive payment during the
grace period, it may charge a late fee. If a payment was not received within 16-30 days after
the due date, the status becomes Late (16-30 days). If a payment was not received within
31-120 days after the due date, the status becomes Late (31-120 days). When a borrower
misses several payments, the loan will enter Default status. When there is no longer a
reasonable expectation of further borrower payments, the loan will be Charged Off by the
platform. The status becomes Fully Paid if the loan is fully paid off. A loan is defined as
normal loan if its status stays as Issued, Current, Fully Paid, or In Grace Period during the
24-month period after loan origination. A loan is defined as an abnormal loan if its status
falls into Late (16-30 days), Late (31-120 days), Default, or Charged Off at least once during
the 24-month after loan origination.
To test the performance of loans originated in different social connectedness areas. I run
a set of logit regressions:
BadPerformancei,k = α + βRSCIi + γX i,t + sk + qt + εi,k (35)
where i indexes area and k indexes loan. BadPerformancei,k equals 1 if at least one of
the following statuses occurs on loan k within 24 months after loan origination: Late (16-30
days), Late (31-120 days), Default, Charged Off, and 0 otherwise.
Hypothesis 14.A predicts that the coefficient on β is expected to be positive. Alterna-
tively, Hypothesis 14.B predicts that the coefficient on RSCI is expected to be negative.
Panel A of Table 3.12 presents the results for Equation (35). Consistent with Hypothesis
14.B, β is negative at the 1% level. Economically, using the full regression results in Column
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(3), starting from median level of 3.42%, for each one standard deviation increase in RSCI,
the likelihood of bad performance decreases by 0.15%. Moreover, Panel B of Table (3.12)
shows an improvement in performance across all credit qualities from marginal increases
in social connectivity, such that the improvements are higher for high FICO borrowers.
Unreported tests show that the coefficients on RSCI across FICO scores are significantly
different from each other at the 1% significance level. Hence, my results support the informa-
tion dissemination channel, hypothesizing that online social networks improve information
dissemination and reduce information asymmetry.
3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I use a novel measure, the social connectivity index (SCI), to examine the
effects of social connections on the demand for and supply of consumer and small business
loans on peer-to-peer (P2P) FinTech sites such as LendingClub. I find that P2P loan demand
increases when geographically distant, but socially connected areas have large amounts of
past P2P borrowing activity. This suggests that social networks provide a mechanism for
propagation across markets of awareness about and recognition of alternative sources of
borrowing. Loans originated in high SCI areas are more likely to be approved and funded.
Both approval rates and quality (as measured by assigned loan grades and interest rates)
are higher the greater an area’s aggregate social connectivity. I then examine whether the
results are driven by an irrational emotional connection channel or by a rational information
asymmetry channel. I find that loans originated in high SCI areas are less likely to experience
late payment or default, which suggests that social connectivity facilitates P2P lending
through a channel of reducing information asymmetries and uncertainty, thereby assisting
rational decision making. In sum, my findings suggest that social connectivity plays an
important role in affecting individual economic decisions in the context of FinTech P2P
on-line lending.
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of Online Adults Who Use Each Social Media Platforms
This figure shows the percentage of online adults who use each social media platform. By
April 2016, 86% of Americans are internet users. Source: Pew Research Center, November
2016, “Social Media Update 2016”
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of LendingClub Borrower Employment Length and Face-
book User Age
This figure shows the distribution of LendingClub loan applicants’ employment length (by
year) and Facebook user age as of 2016.
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Figure 3.3. Time Series of Flu Measures
This figure presents the nation-level monthly time series of the two measures of flu epidemics.
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Figure 3.4. Relationship Between the Level of and Cross-sectional Variation in Flu
Measures
This figure shows the relationship between monthly nation-level value of flu measures and
monthly cross-sectional variation in flu measures across all U.S. states.
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition
SCIi SCIi = ΣjSCIi,j
where SCIi,j is the normalized total number of friendship links between county i and
county j. The normalized SCI has a maximum value of 1, and relative differences
in the SCI correspond to relative differences in the total number of friendship links.
SCIi is thus the total connectedness of county i with all other counties in U.S.
RSCIi RSCIi = ΣjSCIi,j/Popi
where Popi is the population in county i. Popi can be replaced with the number of
Facebook users in county i, and Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel & Wong (2017) show
that results are very similar between the two alternative treatments.
Interest Rate Interest Rate on the loan.
Grade LC assigned loan grade.
FundAmnt The total amount committed to that loan at that point in time.
Employment Length Employment length in years. Possible values are between 0 and 10 where 0 means
less than one year and 10 means ten or more years.
FICO The simple average of the upper and lower boundary ranges the borrower’s FICO at
loan origination belongs to.
Income The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower during registration.
DTI A ratio calculated using the borrower’s total monthly debt payments on the total debt
obligations, excluding mortgage and the requested LC loan, divided by the borrower’s
self-reported monthly income.
Home Ownership The home ownership status provided by the borrower during registration. Values are:
RENT, OWN, MORTGAGE, OTHER.
Population The total population of all counties containing a specific 3-digit zip code.
Branch Number of bank branches per one thousand population. Source: FDIC Summary of
Deposits.
Deposit Amount of bank deposit (in thousands) per capita. Source: FDIC Summary of De-
posits.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann index computed in terms of deposits. Source: FDIC Summary
of Deposits
White Share of white people in local population.
Female Share of female in local population.
Education The number of people over 25 years and with high school education (or higher) divided
by total population older than 25. Source: 2013 American Community Survey 5-year
estimates
Income Income per capita. Source: 2013 American Community Survey 5-year estimates
Unemployment Local unemployment rate. Source: 2013 American Community Survey 5-year esti-
mates
Senior The share of population that is over 65 years old. Source: 2013 American Community
Survey 5-year estimates
Manufacture The share of labor working in manufacturing industry. Source: 2013 American Com-
munity Survey 5-year estimates
Infomration The share of labor working in information industry. Source: 2013 American Commu-
nity Survey 5-year estimates
ILI The percentage of patient visits to healthcare provider for influenza-like illness.
Source: CDC and WHO/NREVSS
POS The percentage of flu tests with positive results. Source: CDC and WHO/NREVSS
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample. Sample period spans the time of Jan 2010 to Dec
2017. Panel A shows summary statistics for the full loan application sample, including both approved and
rejected loans. Panel B presents summary statistics for approved loans only. Panel C and Panel D presents
the distribution of monthly loan status for all loans originated in 2015. I focus on monthly loan statuses
for each of the 24 months following loan origination. For each loan in each of the 24 months following loan
origination, the status could be one of the followings: Issued, Current, In Grace Period, Late (16-30 days),
Late (31-120 days), Default, Charged Off, and Fully Paid. A loan is at the status of Issued in the origination
month. The status is Current if a monthly payment is made before due date. If a borrower misses a monthly
payment and the end of that month is within 1-15 days past the due date, then the status becomes In Grace
Period for that month. If a payment is not received within 16-30 days after the due date, the status becomes
Late (16-30 days). If a payment was not received within 31-120 days after the due date, the status becomes
Late (31-120 days). When borrowers miss several payments, the loan will enter Default status and, when
there is no longer a reasonable expectation of further borrower payments, the loan will be Charged Off. The
status becomes Fully Paid if the loan is fully paid off. A loan is defined as a normal loan if its status is Issued,
Current, Fully Paid, or In Grace Period. A loan is defined as an abnormal loan if its status is Late (16-30
days), Late (31-120 days), Default, or Charged Off. Panel D shows the number of normal and abnormal
loans originated in 2015.
Panel A
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. P25 P75
Social Connectivity
RSCI 9,827,198 0.132 0.125 0.040 0.107 0.152
Loan and Borrower Charateristics
Approval 9,827,198 0.175 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.000
Loan Amnt ($Thou-
sands)
9,827,198 13.142 10.000 10.646 5.000 20.000
ln(Loan Amnt) 9,827,198 2.169 2.303 1.002 1.609 2.996
FICO 9,827,198 642.337 652.000 80.627 604.000 687.000
DTI 9,827,198 29.548 20.020 46.618 15.330 33.200
Employment Length 9,827,198 2.145 1.000 2.706 1.000 1.000
Demographic Characteristics
Population 9,827,198 1.063 0.613 1.573 0.300 1.140
White 9,827,198 0.738 0.768 0.162 0.631 0.869
Female 9,827,198 0.507 0.508 0.011 0.502 0.514
Senior 9,827,198 0.136 0.13 0.037 0.115 0.151
Economic Characteristics
Income 9,827,198 27.901 26.813 6.692 23.431 30.800
Unemployment 9,827,198 0.099 0.099 0.024 0.082 0.114
Manufacture 9,827,198 0.789 0.143 1.561 0.079 0.865
Information 9,827,198 0.128 0.033 0.239 0.021 0.117
Branch 9,827,198 0.284 0.276 0.097 0.219 0.336
Deposit 9,827,198 29.003 19.283 28.492 13.846 32.052
HHI 9,827,198 0.148 0.123 0.104 0.093 0.160
Social Characteristics
Education 9,827,198 0.857 0.868 0.055 0.832 0.896
Flu Epidemic Measures
ILI 88,678 0.019 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.022
POS 88,678 0.092 0.050 0.095 0.016 0.155
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Panel B
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. P25 P75
Social Connectivity
RSCI 1,722,890 0.133 0.126 0.039 0.109 0.153
Loan and Borrower Charateristics
Interest Rate 1,722,890 13.206 12.740 4.742 9.750 15.990
Loan Grade 1,722,890 24.357 25.000 6.331 21.000 29.000
Funded Amnt
($Thousands)
1,722,890 14.761 12.550 8.879 8.000 20.000
ln(Funded Amnt) 1,722,890 2.483 2.530 0.698 2.079 2.996
Short Term 1,722,890 0.715 1.000 0.451 0.000 1.000
FICO 1,722,890 698.335 692.000 31.709 672.000 712.000
Annual Income 1,722,890 77.051 65.000 120.806 46.000 91.511
ln(Annual Income) 1,722,890 4.184 4.174 0.546 3.829 4.517
DTI 1,722,890 18.667 17.96 11.825 12.09 24.45
Employment Length 1,722,890 5.697 6.000 3.756 2.000 10.000
Demographic Characteristics
Population 1,722,890 1.100 0.633 1.589 0.320 1.185
White 1,722,890 0.740 0.768 0.158 0.633 0.866
Female 1,722,890 0.507 0.508 0.011 0.502 0.514
Senior 1,722,890 0.135 0.129 0.037 0.114 0.149
Economic Characteristics
Income 1,722,890 28.855 27.726 7.148 24.069 32.344
Unemployment 1,722,890 0.098 0.098 0.024 0.080 0.113
Manufacture 1,722,890 0.732 0.132 1.460 0.078 0.741
Information 1,722,890 0.126 0.035 0.240 0.022 0.111
Branch 1,722,890 0.285 0.279 0.096 0.220 0.337
Deposit 1,722,890 30.308 19.944 30.028 14.213 33.321
HHI 1,722,890 0.148 0.122 0.105 0.094 0.158
Social Characteristics
Education 1,722,890 0.861 0.872 0.054 0.837 0.899
Flu Epidemic Measures
ILI 88,678 0.019 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.022
POS 88,678 0.092 0.050 0.095 0.016 0.155
Panel C
Monthly Status Number of Obs. Percent Cumulative Percent
Issued 299 0.00% 0.00%
Current 7,924,917 94.96% 94.96%
Fully Paid 134,873 1.62% 96.58%
In Grace Period 139 0.00% 96.58%
Late (16-30 days) 58,798 0.70% 97.28%
Late (31-120 days) 171,991 2.06% 99.34%
Default 7,680 0.09% 99.43%
Charged off 47,009 0.57% 100.00%
Panel D
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Social Connectivity and P2P Borrowing Decisions: First Stage
This table shows the results of first stage of the 2SLS regression:
FrndExpAlli,t1,t2 = β
FSFrndExpOSi,t1,t2 + δXi,t1 + εi,t1,t2
where FrndExpAlli,t1,t2 is the average borrowing experience of area i’s all connections between time t1 and t2.
FrndExpOSi,t1,t2 is the average borrowing experience of area i’s out-of-state connections between time t1 and
t2. Friend borrowing experience between t1 and t2 includes changes in loan application (∆FrndAppi,t1,t2),
changes in loan origination (∆FrndOrgi,t1,t2), changes in approval rate (∆FrndRatei,t1,t2), and aggregate
approval rate (FrndRatei,0). Standard errors are clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses.
















Branchi,t -0.015** -0.093** -0.058 -0.424**
(0.007) (0.037) (0.101) (0.193)
Depositi,t 0.063* 0.389* 0.679 1.839*
(0.033) (0.194) (0.507) (0.971)
HHIi,t -0.008 -0.031 -0.009 -0.163
(0.005) (0.031) (0.077) (0.164)
Populationi,t -0.866*** -1.783 -16.576*** -31.472***
(0.300) (1.588) (3.611) (8.155)
Whitei,t 0.005 0.049 0.178 0.262
(0.007) (0.045) (0.121) (0.249)
Femalei,t 0.135 0.668 1.015 4.186
(0.089) (0.500) (1.279) (3.024)
Educationi,t 0.017 0.090 -0.082 0.402
(0.022) (0.129) (0.315) (0.741)
Incomei,t -0.001*** -0.003** -0.007** -0.014**
0.000 (0.001) (0.003) (0.007)
Unemploymenti,t -0.008 -0.045 0.373 0.920
(0.062) (0.291) (0.753) (1.796)
Seniori,t -0.024 -0.150 -0.242 -0.931
(0.027) (0.159) (0.369) (0.807)
Manufacturei,t -0.001 -0.010 -0.021* -0.043
(0.001) (0.006) (0.011) (0.028)
Informationi,t 0.010** 0.058** 0.149** 0.296**
(0.004) (0.026) (0.061) (0.127)
Observations 854 854 854 854
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.985 0.981 0.983
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.5: Social Connectivity and P2P Borrowing Decisions: Second Stage
This table reports the results of the second stage of the 2SLS regressions of borrowing decisions and outcomes




+ γXi,t2 + εi,t2,t3 .
where i indexes area. t1, t2, t3 index the year 2010, 2013, and 2016, respectively. Applicationi,t2,t3 is the




is the estimated average borrowing
experience of area i’s all connections between time t1 and t2, including changes in count (or amount) of
loan application (∆FrndAppi,t1,t2), changes in loan origination (∆FrndOrgi,t1,t2), changes in approval
rate (∆FrndRatei,t1,t2), and aggregate approval rate (FrndRatei,t1,t2). All application and originations
on scaled by local population. Areas are at the 3-digit zip level. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **
and ***, respectively.
∆Applicationi,t2,t3









Branchi,t -0.888** -0.837** -1.052*** -0.925***
(0.359) (0.371) (0.348) (0.337)
Depositi,t 1.255 0.984 1.683 1.523
(1.952) (1.995) (1.949) (1.944)
HHIi,t -0.820** -0.836*** -0.909*** -0.865***
(0.320) (0.311) (0.343) (0.328)
Populationi,t 27.747** 21.091* 32.065** 29.134***
(11.004) (10.974) (12.935) (11.182)
Whitei,t -0.277 -0.349 -0.406 -0.329
(0.378) (0.396) (0.383) (0.377)
Femalei,t 6.015*** 5.901** 6.790*** 6.047***
(2.248) (2.404) (2.096) (2.216)
Educationi,t 0.028 -0.054 0.268 0.131
(0.573) (0.610) (0.516) (0.558)
Incomei,t -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Unemploymenti,t 1.458 1.308 0.987 1.142
(1.335) (1.420) (1.471) (1.334)
Seniori,t 0.826 0.915 0.750 0.869
(0.942) (1.098) (0.886) (0.885)
Manufacturei,t -0.010 -0.001 -0.011 -0.013
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
Informationi,t 0.000 -0.032 -0.006 0.018
(0.148) (0.165) (0.160) (0.147)
Observations 807 807 807 807
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.745 0.748 0.760
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: Social Connectivity and Loan-level Approval
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following logit regression:
Approvali,k = βRSCIi + γX i,k + sk + qk + εi,k
where i indexes area and k indexes loan application. Only applications whose FICO score is equal to or
above 660 are included (nearly no applications with lower than 660 FICO were approved in history). Panel
A estimates the regression using the whole sample and Panel B estimates the regression for three separate
sub-samples sorted by FICO scores. Approvali,k is 1 for approved loans and 0 for rejected loans. RSCIi is
the relative social connectedness index for county i measuring its total connectivity with all other regions
of the country. X k is a vector containing a range of control variables, include loan characteristics, borrower
characteristics, local demographic, economic, and social characteristic variables. si indexes state fixed effects
and qk indexes application quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and shown





































Observations 4,097,888 4,097,363 4,097,363
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.433 0.433
State FE Yes Yes Yes




Low FICOs Medium FICOs High FICOs
RSCIi 0.358 0.787** 0.812***
(0.234) (0.316) (0.302)
ln(Amount)k -0.118*** -0.042*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
FICOk 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) 0.000
DTIk -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EmploymentLengthk 3.237*** 3.028*** 2.820***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Populationi,t -30.550*** -18.413*** -15.436**
(3.984) (6.569) (7.312)
Branchi,t -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Depositi,t 1.066*** 1.342*** 1.404***
(0.339) (0.234) (0.388)
HHIi,t -0.093 -0.164** -0.166*
(0.083) (0.069) (0.087)
Whitei,t 0.127** 0.033 0.116
(0.062) (0.081) (0.108)
Femalei,t 2.206 1.695 1.441
(1.480) (1.393) (1.583)
Educationi,t 1.076*** 0.736** 1.507***
(0.298) (0.330) (0.390)
Incomei,t 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemploymenti,t 0.759* 0.612 0.911*
(0.447) (0.495) (0.544)
Seniori,t 0.123 -0.116 0.135
(0.394) (0.435) (0.510)
Manufacturei,t -0.007** -0.008* -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Informationi,t 0.122*** 0.084** 0.105***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036)
Observations 1,372,849 1,360,508 1,363,991
Pseudo R2 0.471 0.434 0.407
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.7: Social Connectivity and Areal-level Loan Approval Rate: Tobit Regressions
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following Tobit regression:
ApprovalRatei,t = βRSCIi + γX i,k + sk + qk + εi,k
where i and t indexes region and quarter. ApprovalRatei,t is the number (or amount) of approved loans in
region i in quarter t divided by the total number (or amount) applications. X k is a vector containing a range
of control variables, include loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, local demographic, economic, and
social characteristic variables. si indexes state fixed effects and qk indexes application quarter fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSCIi 24.168*** 6.748*** 35.304*** 7.331**
(4.909) (2.495) (5.123) (2.996)
ln(Amount)i,t 0.830** 0.912** -5.755*** -5.664***
(0.389) (0.389) (0.400) (0.397)
FICOi,t 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DTIi,t 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EmploymentLengthi,t 6.657*** 6.662*** 8.251*** 8.257***
(0.086) (0.087) (0.112) (0.112)
Populationi,t 0.890*** 1.010*** 0.948*** 1.078***
(0.208) (0.224) (0.201) (0.217)
Branchi,t -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 26.099*** 25.364*** 28.303*** 27.505***
(6.032) (5.492) (7.123) (6.515)
HHIi,t -3.697*** -3.696*** -4.082*** -4.081***
(0.903) (0.838) (1.100) (1.019)
Whitei,t 1.515* 2.321*** 0.379 1.255
(0.810) (0.827) (0.730) (0.768)
Femalei,t -1.997 -2.060 -3.216 -3.279
(7.114) (7.339) (7.604) (7.812)
Educationi,t 2.781 1.613 4.793** 3.526*
(2.196) (2.120) (2.085) (2.076)
Incomei,t 0.215*** 0.208*** 0.247*** 0.240***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024)
Unemploymenti,t -2.283 -2.334 3.186 3.129
(4.647) (4.775) (4.912) (5.016)
Seniori,t -6.368 -4.787 -10.126** -8.409*
(4.002) (3.767) (4.668) (4.386)
Manufacturei,t -0.004 -0.002 -0.035 -0.032
(0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)
Informationi,t 0.422 0.456 0.501 0.538
(0.313) (0.326) (0.353) (0.367)
Observations 55,988 55,988 55,988 55,988 55,988 55,988
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.259 0.259 0.186 0.251 0.251
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.8: Social Connectivity and Areal-level Loan Approval Rate: Linear Regressions
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:
ApprovalRatei,t = βRSCIi + γX i,k + sk + qk + εi,k
where i and t indexes region and quarter. Observations with approval rates being 0% or 100%,
which constitute 5% of the sample size, are dropped out of the sample to allow linear regressions.
ApprovalRatei,t is the number (or amount) of approved applications in region i in quarter t divided
by the total number (or amount) of applications. X k is a vector containing a range of control
variables, include loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, local demographic, economic, and
social characteristic variables. si indexes state fixed effects and qk indexes application quarter
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSCIi 21.515*** 7.503*** 32.928*** 7.991**
(4.542) (2.570) (4.685) (3.053)
ln(Amount)i,t 1.094*** 1.191*** -6.274*** -6.171***
(0.377) (0.377) (0.376) (0.376)
FICOi,t 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DTIi,t 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EmploymentLengthi,t 6.543*** 6.549*** 8.233*** 8.239***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.103) (0.103)
Populationi,t 0.329* 0.461** 0.422** 0.562***
(0.173) (0.205) (0.160) (0.189)
Branchi,t -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 22.159*** 21.350*** 24.025*** 23.163***
(5.798) (5.213) (6.738) (6.088)
HHIi,t -2.484*** -2.486*** -2.850*** -2.852***
(0.823) (0.759) (0.972) (0.889)
Whitei,t 1.167 2.069*** 0.104 1.064
(0.734) (0.683) (0.651) (0.640)
Femalei,t -5.046 -5.053 -6.730 -6.737
(6.012) (6.313) (6.515) (6.794)
Educationi,t -0.021 -1.333 1.849 0.452
(2.000) (1.799) (1.767) (1.587)
Incomei,t 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.239*** 0.231***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.024)
Unemploymenti,t -7.441* -7.488* -0.994 -1.043
(4.132) (4.168) (4.597) (4.584)
Seniori,t -5.040 -3.300 -8.764** -6.911*
(3.504) (3.301) (4.152) (3.879)
Manufacturei,t -0.021 -0.019 -0.054 -0.052
(0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041)
Informationi,t 0.482 0.522 0.583* 0.626*
(0.300) (0.313) (0.338) (0.351)
Observations 53,285 53,285 53,285 53,285 53,285 53,285
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.908 0.908 0.818 0.898 0.898
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.9: Flu Epidemics as Exogenous Shocks to Social Connectivity
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following panel regression:
ApprovalRatei,t = β1RSCIi + β2FluImpacti,t + γXi,t + sk + θt + εi,t
where i and t denote area and time. ApprovalRatei,t is the loan approval rate (total origination count
or amount divided by total application count or amount) in area i and month t. Xi,t is a vector of loan,
borrower, demographic, economic, and social characteristics. sk indexes state fixed effects and θt indexes
application time fixed effects. FluImpact is the flu impact measure constructed in Equation (30) and
can be either FluImpactILIi,t or FluImpact
POS
i,t depending on the flu measure used. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Panel A ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount Count Amount
RSCIi 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.052*** 0.057***





ln(Amount)i,t -0.142 -3.770*** -0.112 -3.736***
(0.377) (0.447) (0.380) (0.449)
FICOi,t 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DTIi,t -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
EmploymentLengthi,t 5.526*** 6.875*** 5.556*** 6.905***
(0.115) (0.124) (0.115) (0.124)
Populationi,t 0.420* 0.411** 0.443* 0.435**
(0.225) (0.175) (0.230) (0.178)
Branchi,t -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 19.678*** 24.778*** 19.785*** 24.904***
(6.078) (6.345) (6.138) (6.373)
HHIi,t -2.565** -3.297*** -2.706** -3.441***
(1.033) (1.166) (1.034) (1.149)
Whitei,t 0.233 -0.748 0.751 -0.230
(1.012) (0.813) (1.019) (0.817)
Femalei,t -10.415 -8.129 -10.303 -8.000
(6.358) (6.956) (6.319) (6.998)
Educationi,t 0.845 2.353 0.169 1.673
(2.126) (1.849) (2.114) (1.795)
Incomei,t 0.246*** 0.252*** 0.244*** 0.251***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Unemploymenti,t -0.111 0.411 -1.301 -0.742
(5.835) (5.477) (5.906) (5.582)
Seniori,t -7.511** -11.466*** -6.849* -10.804***
(3.363) (3.719) (3.516) (3.904)
Manufacturei,t -0.043 -0.090** -0.043 -0.090**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
Informationi,t 0.875** 1.000*** 0.883** 1.009***
(0.344) (0.358) (0.342) (0.354)
Observations 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737
Adjusted R2 0.861 0.848 0.861 0.847
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount Count Amount Count Amount
RSCIi 0.037** 0.044** 0.036** 0.043** 0.023 0.029*







ln(Amount)i,t -0.084 -3.711*** -0.109 -3.735*** -0.065 -3.691***
(0.378) (0.448) (0.381) (0.450) (0.379) (0.450)
FICOi,t 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DTIi,t -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.053***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
EmploymentLengthi,t 5.561*** 6.910*** 5.560*** 6.909*** 5.567*** 6.916***
(0.115) (0.124) (0.115) (0.124) (0.115) (0.125)
Populationi,t 0.432* 0.423** 0.443* 0.435** 0.438* 0.430**
(0.227) (0.176) (0.229) (0.177) (0.228) (0.177)
Branchi,t -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 20.159*** 25.259*** 20.004*** 25.111*** 20.187*** 25.290***
(6.116) (6.395) (6.137) (6.362) (6.136) (6.386)
HHIi,t -2.714** -3.445*** -2.728** -3.461*** -2.742** -3.475***
(1.043) (1.174) (1.033) (1.143) (1.039) (1.157)
Whitei,t 0.452 -0.530 0.728 -0.252 0.614 -0.364
(1.012) (0.814) (1.013) (0.811) (1.022) (0.821)
Femalei,t -10.210 -7.927 -10.112 -7.820 -10.164 -7.870
(6.324) (6.935) (6.363) (7.022) (6.327) (6.963)
Educationi,t 0.436 1.946 0.217 1.721 0.177 1.682
(2.087) (1.803) (2.113) (1.788) (2.112) (1.804)
Incomei,t 0.245*** 0.251*** 0.245*** 0.251*** 0.247*** 0.253***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Unemploymenti,t -0.565 -0.047 -1.058 -0.521 -0.474 0.052
(5.838) (5.510) (5.861) (5.539) (5.845) (5.511)
Seniori,t -7.138** -11.094*** -6.946* -10.898*** -6.933* -10.886***
(3.420) (3.789) (3.549) (3.936) (3.466) (3.841)
Manufacturei,t -0.045 -0.091** -0.045 -0.091** -0.045 -0.091**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
Informationi,t 0.884** 1.009*** 0.894** 1.019*** 0.891** 1.017***
(0.347) (0.359) (0.341) (0.352) (0.345) (0.356)
Observations 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737
Pseudo R2 0.860 0.847 0.860 0.847 0.860 0.847
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.10: Flu Epidemics as Exogenous Shocks to Social Connectivity: Tobit Regressions
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following Tobit regression:
ApprovalRatei,t = β1RSCIi + β2FluImpacti,t + γXi,t + sk + θt + εi,t
where i and t denote area and time. ApprovalRatei,t is the loan approval rate (total origination count
or amount divided by total application count or amount) in area i and month t. Xi,t is a vector of
loan, borrower, demographic, economic, and social characteristics. FluImpact is the flu impact measure
constructed in Equation (30) and can be either FluImpactILIi,t or FluImpact
POS
i,t depending on the flu
measure used. sk indexes state fixed effects and t indexes application time fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Panel A ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount Count Amount
RSCIi 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.050*** 0.054***





ln(Amount)i,t 0.527 -4.046*** 0.564 -4.011***
(0.385) (0.490) (0.386) (0.490)
FICOi,t 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DTIi,t -0.010 -0.015 -0.010 -0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
EmploymentLengthi,t 6.053*** 7.524*** 6.086*** 7.558***
(0.130) (0.139) (0.128) (0.137)
Populationi,t 0.793*** 0.845*** 0.818*** 0.870***
(0.287) (0.256) (0.292) (0.259)
Branchi,t -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 26.195*** 32.053*** 26.296*** 32.170***
(6.310) (6.908) (6.352) (6.938)
HHIi,t -4.315*** -5.352*** -4.452*** -5.490***
(1.328) (1.460) (1.329) (1.450)
Whitei,t 0.326 -0.517 0.832 -0.012
(1.240) (1.114) (1.248) (1.123)
Femalei,t -3.385 -0.576 -3.285 -0.481
(8.207) (9.109) (8.161) (9.116)
Educationi,t 6.093** 8.005*** 5.431* 7.337***
(2.905) (2.588) (2.929) (2.577)
Incomei,t 0.242*** 0.256*** 0.241*** 0.255***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Unemploymenti,t 9.580 12.351 8.442 11.240
(8.141) (8.528) (8.202) (8.597)
Seniori,t -11.708*** -16.381*** -10.999** -15.674***
(4.398) (5.217) (4.559) (5.387)
Manufacturei,t 0.009 -0.033 0.009 -0.033
(0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.057)
Informationi,t 0.628 0.754* 0.638 0.765*
(0.398) (0.433) (0.398) (0.433)
Observations 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.208 0.214 0.207
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B ApprovalRatei,t
Count Amount Count Amount Count Amount
RSCIi 0.036** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.021* 0.027*







ln(Amount)i,t 0.592 -3.986*** 0.570 -4.008*** 0.613 -3.966***
(0.385) (0.476) (0.386) (0.477) (0.385) (0.477)
FICOi,t 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DTIi,t -0.011 -0.016* -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.016*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
EmploymentLengthi,t 6.090*** 7.561*** 6.090*** 7.562*** 6.097*** 7.569***
(0.128) (0.135) (0.127) (0.134) (0.128) (0.135)
Populationi,t 0.805*** 0.856*** 0.818*** 0.871*** 0.812*** 0.865***
(0.289) (0.257) (0.291) (0.259) (0.290) (0.258)
Branchi,t -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Depositi,t 26.679*** 32.557*** 26.524*** 32.384*** 26.707*** 32.589***
(6.353) (6.775) (6.363) (6.701) (6.352) (6.745)
HHIi,t -4.457*** -5.495*** -4.479*** -5.516*** -4.491*** -5.532***
(1.336) (1.453) (1.328) (1.424) (1.324) (1.432)
Whitei,t 0.512 -0.338 0.810 -0.032 0.677 -0.166
(1.250) (1.164) (1.244) (1.155) (1.256) (1.161)
Femalei,t -3.119 -0.318 -3.075 -0.283 -3.082 -0.277
(8.199) (9.115) (8.232) (9.182) (8.204) (9.138)
Educationi,t 5.740** 7.660*** 5.491* 7.398*** 5.472* 7.382***
(2.869) (2.519) (2.932) (2.555) (2.920) (2.556)
Incomei,t 0.241*** 0.255*** 0.241*** 0.255*** 0.243*** 0.257***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Unemploymenti,t 9.174 11.944 8.666 11.445 9.311 12.086
(8.112) (7.974) (8.143) (8.012) (8.164) (8.018)
Seniori,t -11.360** -16.044*** -11.096** -15.771*** -11.120** -15.795***
(4.440) (5.202) (4.595) (5.357) (4.498) (5.262)
Manufacturei,t 0.008 -0.034 0.008 -0.034 0.008 -0.034
(0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055)
Informationi,t 0.633 0.759* 0.648 0.775* 0.644 0.771*
(0.400) (0.432) (0.397) (0.429) (0.400) (0.432)
Observations 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737 67,737
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.207 0.214 0.207 0.214 0.207
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.11: Social Connectedness, Loan Rates, and Loan Grades
This table presents the regression results for the following equation:
InterestRatei,k = βRSCIi + γX i,k + sk + qk + εi,k
where i indexes county and k indexes loan. The unit of observation is an approved loan. InterestRatei,k
is the loan rate and is used as the dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2). In Column (3) and (4), the
dependent variable is replaced with LoanGradei,k, which is a loan grade indicator variable with value of
35 for Grade A1 and decrease its value by 1 for each of the 34 sub-grades below A1. RSCIi is the social
connectedness index for county i. X k is a vector containing a range of control variables, include loan
characteristics, borrower characteristics, local demographic, economic, and social characteristic variables.
Home ownership can be own, mortgage, or rent. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and shown
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
InterestRatei,k LoanGradei,k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RSCIi -3.613*** -0.792*** 5.020*** 1.180***





































Observations 1,535,725 1,535,201 1,535,725 1,535,201
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.398 0.019 0.411
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.12: Loan Performance and Social Connectedness
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following logit regression:
BadPerformancei,k = α+ β1RSCIi + γ1Inti,k + γ2X i,k + sk + qk + εi,k
where i indexes county and k indexes loan. BadPerformancei,k equals 1 if at least one of the following
statuses occurs on loan k within 24 months after loan origination: Late (16-30 days), Late (31-120 days),
Default, Charged Off, and 0 otherwise. Panel A estimates the regression using the whole sample and Panel
B estimates the regression for three separate sub-samples sorted by FICO score. RSCIi is the social
connectedness index for county i. X k is a vector containing a range of control variables, include loan
characteristics, borrower characteristics, local demographic, economic, and social characteristic variables. si
indexes state fixed effects and qk indexes application month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted











































Observations 1,535,723 1,535,199 1,535,199
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.069 0.069
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Home Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes




Low FICOs Medium FICOs High FICOs
RSCIi -0.649*** -0.816*** -1.020***
(0.202) (0.223) (0.351)
InterestRatek 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.133***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(Amount)k 0.234*** 0.161*** 0.162***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
FICOk -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003***
(0.001) 0.000 0.000
ln(Income)k -0.085*** -0.116*** -0.180***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
DTIk 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ShortTermk 0.205*** 0.167*** 0.085***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
EmploymentLengthk -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Populationi,t 3.322 1.782 12.123*
(3.311) (4.101) (7.070)
Branchi,t 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Depositi,t -0.641* -0.815** -1.139***
(0.346) (0.336) (0.326)
HHIi,t 0.115 0.030 0.101
(0.073) (0.079) (0.066)
Whitei,t -0.211*** -0.166** -0.116
(0.060) (0.072) (0.111)
Femalei,t -1.236 0.173 -0.964
(0.881) (0.792) (0.875)
Educationi,t 0.218 0.363 0.195
(0.181) (0.275) (0.242)
Incomei,t -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemploymenti,t 0.670 1.000 2.096***
(0.591) (0.774) (0.791)
Seniori,t -0.105 -0.068 -0.155
(0.157) (0.184) (0.185)
Manufacturei,t 0.012** 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Informationi,t -0.112** -0.130*** -0.105**
(0.049) (0.039) (0.047)
Observations 517,724 571,703 445,772
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.053 0.074
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Home Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition
Panel A: Systemic Risk Variables
∆CoV aR Micro-level systemic risk at 99% or 95% quantiles (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016).
CATFIN Macro-level systemic risk (Allen, Bali and Tang, 2012).
Panel B: Loan Characteristics
Share a bank’s allocation share in a package/facility in percentages
ln(Amount) Log of the package/facility size. Amount is in millions.
ln(Maturity) Log of the maturity of the package/facility in months. Package maturity is the weighted
average of the facility maturities.
ln(Number of Leads) Log of the number of lead lenders in the deal syndicate.
ln(No. of Participants) Log of the number of participating lenders in the facility syndicate.
Secured An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the facility is secured, and 0 otherwise.
Panel C: Bank Characteristics
ln(Total Assets) Log of total assets (bhck2170, in 2000 $).
Capital Ratio Total equity (bhck3210) over total assets (%).
Return on Equity Lenders return on book equity (bhck4340/bhck3210).
Liquidity The sum of cash (bhck0010) and available-for-sale securities (bhck1773) divided by bank
total assets.
Loan Charge-offs The total charge-offs on loans and leases (bhck4635) divided by bank total assets.
Loan Loss Allowance The total allowance for loan and lease losses (bhck3123) divided by bank total assets.
Risk-Weighted Assets The total risk weighted assets (bhcka223) divided by bank total assets.
Trading Assets The total trading assets (bhck3545) over total assets.
Intangible Assets The sum of goodwill and other intangible assets over total assets.
Before 1999: (bhck3163+bhck3164+bhck5506+bhck5507)/bhck2170
After 1999 and before 2001: (bhck3163+bhck3164+bhckb026+bhck5507)/bhck2170
After 2001: (bhck3163+bhck0426)/bhck2170
Non-interest income Non-interest income (bhck4079) over the sum of interest income (bhck4107) and non-interest
income (bhck4079) (%).
Loans Total loans (bhck2122) over total assets (%).
MBS Before 2009: Private-label mortgage backed securities (bhck1709 + bhck1733 + bhck1713 +
bhck1736 + bhck3536) over total assets (%).
After 2009: Private-label mortgage backed securities (bhckg308 + bhckk146 + bhckg320 +
bhckk154 + bhckg311 + bhckk149 + bhckg323 + bhckk157 + bhckg381 + bhkk198) over
total assets (%).
Derivatives Gross notional amount of derivative contracts held for trading (log of 1 + gross notional
amounts on contracts on interest rate (bhcka126), foreign exchange (bhcka127), equity deriva-
tives (bhck8723), and others (bhck8724)) over total assets (%).
Lending diversification 1-Herfindahl index of the shares of real estate (bhck1410), commercial and industrial
(bhck1763 + bhck1764), consumer (bhck1975) and other loans out of total loans.
Liquidity Gap Liabilities repricing or maturing within 12 months (bhck3197) minus assets repricing or
maturing within 12 months (bhck3296 + bhck3298) divided by total asset (%).
Loans/Deposits Total loans over total deposits (bhdm6631 + bhdm6636 + bhfn6631 + bhfn6636) (%).
Non-deposit funding 1 - (deposits over total liabilities (bhck2948)) (%).
Market to book Log of the ratio of the market to book value of equity.
Core deposits 1 - (total time deposits of $100,000 or more (bhcb2604) over total deposits (%).
Productivity Total assets over full-time employees (bhck4150) ($ millions).
Panel D: Borrower Characteristics
Distance-to-default The expected distance-to-default of the borrowers following Bharath and Shumway (2004),
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Drucker and Puri (2009).
Borrower Total Assets Borrower book assets.
Borrower Leverage The ratio of the book value of total long- and short-term debt to the book value of total
assets.
Borrower Tangibility The ratio of net plant, property, and equipment (NPPE) to total assets.
Lending Relationship Following Bharath el al. (2007), the lending relationship between borrower i and bank j in
year t is defined as:
LendingRelationship(i, j, t) = ( Amount of loans to borrower i by bank j in last 5
years)/(Total amountofloansbyborroweriinlast5years)
Panel E: Compensation Incentives
Vega Log ($ value of pay-risk sensitivity / cash compensation)
Delta Log ($ value of the pay-performance sensitivity / cash compensation)
Bonus Log (1 + the $ value of cash bonuses)
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Panel F: Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Quarterly GDP per capita growth rate. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Recession An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the quarter right before loan origination is
a recession period. Source: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Coincident 12-month average of the monthly coincident index at the state level.
Three-month Yield Change The change in the three-month Treasury bill rate. Source: The Federal Reserve Board’s H.15
release
Term Spread Change The change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the spread between the composite
long-term bond yield and the three-month bill rate. Source: The Federal Reserve Board’s
H.15 release.
TED Spread The difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month secondary market
Treasury bill rate.
Credit spread Change The change in the credit spread between Moody’s Baa-rated bonds and the ten-year Treasury
rate. Source: The Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release
Market Return The weekly market return computed from the S&P500.
Real Estate Excess Return The weekly real estate sector return in excess of the market financial sector return (from the
real estate companies with SIC code 65-66).
Equity Volatility The 22-day rolling standard deviation of the daily CRSP equity market return. Measured
weekly.
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Appendix B. Derivation of Systemic Risk Measure
All variables are summarized in Appendix A. I measure bank systemic risk using a widely used
systemic risk measure, ∆CoV aR, proposed by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016). The ∆CoV aR of a
bank is defined as the difference between the VaR of the financial system conditional on the bank
being in financial distress and the VaR of the financial system conditional on the bank being in
its normal state. The method to compute ∆CoV aR is as follows. First, I estimate the following
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where Xjt denotes the weekly stock return of bank j in week t, X
(
t system|j) denotes the financial
sector return in week t, and Mt−1 denotes a vector of seven systematic state variables in week t,
including three-month yield change, term spread change, TED spread, credit spread change, market
return, real estate excess return, and equity volatility. Using the coefficient estimations from the
quantile regressions, I obtain predicted values for both median regression and quantile regression:














where q is 50 for median regression estimation and 99 (or 95) for quantile estimations. Then I
compute the ∆CoV aRjq,t for each bank j:
∆CoV aRjq,t = CoV aR
j
q,t − CoV aR
j
50,t = β̂
system|j(V aRjq,t − V aR
j
50,t). (40)
This creates a panel of weekly ∆CoV aRjq,t. A quarterly time series of ∆CoV aR
j
q,t is obtained
by averaging the weekly risk measures within each quarter. For simplicity, I let q equals 99%, in
this chapter.
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Appendix C. Identifying Manager and Firm Fixed Ef-
fects Using a Connectedness Sample
Consider the following three-way fixed effects regression:
Pm(j,t) = Mm(j,t)β +Bj,tδ + Etη + Σ
j
j=1Dm(j,t)φj + µt + θm + εm(j,t), (41)
where m denotes manager, j denotes bank, and t denotes time. Dm(j,t) is equal to 1 if manager
m works for bank j at time t. First, I take a time-series average for each manager m:
P̄m = M̄mδ + Ēmη + Σ
J
j=1D̄m(j)φj + µ̄t + θm + ε̄m. (42)
Then I remove manager fixed effects by subtracting Equation (42) from Equation (41):
Pm(j,t) − P̄m =(Mm(j,t) − M̄m)β + (Bj(m,t) − B̄m)δ + (Et − Ēm)η
+ Σjj=1(Dm(j,t) − D̄m(j))φj + (µt − µ̄t) + (εm(j,t) − ε̄m)
(43)
By estimating Equation (43) I can identify β̂, δ̂, and η̂. Since Dm(j,t) − D̄m(j) 6= 0 only for a
mover, I can identify bank fixed effects φ̂j for banks that employed movers. µ̄t is treated as the
benchmark in estimating time fixed effects and assumed to be 0. Finally, using these estimates I
can calculate the manager fixed effects through the following equation:
θ̂m = P̄m − M̄mβ̂ − B̄mδ̂ − Ēmη̂ − Σjj=1D̄m(j)φ̂j . (44)
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Appendix D. Estimation of Borrower Distance-to-Default
Monthly borrower distance to default is calculated via the Merton credit risk model as follows:
DDt =





where VA,t denotes the market value of assets, Xt denotes the book value of total liabilities (cal-
culated as debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 45) plus one half of long-term debt
(COMPUSTAT data item 51)), rt denotes risk-free rate of return (the 1-Year Treasury Constant
Maturity Rate obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), σA,t denotes
the annualized asset return volatility in month t, and T is the time to maturity (conventionally set
to 1 year). Calculating DDt requires estimating VA,t and σA,t, which I infer through an iteration
process based on Black-Scholes-Merton model. Specifically, the market value of equity VE,t, cal-
culated from the CRSP database as the product of share price at the end of the month and the
number of shares outstanding) can be modeled as a call option on VA,t:





where σE,t is the annualized equity return volatility (standard deviation of returns in month t).
d1,t and d2,t are expressed as:
d1,t =





d2,t = d1,t − σA,t
√
T (49)
Equation (47) is the optimal hedge equation that relates σE,t to σA,t. I employ
σE,tVE,t
VE,t +Xt
as the starting value for σA,t. I then identify VA,t and σA,t using a Newton’s iteration algorithm
and employ them to compute DDt in Equation (45). There are a number of extreme values
among the observations of each variable constructed from raw COMPUSTAT data. To ensure that
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